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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The inability to gather, analyze and share various aspects of an attack has made it 
difficult to effectively counter real-world information system attacks. The lack of a 
formally defined vocabulary which can express an “attacker‟s-perspective” makes 
collaboration of academic research difficult. These problems lead to significant confusion 
by security managers and decision makers who are constantly bombarded by the media and 
security vendors attempting to describe or prevent the latest attack (Hoglund & McGraw, 
2004). 
 The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration Classification (CAPEC) Release 1 
Dictionary defines attack patterns as a formalized representation of a computer attacker‟s 
tools, methodologies, and perspective (capec.mitre.org, 2007). CAPEC provides a formal 
definition of each attack by providing descriptive textual fields. These fields, defined as 
elements, provide explicit details for each identified attack pattern. The current CAPEC 
release includes a list of 101 specific information system attacks. Each attack pattern may 
include up to 30 elements to describe attack details.  
 While CAPEC has addressed the need to create a standard for representing and 
defining attacks from an attacker‟s perspective, issues pertaining to usability and 
consistency exist. The goal of this research is to further refine and extend the CAPEC 
framework in order to provide usability and consistency. Issues of usability arise when 
CAPEC adopters attempt to leverage the Release 1 dictionary because of the sheer amount 
of information presented (Engebretson, Pauli, & Streff, 2008). Furthermore, while the 
vii 
 
details of each attack pattern are extremely valuable, CAPEC does not provide a consistent 
level of documentation for each element among the 101 attack patterns.  
 Our approach includes three distinct processes to take the vast repository of CAPEC 
information and create a usable and consistent model for leveraging attack pattern details in 
system security configurations.  
 Process one creates a framework for general parent mitigations for each attack 
pattern. Parent mitigations are abstracted directly from the “solutions and mitigation” 
element in CAPEC and adds the appropriate National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) based Parent Mitigation element (Engebretson et al., 2008). These 
solutions and mitigations improve the resistance of the target software and reduce the 
likelihood of the attack‟s success. They also improve the resilience of the target software 
and reduce the impact of the attack if it is successful. 
 Process two re-includes a Parent level Threat as an attack pattern element. The 
Parent Threat element places all 101 of the attack patterns into context without having to 
manually interact with both the full Release 1 dictionary and the CAPEC Classification 
Tree, thus ridding our approach of this manual research. We also use the Parent Threat 
element to provide structure in our hierarchy-based graphical models. Textual attack 
descriptions for viewing attack patterns are created to provide additional details about each 
attack pattern in a consistent manner. 
 Process three creates two security metrics, Knock-Out Effect (KOE) and Parent 
Mitigation Power (PMP), to provide usability to CAPEC. The addition of security metrics 
to our approach allows adopters to quickly and accurately leverage the vast amount of 
viii 
 
information provided by the CAPEC standard from both the individual attack pattern and 
parent mitigation perspectives. 
 The result of this dissertation is an approach for increasing the usability and 
consistency of the CAPEC standard. The use of a taxonomy for cataloging and organizing 
attacks can increase awareness and communication about attacks as well as provide a 
framework for collecting consistent data about each attack (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). 
  Process one abstracts nearly 400 unique mitigation strategies into one of 17 
commonly accepted, Parent Mitigations. Process two re-includes the “Parent Threat” 
element into the dictionary to provide consistency and context to each attack pattern. The 
creation of graphical hierarchies and textual attack descriptions are used to provide CAPEC 
with visual and textual representations for each attack without becoming overwhelming to 
the user. The introduction of a defined hierarchy between descriptive elements assists with 
learning and processing attack patterns. The significance of this process is a much clearer 
and less convoluted picture of the attack, resulting in a more usable and appropriate 
element set.  
 Process three creates security metrics derived from defined mitigation strategies, 
which creates a measurable numeric value which can allow security personnel to make 
more informed security decisions, play "what-if" security scenarios, and quickly analyze 
the cost-benefit for mitigation strategies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
In the United States and around the globe, information systems make up a critical 
component of communication, commerce, and control of the physical infrastructure 
(Benioff & Lazowska, 2005). Along with data, infrastructure components include 
networks, computers, routers, domain servers, switches, and transmission lines (Bishop, 
2003). Taken together, these systems allow for the exchange and flow of information. 
These connections can be tied directly to one another through dedicated paths or indirectly 
through the ubiquity of interlaced, non-centralized networks. Unbounded networks, such as 
the Internet, represent a growing collection of interconnected systems, devices and 
organizations (Ellison et al., 1999). Because of their distributed nature and lack of central 
control, unbounded networks increase both risk and exposure to abuse. It is not possible for 
any system connected to an unbounded network to be completely immune from attack 
(Ellison et al., 1997). The digital infrastructure of unbound networks provides new areas 
and avenues for malicious exploitation leaving governments, corporations, and private 
citizens vulnerable to such attacks. The protection and securing of this infrastructure is 
vital, as their destruction would have an immediate impact on the economy, livelihood, and 
psychology of the nation (Chakrabarti & Manimaran, 2002; Lewis, 2006). 
The US Department of Homeland Security defines critical infrastructure into 11 
sectors (Lewis, 2006). 
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1. Agriculture 
2. Water 
3. Public Health 
4. Emergency Services 
5. Defense Industrial Base 
6. Telecommunications 
7. Energy 
8. Transportation 
9. Banking and Finance 
10. Chemical and Hazardous Materials 
11. Postal and Shipping 
 
Each of the 11 critical infrastructures relies heavily on the use of information 
technology and interconnected systems through the use of unbounded networks (Ellison et 
al., ; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001).  
Integrating security throughout the entire organization has long been understood as being 
very important (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004).  
A wide variety of standards and technologies have emerged to address the rise of 
security risks. Generally, these standards and technologies are grouped into one of four 
categories, which include: 1) standards and policies, 2) library and tools, 3) administrative 
and system management, and 4) physical tools (Wang & Wang, 2003). Standards and 
policies are a series of best practices that work to alleviate specific security issues. 
Libraries and tools are integrated directly into the software development process and have 
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the ability to provide protection from the planning phase. Administrative and management 
technologies include any tool that a system administrator would use to guard against 
security attacks. Physical tools include physical and external hardware designed for the 
specific purpose of security protection (Wang & Wang, 2003). Most security managers 
attempt to provide system security by using a combination of these standards and 
technologies. Unfortunately, these standards and technologies alone are not enough to fully 
prevent all attacks from executing and causing harm to the software system. 
The loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems due to 
security problems such as Trojan horses, backdoors, denial of services, viruses, worms, 
misuse, buffer overflows, and configuration errors continues to rise. Even though these 
attacks have been studied, the appropriate mitigation strategies and solutions are not well 
understood.  
Each year, the number, severity and sophistication of computer, network, and 
software security attacks continues to increase at an alarming rate (Hansman & Hunt, 
2005). The ability to organize, comprehend and disseminate these attacks is a critical 
component in defending against them. System administrators, managers, and security 
experts must be able to understand the individual characteristics of each attack as well as 
how the attacks relate to one another (Jajodia, 2007). As the complexity of systems, 
networks and software continues to grow, the ability to keep track of attack specific details 
and relationships becomes increasingly difficult.  
The process of learning, dissecting and understanding computer, network, and 
software security attacks requires an extra ordinary amount of effort. The need for a 
standard which addresses multiple audiences is important as security depends on people in 
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many different capacities, such as requirement specifiers, designers, coders, users, 
maintenance personnel, managers, and administrators (Neumann, 2004). The use of a 
formal language and defined structure provides a modular approach which eases the 
inclusion and discovery of new attacks as well as giving users an increased ability to 
predict new attacks (DeLooze, 2004).  
In March of 2007, the National Cyber Security Division of the Department of 
Homeland Security in conjunction with Cigital and MITRE Corporation released an 
official dictionary of 101 attack patterns. The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification (CAPEC) Release 1 Dictionary provides an official schema and formal 
representation for defining attack patterns (Barnum & Amit, 2006a; capec.mitre.org, 2007). 
CAPEC further organizes attack patterns by gathering and displaying both primary and 
supporting data elements for each identified attack (Sean Barnum, 2007) .  
 
1.2. Problem Definition  
 The inability to gather, analyze and share various aspects of an attack has made it 
difficult to effectively counter real-world information system attacks. The lack of a 
formally defined vocabulary which can express an “attacker‟s-perspective” makes 
collaboration of research difficult. Simultaneously, this problem leads to significant 
confusion by security managers and decision makers who are constantly bombarded by the 
media and security vendors attempting to describe or prevent the latest attack (Hoglund & 
McGraw, 2004). 
  A taxonomy is needed in order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of 
information system attacks (Chakrabarti & Manimaran, 2002). While a wide variety of 
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network, computer and software security attack classifications have been suggested, very 
few have attempted to address more than one specific audience (Lindqvist & Jonsson, 
1997). CAPEC provides a useful framework for classifying attacks, but each of the 101 
attack patterns provides approximately 30 descriptive fields, thus making it difficult to 
implement. (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).  
While CAPEC has addressed the need to create an industry standard for 
representing attacks from an attacker‟s perspective, several issues pertaining to usability 
and consistency remain as introduced below.  
1. CAPEC’s Release 1 Dictionary is inconsistent level of information for 
“Solutions and Mitigation” element. CAPEC includes nearly 400 individually 
prescribed controls in the “Solutions and Mitigations” element. These controls can 
be used to mitigate or reduce the effects of the defined 101 attack patterns. The 
current level of detail documented in the “Solutions and Mitigations” element is 
inconsistent. Some attack patterns provide an extremely granular level of detail. For 
example, one of the prescribed mitigations for attack pattern 42 (MIME 
Conversion) calls for disabling “the 7 to 8 bit conversion by removing the F=9 flag 
from all Mailer specifications in the sendmail.cf file.” (capec.mitre.org, 2007). This 
level of detail may lead CAPEC adopters to believe that they need not be concerned 
with MIME Conversion attacks if they implement a Microsoft Exchange server 
rather than a Sendmail-based email server. Such a mistake could lead to an 
increased attack exposure and a false sense of security. The reverse is also true; 
some attack patterns provide only a high level overview of potential mitigation 
strategies. Attack pattern 9 (Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities) 
6 
 
 
includes the “Do not unnecessarily expose services” mitigation (capec.mitre.org, 
2007). This is too vague and undefined to be of use. The Solutions and Mitigations 
is also inconsistent in its specificity of mitigation.  As demonstrated in the example 
above some solutions are presented at the architectural level while others are 
presented at the system or product level.   
 
2. CAPEC’s Release 1 Dictionary is inconsistent use of elements to describe 
attack patterns. In many cases attack pattern elements are missing completely. 
CAPEC‟s disjointed structure leads to confusion and frustration when attempting to 
make use of the current CAPEC Dictionary (Engebretson et al., 2008). The 
inconsistent use of elements makes it problematic to discern the relationship, if any, 
between the descriptive fields. The lack of a defined and consistent structure makes 
it difficult for new adopters to fully understand the context of each attack. This 
problem is exacerbated when descriptive elements are missing. The current 
inconsistent use of elements and presentation of information represents a significant 
challenge to increased adoption of CAPEC (Engebretson et al., 2008; J Pauli & 
Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).  
 
3. The volume of information presented to users is overwhelming. CAPEC defines 
101 unique attack patterns.  Each attack pattern can make use of up to 28 elements 
to describe attack details.  Given the number of attacks and volume of information 
presented about each attack, deep understanding of the CAPEC library is difficult 
(Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a). This issue is further complicated by the inability to 
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quickly and accurately discern related attack patterns. Ideally, a user interested in 
CAPEC attack patterns should be able to quickly and accurately identify the threat 
family that the particular attack pattern belongs to. The lack of a formally defined 
“Parent Threat” element results in a disjointed presentation. The parent threat data 
is currently available via the CAPEC website, but it is not part of the 101 formal 
attack pattern definitions. This structure leads to confusion and frustration when 
attempting to make use of the current CAPEC Dictionary (Engebretson & Pauli, 
2008). 
 
4. CAPEC R1 does not include associated metrics to measure the effectiveness of 
chosen mitigation strategies. The CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary does not include 
any metrics which can be used to measure the effectiveness of prescribed mitigation 
strategies. Metrics are a critical component in aiding security related decisions. The 
lack of a defined metric remains a significant hurdle to the widespread adoption of 
CAPEC outside of academia. The creation of a metric would provide value for 
many potential CAPEC adopters including software designers, administrators, 
managers and researchers (Engebretson & Pauli, 2008).   
 
1.3. Objectives and Approach  
Our objective is to develop and demonstrate an approach that meets the needs of the 
problem definition. 
1. Create a Parent Mitigation element for inclusion into the CAPEC standard to 
provide consistency to the currently given child mitigations. This objective will 
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simultaneously create a manageable and serviceable list of accepted mitigation 
strategies. 
2. Creation of an enhanced CAPEC view to augment the existing CAPEC standard by 
re-include the Parent Threat element into the view to provide logical grouping of 
the 101 Attack Patterns at the Parent Threat level.  
3. Further refine the enhanced CAPEC view by trimming the element set. Only 
descriptive elements which have an entry in each of the 101 attack patterns will be 
considered for inclusion into the view.  This will provide a consistent framework 
for viewing the details of each attack pattern. 
4. Create a graphical representation and textual description of each attack pattern for 
purpose of viewing information in a condensed and meaningful way. This will 
provide contextual information for each attack.  
5. Create security metrics from the CAPEC standard which can be used to make 
security related decisions. These metrics provide a numeric value to help make 
security decisions for different situations that include specific threats. 
 
Our objectives are accomplished through the creation of an approach that includes 
three processes which provide a level of consistency and standardization to the CAPEC 
library that it had previously lacked. Our models specify which information needs to be 
documented for each attack and how that information is documented. We also provide 
context through the use of standardized threats and mitigations. These threats and 
mitigations frame each attack and provide relationship data between each attack element. 
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Our approach is best understood when broken down into three distinct processes which 
provide a level of consistency to make the CAPEC library more useable for multiple 
audiences including requirement specifiers, designers, coders, users, maintenance 
personnel, managers, and administrators. A breakdown of our approach is introduced in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. High-Level Overview of Our Approach with Problem Addressed. 
 
Process one creates a framework for introducing a series of general Parent 
Mitigations for each attack pattern. Attack patterns can be defined as a formalized 
representation of an attacker‟s perspective including specific and clear terminology 
(Barnum, 2008). Parent mitigations are abstracted directly from the “solutions and 
mitigation” element currently defined in the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. CAPEC 
provides the following definition for the “Solutions and Mitigations” element: “the actions 
or approaches that can potentially prevent or mitigate the risk of this type of attack. These 
solutions and mitigations are targeted to improve the resistance of the target software and 
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thereby reduce the likelihood of the attack‟s success or to improve the resilience of the 
target software and thereby reduce the impact of the attack if it is successful” (Barnum, 
2008). 
This element is a required field in order to make the standard effective for 
mitigating attacks (Engebretson et al., 2008). Ideally, a user concerned with a given attack 
pattern must be able to review the CAPEC standard for the particular attack and formulate 
a plan for reducing exposure to the attack. However, as previously highlighted some attack 
patterns provide details that are too granular while others provide information that are too 
vague. The objective of this process is to leverage this vast repository of attack pattern 
information and add an addition layer of information thus providing a uniform standard for 
mitigation strategies for each attack pattern.  
Process one adds the appropriate NIST-based Parent Mitigation element. In the first 
step, mitigations are listed individually from the CAPEC “Solutions and Mitigation” 
element to create a list. Each mitigation is then matched up to a corresponding NIST Child 
Element from the NIST 800-53r2 control list (NIST, 2007). The final step in Process 1 is to 
abstract the NIST Child level control to its corresponding Parent level control. The Parent 
level control is then documented as a new mitigation element. This process is repeated for 
each control listed under the current CAPEC “Solutions and Mitigation” element.  
Just as adding a level of consistency to the mitigation element is an important step 
in increasing usability, another benefit of this process is the creation of a unifying Parent 
Threat element (Engebretson et al., 2008). While this information is available via the 
CAPEC website, it is currently separated from the formal attack pattern definitions 
(capec.mitre.org, 2007). Process 2 re-includes a Parent level threat as an attack pattern 
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element. The goal of adding the Parent Threat element to the formal definition set is to 
assist in placing all 101 of the attack patterns into context without having to manually 
interact with both the full Release 1 dictionary and the CAPEC Classification Tree. Adding 
Parent Threat as a formal element increases usability by simplifying the process of 
identifying threat families. We also use the Parent Threat element to provide structure and 
introduce the top node in our hierarchy-based model for viewing attack patterns. The 
purpose of this hierarchy is to logically group each attack pattern with related attack 
patterns from the same Parent Threat.  
An illustration of this point can be seen by examining attack pattern 101, “Server 
Side Includes”. The CAPEC website provides the following elements to describe Attack 
Pattern 101: Attack Pattern ID, Typical Severity, Description, Attack Pattern Prerequisites, 
Typical Likelihood of Exploit, Methods of Attack, Examples-Instances, Attacker Skill or 
Knowledge Required, Resources Required, Probing Techniques, Solutions and Mitigations, 
Attack Motivation Consequences, Context Description, Injection Vector, Payload, 
Activation Zone, Payload Activation Impact, Related Weaknesses, Related Security 
Principles, Related Guidelines, Purpose, CIA Impact, Technical Context, and Source. 
In order to determine the general threat classification, a CAPEC user is forced to 
navigate away from the “Full CAPEC Dictionary” on the CAPEC web site and search the 
“CAPEC Classification Tree”. The user must then wade through three levels of detail to 
uncover “Server Side Includes” (attack pattern 101) as a member of the “Injection” threat 
family. 
Our hierarchy structure also increases usability by documenting relationships 
between the descriptive elements. In order to facilitate learning and foster a deeper 
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understanding of attack patterns, our model reduces the number of descriptive elements 
displayed. Using a smaller number of elements presents adopters with a more manageable 
and usable dataset. Trimming the current CAPEC dataset and presenting the elements in a 
hierarchical fashion was a technique previously used to introduce students to the concept of 
attack patterns without overwhelming the audience (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a). The 
trimmed element set provides usability, consistency, structure, and logical organization to 
the model. The top of this model will include the 11 Parent Threats and be tied together at 
the bottom of the hierarchy by 17 Parent Mitigations which were introduced in Process 1. 
An example of this model is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Trimmed Hierarchical Model for Viewing Attack Patterns. 
 
The hierarchy can be traversed in either direction.  Each attack pattern is framed by 
the use of Parent Threats at the top of the hierarchy and Parent Mitigations at the bottm. 
These elements serve to provide natural grouping and context. Process 3 creates two 
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security metrics as part of each hierarchy and textual attack description. Our first metric, 
Knock-Out Effect (KOE), is the total number of Parent Mitigations abstracted in Process 1 
for each attack pattern. KOE provides a metric for quickly determining the number of 
Parent Mitigations needed to fully mitigate an individual attack pattern. This metric 
remains the same for each attack pattern no matter what the system configuration is. 
Our second metric, Parent Mitigation Power (PMP), is calculated at the conclusion 
of Process 3. PMP is a numeric summary expressing two types of mitigation in a “X.Y” 
format, where: 
 X = Number of unique attacks that the parent mitigation helped to mitigate. 
 Y = Total number of child mitigations that can be traced back to the parent 
mitigation. 
 
  It is important to note the goal of our approach is not to challenge or advocate 
replacement of the current CAPEC standard. Original element details will always be 
readily available in addition to the hierarchy and textual attack descriptions that our 
approach creates. 
Our approach will make use of the design science research methodology.  
Specifically use the seminal work which formalized these concepts for the IS world to 
ensure that our methodology is appropriately applied (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004).  
Design science was chosen because of its natural fit with our approach.  The goal of design 
science is to extend human and organizational capabilities through the creation of artifacts 
and models.  Our artifact is a model which combines two federally funded standards, NIST 
and CAPEC, into a singular consistent framework.   
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Our work can be evaluated by examining each of the seven guidelines prescribed by 
Hevner et al., (2004).   
 
 Guideline 1:  Design as an Artifact 
o Requirement: “Design-science must produce a viable artifact in the form of 
a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation.” (Hevner et al., 2004) 
o How our work meets Guideline 1:  Our work provides an innovative 
solution, in the form of a model, which solves a previously identified and 
unsolved problem.    
 Guideline 2:  Problem Relevance 
o Requirement: “The objective of design-science research is to develop 
technology based solutions to important and relevant business problems” 
(Hevner et al., 2004) 
o How our work meets Guideline 2: Our work is based on problems which 
have been identified, discussed, and accepted into the knowledgebase.  
Specifically, CAPEC is too large and inconsistent to be useful outside of a 
theoretical context. (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).  
 Guideline 3: Design Evaluation 
o Requirement: “The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact must be 
rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods.” (Hevner et 
al., 2004) 
o How our work meets Guideline 3: Our work can be viewed as functional, 
complete, and consistent.  Furthermore our work was completed in an 
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iterative sequence which allowed several cycles of incremental activity and 
evaluation while the model was being developed. Our model solves each of 
the identified problem statements. We make use of informed argument, 
experimental and analytical validation techniques.  We provide details of the 
validation techniques in the Discussion section of each chapter. We provide 
further validation through the execution and simulation of our model by use 
of a case study comprised of 11 attack patterns.   
 Guideline 4: Research Contributions 
o Requirement: “Effective design-science research must provide clear and 
verifiable contributions in the areas of the design artifact, design 
foundations, and/or design methodologies.” (Hevner et al., 2004) 
o How our work meets Guideline 4: Our approach provides new and 
interesting contributions by providing an artifact which solves a heretofore 
unsolved problem.  Our contribution is a model.  This design artifact applies 
existing knowledge in new and innovative ways.   
 Guideline 5: Research Rigor 
o Requirement: “Design-science research relies upon the application of 
rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the design 
artifact.” (Hevner et al., 2004) 
o How our work meets Guideline 5: “The artifact itself must be rigorously 
defined, formally represented, coherent, and internally consistent” (Hevner 
et al., 2004).  Our work clearly follows this guideline through the creation of 
a defined, represented, consistent model which is presented in Figure 1. We 
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provide further rigor through application of the knowledgebase.  Both 
CAPEC and NIST are well established, highly respected standards.  Our 
work relies on the use and application of these bodies to provide rigor.  
 Guideline 6: Design as a Search Process 
o Requirement: “The search for an effective artifact requires utilizing 
available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem 
environment.” (Hevner et al., 2004) 
o How our work meets Guideline 6: Our artifact was created through an 
iterative process.  Our development cycle consisted of construction, 
feedback, and incorporation of feedback into a new model.  This process 
was repeated over a half a dozen times. 
 Guideline 7: Communication of Research 
o Requirement: “Design-science research must be presented effectively both 
to technology-oriented as well as management-oriented audiences.” (Hevner 
et al., 2004)  
o How our work meets Guideline 7: This dissertation and the subsequent 
academic publications serve to provide communication to technical 
audiences.  Our approach as provided in this dissertation is well documented 
and can be used to establish repeatability for further research.  The scenarios 
provided in each chapter, future grant applications, and whitepapers will 
provide communication to business oriented audiences. Research 
communication is also being achieved by incorporating the research results 
into teaching. 
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1.4. Results and Significance  
  The result of this dissertation is an approach for increasing the usability and 
consistency of the CAPEC standard. The use of a taxonomy for cataloging and organizing 
attacks can increase awareness and communication about attacks as well as provide a 
framework for collecting consistent data about each attack (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). 
While the current CAPEC standard provides a significant amount of information, there are 
tremendous variations in the depth and breadth of the “Mitigations and Solutions” currently 
outlined for each attack pattern. The result of our approach is the abstraction of nearly 400 
unique mitigation strategies into one of 17 commonly accepted and federally standardized 
Parent Mitigations.  
The introduction of a “Parent Mitigation” element into the dictionary provides 
consistency to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. Because the current “Mitigation and 
Solutions” element provides valuable information, we are not advocating its removal. One 
intention of our approach is to add the “Parent Mitigation” element to provide a more 
manageable number of mitigations. This is a valuable step to the increased adoption and 
wide spread acceptance of the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. 
The re-inclusion of a “Parent Threat” element into the dictionary provides 
consistency and context to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. We present a new model for 
presenting CAPEC attack patterns by refining nearly 30 descriptive elements to provide a 
standardized set of useable and consistent elements. The creation of a graphical hierarchy 
provides CAPEC with a new visual representation for each attack without becoming 
overwhelming to the user. The introduction of a defined hierarchy between descriptive 
elements assists with learning and processing attack patterns. The significance of this 
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process is a much clearer and less convoluted picture of the attack, resulting in a more 
usable element set.  
The creation of security metrics derived from defined mitigation strategies increases 
the usability of CAPEC for several audiences. This process creates measurable numeric 
values which can allow security personnel to make more informed security decisions and 
play "what-if" scenarios.  
A deep understanding of attack patterns can lead to the permeation of security 
throughout an organization, as well as heighten awareness of known exploits, 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Gegick & Williams, 2005). Integrating attack pattern 
knowledge into managerial level IT security decisions can result in a higher level of 
security by creating less exposure to identified bugs and known flaws (Hoglund & 
McGraw, 2004). Attack patterns can be used by developers, administrators and managers 
to provide a deeper understanding of security (S. Barnum, 2007). 
 
1.5. Outline 
 The study is structured where Chapter 2 covers related work. Chapter 3 covers 
Process 1 of our approach for abstracting Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC attack 
pattern dictionary. Chapter 4 covers Process 2 of our approach of formally re-including the 
Parent Threat element into the attack dictionary. Chapter 4 also covers the new models 
created for viewing and using CAPEC attack patterns. This process includes trimming the 
element set, defining a hierarchy, and creating a graphical representation and textual attack 
description for each attack. Chapter 5 covers the creation, explanation, and use of our 
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Knock-Out Effect and Parent Mitigation Power security metrics. This is Process 3 of our 
approach. Chapter 6 is the Conclusions reached from this study. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Risk Assessment  
The identification and mitigation of risks to information systems are paramount to 
the sustainability and survival of organizations (Rowe, 1977; Stoneburner, Goguen, & 
Feringa, 2002). The study and analysis of risk has become common practice throughout 
several industries including medical, insurance, earth science, financial, investment, public 
health, environmental, engineering and economics. The concept of studying, analyzing and 
scientifically framing the risk assessment procedure specifically for use in protecting and 
safeguarding information systems has been grossly under-managed and underutilized 
(Coleman & Jamieson, 1991; Farbey, Land, & Targett, 1992; Willcocks, 1992).  
Information technology risks can be defined as the probability of a threat to a 
system, the probability of a vulnerability being discovered, or the probability of equipment 
or software malfunctioning (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). Risk assessment is an analysis 
that identifies the risks and protection requirements for the system through a formal 
process. It is also a key component of risk management that brings together important 
information for officials regarding the identification of threats and vulnerabilities and 
includes the potential impact on an organization‟s operations, assets or individuals which 
can result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability (Grance, Hash, & Stevens, 
2003; McCumber, 2004). By identifying and computing the probability of a threat 
occurring and separately determining the ramifications of the particular threat, an 
organization can begin to determine its risk level (Blakley, McDermott, & Geer, 2001).  
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Early information system risk assessment models can be traced back to system 
security modeling. Security modeling allowed for the definition of relationships. In this 
model, users were defined as subjects and data was defined as objects. This process 
allowed for enforcing the state of information within a system (Bell, 1996). 
Attackers are constantly evolving their attacks and technologies through the 
creation of new tools and the discovery of new vulnerabilities (Recipes). In order to be 
effective against such attackers, the risk assessment process must be updated regularly and 
allow for flexibility in dealing with these new threats and vulnerabilities (Myerson, 2002). 
The risk assessment process defines threats as that which could cause potential harm to 
resources or the organization; while a vulnerability is defined as weakness in the asset 
which could be exploited by a threat (Ciampa, 2005; Hansche, Berti, & Hare, 2003; 
Hoglund & McGraw, 2004). 
The keys to completing a viable and accurate risk assessment are clear and 
complete documentation of the information system, its relationship to other systems, and 
the information system‟s relationship to the business itself (P. Fung & Longley, 2003). The 
accurate documentation of each system and its contents naturally leads to a more precise 
risk assessment. Knowing where your critical information is stored and who has access to it 
is equally important as knowing the probability and impact of a particular threat to a 
system. Often times this documentation process is overlooked or simply not addressed. 
Because media outlets tend to sensationalize hacker activity and malicious code such as 
viruses and worms, many companies disproportionately invest in attempting to mitigate 
these types of risks(P. Fung & Longley, 2003). The blending of these two points can lead 
to disastrous results. A clear illustration of this problem was brought to light recently when 
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a laptop containing the confidential records of 26.5 million retired veterans was stolen from 
the home of a Veterans Affairs employee. The largest security breach in the history of the 
United States Government was not the result of nefarious hacker activity or the use of some 
exotic code exploit, rather it was simple theft (Burger, 2006). Proper documentation and 
risk assessment would have prevented the employee from leaving the government facility 
with such a valuable asset.  
As businesses continue to grow and become more dependent on large scale 
computing systems, managers and organizations must learn to effectively identify and 
assess risks to these systems. Organizations have several choices and methodologies for 
attempting to quantify risk. Bayesian Probabilistic Risk Analysis is the process of risk 
management which includes identifying system weaknesses and reducing the probability of 
the particular system from being impacted by the exposed weaknesses (Ali, Hilton, & 
Peter, 1985). Bayesian risk analysis was originally developed for use in the nuclear power 
industry. A measurement of risk can be determined by answering four fundamental 
questions (Ali et al., 1985; Bedford & Cooke, 2001). 
 What can go wrong?  
 How frequently can it be expected to happen?  
 What would be its consequences?  
 How certain are we about the answers to the first three questions?  
 
While much has changed through the use of advanced computer modeling and the 
creation of complex risk assessment software, the answers to these four questions can still 
provide a highly useful and accurate level of information system risk analysis.  
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 The ability to defend an information system depends upon fully understanding the 
risks associated with that system and applying controls commensurate with the defined 
level of risk (Holden, 2003). This process of risk assessment helps organizations and 
managers appropriately spend time and money defending and protecting assets which need 
it most. In this way, risk assessment can be seen as a productivity tool that saves the 
organization time, money and reputation.  
 While several common underlying themes are often found in the risk assessment 
process such as, risk = impact x probability, there are often many different and widely 
accepted models used to complete the actual risk assessment (Woerner, 2007). Some 
methodologies focus on system failure to help identify risk (Gautam, Kenneth, & 
Kazuhiko, 1989). These models present a qualitative modeling technique to enhance the 
risk assessment process and facilitate the design of a risk assessment system. This approach 
helps overcome uncertainties associated with the unpredictability of human behavior and 
the failure rate of information systems, which must be factored into an overall risk rating 
(Gautam et al., 1989).  
Other approaches call for the combined use of a knowledge based system and 
qualitative problem solving which can result in the creation of a generic and portable risk 
assessment tool (Gautam et al., 1989). A prevalent theme in the use of such knowledge 
based systems is the incorporation of event and fault trees. Event and fault tree analysis 
involves identifying unique potential failure as individual “tree-roots or trunks”, then 
properly identifying each of the potentially impacted system as a branch on the tree. The 
result of this concept is that given a particular failure, a detailed list of all potentially 
impacted systems can be accurately generated (Haasl, Roberts, Vesely, & Goldberg, 1981). 
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One of the primary advantages of developing a knowledge based system using fault tree 
analysis is that it provides for an excellent tool to model “what-if” scenarios. By examining 
the potential system failures, organizations and managers can get a broad and accurate 
picture of potential risk.  
Another popular method for measuring risk is through the concept of Annualized 
Loss Expectation. Annualized Loss Expectation helps to quantify risk in terms of a 
financial definition where companies predict a specific value or cost associated with the 
occurrence of a particular risk (Blakley et al., 2001). Using this model, an organization 
calculates risk by multiplying a specific dollar amount against the probability of the risk‟s 
occurrence. Cost is estimated by totaling both the direct and indirect dollar amounts over 
the course of one year, which are related to the occurrence of the risk. Examples of direct 
and indirect dollar amounts include physical damage, equipment replacement, labor costs 
to repair, decreased employee productivity, lost sales, reputation damage, and legal costs. 
Probability is determined by weighing the likelihood of a risk event on a 1 to “x” scale. 
This probability is then multiplied by the cost associated with the annual loss resulting in a 
final dollar value which is representative of risk for the particular system (Visintine, 2003).  
Others methodologies have taken a different approach to defining the risk 
assessment process. One model defines risk assessment in six distinct steps (Ye, Barry, & 
Betsy, 2006). This approach begins with identifying a cost factor rating system. Once the 
rating system has been defined, risks are identified. The next step is assigning risk 
probability. This is followed by analyzing risk severity where an overall risk can be 
normalized on a scale from 1-100. The scale of 1-100 can then be disseminated into the 
following categories. Systems with an overall risk from 0-5 are considered “low risk”, 5-15 
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are marked as “moderate risk”, 15-50 are said to be “high risk” while 50-100 should be 
labeled as “very high risk”. The final step is to offer ways of reducing the presented risk 
(Ye et al., 2006).  
Not every framework for assessing risk is concerned with both impact and 
probability. Some risk assessments focus solely on the probability of the risk occurring 
(Benoit, Michel, & Suzanne, 2005). This type of risk assessment can be especially useful 
when the impact or occurrence of a particular risk results in an irreversible state. The 
medical community provides several examples of this type of risk assessment. Often times 
medical risk assessments will focus solely on the probability of a particular disease because 
the resulting impact is death. In these cases, because the impact is irreversible, it is no 
longer given consideration (Benoit et al., 2005).  
Many organizations mistakenly assume that increased spending on security 
investments will lead to a direct decrease in overall information system risk. The level of 
risk obtained from an organization‟s completed risk assessment often determines the 
organization‟s willingness to invest in appropriate security controls (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & 
Raghunathan, 2004). This type of organizational philosophy illustrates the importance of 
an appropriate and accurate risk assessment as there are clear implications to an 
organization‟s financial health and bottom line.  
The process of assessing risk is often too difficult to perform accurately without the 
use of automated software. Because of the complexity involved in accurate risk assessment, 
there is a need for the creation of an automated system (Hamdi & Boudriga, 2003).  
Several standards have been introduced which can help organizations understand 
and complete the risk assessment process. ISO 27001, COBIT and NIST each provide 
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guidance to ensure that risk assessment is handled appropriately (Brenner, 2007; NIST, 
2002; von Solms, 2005).  
  Completing an accurate risk assessment is both valuable and necessary for an 
organization and its ability to properly protect its information system assets. Upon 
completion of the risk assessment process the organization and management staff will be 
ready to make precise and informed decisions with regard to budgeting, staffing and 
resource management. A well defined risk assessment leads to a deeper and more complete 
understanding of both the overall level of risk associated with the implemented technology 
and the risks associated with each individual system. 
Upon completion of the risk assessment process, organizations have four options 
when addressing each risk (Blakley et al., 2001).  
1. Liability Transfer: This occurs when a business is able to convey the risk to another 
party outside of the organization, effectively removing the responsibility or 
accountability for the particular risk. Most often this is accomplished through use of 
a disclaimer or other type of binding agreement.  
2. Indemnification: Indemnifying risks is effectively insuring the organization against 
the occurrence of a particular risk.  
3. Mitigation: This is the process of reducing identified risks through procedure, 
processes, or controls. Mitigations can be used to specifically reduced the impact, 
probability, or both impact and probability of a risk.  
4. Retention: This is an organization‟s acceptance of a given risk. The specific risk is 
acknowledged and documented during the risk assessment process but no further 
steps are taken to reduce the current level of risk. This path is typically chosen 
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when the probability or impact of a risk occurring is very small. Retention is also a 
viable option when the “return on risk reduction spending” does not produce a 
meaningful return. 
 
 Accurate, complete, and meaningful risk assessment of a business‟s information 
systems is a vital function for every organization across all industries. As standards 
continue to mature, processes continue to evolve, and new forms of risk assessment are 
introduced, organizations must find way to make sense of it all. A thorough risk assessment 
process gives companies a greater degree of power by ensuring risks have been accounted 
for and accurate, meaningful controls are in place (Peltier, 2005). 
 
2.2. Attack Modeling 
Modeling is a technique for organizing and viewing the details of a system or 
process. Models can provide relevant information through the process of abstraction and 
demonstration of relationships (Booch, Rumbaugh, & Jacobson, 1999). The goal of 
modeling is to better understand the systems or processes we are studying; modeling 
accomplishes this goal by providing the following (Booch et al., 1999; Scheer & 
Habermann, 2000). 
 Aiding in the visualization of a system or process 
 Specifying the structure or behavior of a system or process 
 Providing a template which can be used to further advance, create, or study a 
system or process 
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 Providing documentation 
 
Attack modeling is an approach for documenting commonly occurring computer, 
hardware, software, or network attack details while providing information in a structured 
and reusable form (Moore, Ellison, & Linger, 2001). Attack models can be used by system 
administrators, security analysts, system developers and managers. Attacks on information 
systems are often described via a single vulnerability or exploit and therefore lack the 
descriptive depth needed to fully capture the complexity and detail of most attacks 
(Templeton & Levitt, 2001). Utilizing modeling to describe attacks can help to fill in the 
appropriate level of detail.  
Proper techniques for avoiding and mitigating information system attacks require an 
awareness of the risks associated with a particular system. Knowledge sharing through 
modeling can be useful for increasing awareness and collaboration of information system 
attack details (Steffan & Schumacher, 2002). Analysis, prediction and collaboration of 
attacks are valuable tools in the effort to protect information systems. The use of models to 
describe attacks can be extremely helpful in providing these tools (Daley, Larson, & 
Dawkins, 2002). A coherent model of exploits and vulnerabilities provides a solid 
foundation which can be used to educate system administrators as well as offering valuable 
details for appropriately responding to such attacks (Tidwell, Larson, Fitch, & Hale, 2001).  
Attack Trees and Threat Models are two examples of common techniques used to 
organize and present details of attacks. Attack Trees offer a goal-oriented perspective for 
modeling the behavior and effects of an attack while Threat Modeling is often used to 
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provide descriptions of threats at the code level (Schneier, 2000; Swiderski & Snyder, 
2004). 
 
2.2.1. Attack Trees 
Attack trees provide a formal and systematic way of describing threats and counter 
measures to threats for a given information system (Schneier, 1999). Attack trees provide 
users with an ability to make calculations and compare various types of attacks. These 
graphical representations also allow us to visualize, enumerate and weigh information 
system attacks (Salter, Saydjari, Schneier, & Wallner, 1998). Each attack tree consists of a 
root and leaf structure. The end goal of the attack is represented as the tree‟s root while the 
various ways of achieving that goal are represented by its leaves. Despite this apparent 
simplicity, attack trees can be extremely useful in threat analysis (C. Fung et al., 2005). It is 
important to note that some leaves have sub-nodes (child-leaves). This structure indicates 
there are multiple steps needed to accomplish the goal. Each leaf node can be either 
conjunctive or disjunctive in nature (Tidwell et al., 2001). Conjunctive leaves are 
represented using an “AND” and inform the user that all of the child nodes must be 
completed in order to satisfy their parent node. Disjunctive leaf nodes are considered stand-
alone alternatives and do not require other leaves to be satisfied before accomplishing its 
parent node. Disjunctive leaf nodes are represented using the “OR” designation. Upon 
completion of the attack tree each node can be evaluated and assigned a value of either “I” 
for impossible or “P” for possible depending on the probability of the attack. An example 
of a simple attack tree is introduced in Figure 3 (Schneier, 2000).  
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Figure 3. Attack Tree for Accessing a Physical Safe adopted from “Secrets and Lies” (Schneier, 2000).  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the classic example of an attack against a physical safe 
(Schneier, 2000). The goal, represented by the root, is to gain access to a physical safe 
(open safe). The leaves, listed individually below the goal, represent different approaches 
for achieving the goal.  
Upon completion of the attack tree, it is possible to assign a cost to each node. Doing so 
allows for further analysis and comparison of the various attack costs. Evaluating the costs 
of cyber and network attacks is an integral part of understanding both the risks and their 
mitigating countermeasures (Futoransky, Notarfrancesco, Richarte, & Sarraute). Attackers 
often demonstrate a negative correlation between the use of an attack and its cost. The 
insight gained from this process can be extremely helpful in determining which specific 
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attacks an information system may face (Schechter, 2005). Figure 4, introduces the costs 
associated with each node of the “Open Safe” attack tree (Schneier, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 4. Attack Tree with Cost-Per-Node Included adopted from “Attack Trees” (Schneier, 1999). 
 
As shown in Figure 4, it is possible to “Cut Open the Safe” for $10,000 while 
“Learning Combo” through eavesdropping would cost the attacker $60,000 (Listening to 
Conversation + Get Target to State Combo). This type of analysis can be helpful in 
determining which specific attacks you are likely to encounter.  
Attack trees can also be useful for examining technical attacks and environments. 
Consider the various scenarios in which an attacker could gain root (administrative) access 
to a web server. Figure 5, introduces a partially completed attack tree for completing this 
attack (Tidwell et al., 2001). 
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Figure 5. Partial Attack Tree for Gaining Root Access to a Web Server adopted from “Modeling Internet Attacks” 
(Tidwell et al., 2001). 
 
In this example, attack tree nodes are assigned weighted values to represent the 
likelihood of success in achieving the root goal. Assigned values range from 1 (Least 
Likely) to 10 (Most Likely). The “Steal Password” leaf is made up from the children nodes 
“Sniff Network” and “Root Telnet”. The lowest child score is inherited by the parent to 
signal the path of least resistance. As a result of this process, “Steal Password” would be 
assigned a value of 3. Ranking the listed attacks would result in the following (From “Most 
Likely” to occur to “Least Likely” to occur). 
 Sendmail Exploit (6) 
 Steal Password (3) 
 Poor Configuration (2) 
 
Attack trees provide an effective aid for modeling threats (Mauw & Oostdijk, 
2005). The ability to clearly model and understand threats is vital to today‟s security 
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professionals. Carnegie Mellon CERT shows a dramatic growth in the number of new 
vulnerabilities reported each year. 262 new vulnerabilities were catalogedin 1998, while 
7236 new vulnerabilities were recorded in 2007 (CERT, 2007). As the number of reported 
vulnerabilities continues to rise, the need for additional ways to manage and visualize the 
complexity of such attacks grows as well. Attack trees can be an effective methodology for 
understanding threat-based inter-relationships and ranking threats according to risk (Byres, 
Franz, & Miller, 2004).  
 
2.3. Attack Patterns 
An attack is a specific action carried out to exploit a vulnerability (Fong, Gaucher, 
Okun, Black, & Dalci, 2008). The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC) framework is a model for identifying, classifying, cataloging, sharing and 
refining various types of information about attacks (Barnum & Amit, 2006a). The CAPEC 
framework provides this information through descriptive schema or elements used to 
specify the various components which make up an attack. Each attack pattern is a 
generalized outline of the attack which has been developed by reviewing large sets of 
exploits (McGraw, 2006). Attack patterns also detail the approach and methodology used 
by attackers to generate an exploit (Barnum & Sethi). 
Like attack trees, attack patterns represent the objective of the attacker and the 
techniques which may be used by attackers to achieve their goals and provide an organized 
way to analyze the details of a specific attack (Barnum & Amit, 2006b; Viega & McGraw, 
2002). The ability to view threats from an attackers perspective is a vital component in 
protecting information systems (Arce, 2004). Security research is often slowed because of 
34 
 
 
the level of secrecy surrounding attacks, vulnerabilities and exploits (Barnum & Amit, 
2006b; Logan & Clarkson, 2005). Attack patterns can be used to expose the details of such 
attacks. In the past, security experts have been hesitant to create and share the details of 
exploits, fearing such data could be used to further malicious attacker‟s knowledge 
(Russell, 2002). 
Creating a deeper understanding of attackers, attacks, and countermeasures can lead to a 
more effective ability to combat and counter these threats (Schneier, 1999). Fostering this 
deep understanding of attack patterns can also lead to the permeation of security 
throughout the software development life cycle and heighten the awareness of known 
exploits, vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Gegick & Williams, 2005). Integrating and 
increasing attack pattern knowledge can result in adding security by creating less exposure 
to identified bugs and known flaws (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004). Attack patterns can also 
be used to create a security checklist, which in turn can lead to a higher level of security (S. 
Barnum, 2007). 
The origins of attack patterns can be traced back to the 1960‟s when the foundation 
for today‟s attack patterns were established as the concept of a general and repeatable 
solution to identified system development problems (Gamma, Helm, Johnson, & Vlissides, 
1995). More recently the concept of presenting from an attacker‟s perspective was done on 
an individual basis, with no agreed upon formula, structure, or common language for 
consistently presenting such a viewpoint (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004).  
The lack of a common vocabulary makes it difficult to gather, analyze, and share 
pertinent information which could be used to advance the discipline of software 
security(Hoglund & McGraw, 2004). The term “attack pattern” was introduced in 2001 to 
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describe the concept of combining various types of malicious attacks and present the 
attacker‟s perspective within a specified framework (Gamma et al., 1995; Moore et al., 
2001). Further research was done to formally define descriptive attack pattern elements and 
the create 48 original and complete attack patterns (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004).  
  The National Cyber Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security in 
conjunction with Cigital and MITRE Corporation agreed to sponsor CAPEC (S. Barnum, 
2007; Barnum & Amit, 2006b). The final result of this collective effort was published in 
March of 2007 as the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary and included a formalized attack-
driven perspective of software security with 101 different attack patterns outlined (Barnum 
& Amit, 2006a). 
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) list provides 
an official schema and formal representation for defining individual attack patterns 
(Barnum, 2008; Barnum & Amit, 2006a). CAPEC formally organizes and presents each 
attack pattern by gathering and displaying both primary and supporting data elements (Sean 
Barnum, 2007). Primary elements include the following list (Barnum, 2008; 
capec.mitre.org, 2007).  
 Attack Pattern ID 
 Attack Pattern Name 
 Description 
 Related Weaknesses 
 Related Vulnerabilities 
 Methods of Attack 
 Examples-Instances 
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 References 
 Solutions and Mitigations 
 Typical Severity 
 Typical Likelihood of Exploit 
 Attack Prerequisites 
 Attacker Skill or Knowledge Requirements 
 Resources Required 
 Attack Motivation-Consequences 
 Context Description  
 
Supporting elements include the following list (Barnum, 2008; capec.mitre.org, 2007).  
 Injection Vector 
 Payload 
 Activation Zone 
 Payload Activation Impact 
 Probing Techniques 
 Indicators/Warnings of Attack 
 Obfuscation Techniques 
 Related Attack Patterns 
 Relevant Security Requirements 
 Relevant Design Patterns 
 Relevant Security Principles 
 Related Guidelines 
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Exploration and examination of the various techniques used by malicious attackers 
are important steps in providing better security for our technology resources (Skoudis & 
Liston, 2006). “Know thy enemy” is a classic adage amongst security researchers which 
suggests that security professionals need the ability to understand system vulnerability 
from the perspective of a potential attacker (Fadia, 2002; Jones, Shema, & Johnson, 2002; 
Koziol et al., 2004; McClure, Scambray, & Kurtz, 2005). The best penetration tests are 
built on a solid understanding of both design and risks (McGraw, 2006). This type of 
understanding can only be achieved when we have a formal set of definitions to build and 
share knowledge. CAPEC attack patterns provide such a framework.  
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3. ABSTRACTING PARENT MITIGATIONS 
 The CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary includes nearly 400 individually prescribed 
controls which can be used to mitigate or reduce the effects of the defined attack patterns. 
This current level of detail in the “Solutions and Mitigations” element tends to be too 
inconsistent (Engebretson & Pauli, 2008). Some attack patterns provide an extremely 
granular level of detail. For example, one of the prescribed mitigations for attack pattern 1 
(Accessing Functionality Not Proper Constrained by ACLs) calls for changing a Java 
setting. Specifically the Solutions and Mitigations element prescribes, “In a J2EE setting, 
deployers can associate a role that is impossible for authenticator to grant users, such as 
„NoAccess‟, with all Servlets to which access is guarded by a limited number of servlets 
visible to, and accessible by, the user”. This level of detail can lead CAPEC adopters to 
assume that attacks based off accessing functionality not properly constrained by ACL‟s 
are confined only to environments where Java or J2EE are deployed. Such a belief could 
lead to an increased attack exposure and a false sense of security because attacks that focus 
on “Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs” include a much broader 
attack vector than just the Java environments.   
The reverse is also true. Some attack patterns provide only a brief overview of 
potential mitigation strategies. Attack pattern 5 (Analog In-Band Switching Signals (aka 
Blue Boxing)) includes “Upgrade phone lines” as a mitigation strategy. This generalized 
strategy is too open-ended to be of use to many users. This type of vagueness leaves many 
basic questions unanswered related to infrastructure, physical design, layout, speed, and 
quality issues.  
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In order to increase the effectiveness and consistency of mitigation strategies, we 
propose the inclusion of a new element to the CAPEC standard. Our Parent Mitigation 
element is directly abstracted from the currently prescribed CAPEC “Solutions and 
Mitigations” element. 
We examined several standards when looking for a complete set of parent 
mitigation strategies to complement the CAPEC Dictionary. It is vital to make use of a 
predefined, currently accepted and standardized list of controls to remove the heuristic tone 
of an ad-hoc approach. Our approach is both detailed and specific to ensure individuals 
following our prescribed processes will reach the same findings. 
We reviewed COBIT 4.1, ISO 27002:2005, and NIST SP 800-53 for an acceptable 
list of controls to use as Parent Mitigations in our approach (ISACA, 2008; ISO, 2005; 
NIST, 2007). After reviewing the controls outlined in each of these standards, we choose to 
make use of NIST 800-53 (revision 2). Both NIST and CAPEC have strong ties to the 
United States Federal government. NIST is a non-regulatory federal agency funded through 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, while CAPEC is the direct result of funding from the 
Department of Homeland Security (NIST, 2006). CAPEC is a federally funded 
classification of attacks and NIST is a federally funded list of controls.  
During the selection process, we were able to reject the controls outlined in the 
COBIT standard, because it is less specific to Information Systems or Information 
Technology details than the controls outlined in ISO (Flowerday & Von Solms, 2005). 
Because of the technical nature of attack patterns, we focus on controls which provide the 
most technical details. ISO was rejected because of its emphasis on being a management 
system, rather than a technology specification (Calder, 2006). We are providing a technical 
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specification for mitigations as part of our approach. We view NIST as a stronger match 
than the business process-oriented ISO standard. 
Additionally, we chose to use NIST because the controls provide a ready-made 
hierarchy which fits within our Parent-Child model. This additional level of detail and 
structure not only correlates directly with our work, but will also be used in future work to 
further extend the relationship between NIST and CAPEC. 
NIST 800-53 provides an established and usable control-based hierarchy. At the top 
level this hierarchy consists of Family controls which are general and wide-reaching. The 
final draft of 800-53-r2 includes a total of 17 Family controls which are presented in a 
well-defined and organized structure. A two character identifier is used to uniquely identify 
individual family controls. NIST Family level controls and their corresponding identifiers 
are introduced in Table 1 (NIST, 2007). 
 
Table 1. NIST 800-53 17 Family Level Controls and Their Unique Identifier. 
IDENTIFIER  FAMILY  
AC  Access Control  
AT  Awareness and Training  
AU  Audit and Accountability  
CA  Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments  
CM  Configuration Management  
CP  Contingency Planning  
IA  Identification and Authentication  
IR  Incident Response  
MA  Maintenance  
MP  Media Protection  
PE  Physical and Environmental Protection  
PL  Planning  
PS  Personnel Security  
RA  Risk Assessment  
SA  System and Services Acquisition  
SC  System and Communications Protection  
SI  System and Information Integrity  
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Each of the 17 Family level controls is further broken down into individual controls 
identified by NIST. In order to identify individual NIST controls, a number is appended to 
the family identifier. This combination of “Family identifier – control number” is used to 
uniquely identify each control outlined in the NIST 800-53r2 (NIST, 2007). For example, 
CM-8 corresponds to the 8
th
 control listed under the “Configuration Management” Family 
control. Our approach introduces the appropriate NIST control into the existing CAPEC 
dictionary as a “Parent Mitigation” to provide a more generalized mitigation strategy for 
each of the 400 CAPEC attack patterns. Our process groups all 400 mitigations into 17 
standardized Parent Mitigations. 
 
3.1. Abstracting Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC Dictionary 
 To illustrate our approach we completed a case study utilizing the CAPEC attack 
pattern dictionary. This case study consists of 11 unique attack patterns. In order to provide 
adequate sampling, we‟ve chosen one attack pattern from each of the 11 Parent Threats 
outlined on the CAPEC classification tree. Parent Threats are as follows (Engebretson & 
Pauli, 2008):  
 Abuse of Functionality 
 Spoofing 
 Probabilistic Techniques 
 Exploration of Authentication 
 Resource Depletion 
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 Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
 Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
 Data Structure Attacks 
 Data Leakage Attacks  
 Resource Manipulation 
 Time and State Attacks 
 
The same 11 attack patterns were used to demonstrate the three processes that make 
up our approach. The entire approach was carried out for all 101 attack patterns and a 
complete listing of these results can be found in Appendix 1. The chosen attack patterns for 
the case study and corresponding Parent Threat are introduced in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Selected Parent Threats and Corresponding Attack Patterns for Case Study. 
Parent Threat 
Attack Patter Name (Attack Pattern 
Number) 
Abuse of Functionality Forceful Browsing (87) 
Spoofing Man in the Middle Attack (94) 
Probabilistic Techniques Rainbow Table Password Cracking (55) 
Exploration of Authentication Reusing Session IDs (Session Replay) (60) 
Resource Depletion XML Denial of Service (XDoS) (82) 
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files 
(75) 
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content 
through the Data Plane) 
Server Side Includes (SSI) Injection (101) 
Data Structure Attacks 
Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables 
(10) 
Data Leakage Attacks 
Passively Sniff and Capture Application 
Code Bound for Authorize Client (65) 
Resource Manipulation 
Using Leading „Ghost‟ Character Sequences 
to Bypass Input Filters (3) 
Time and State Attacks 
Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-
Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions (29) 
 
 
NIST provides significant detail for each child control including unique control 
number, name, brief control description, and supplemental guidance. The control 
description provides a concise description of the control. The supplemental guidance 
provides additional examples and requirements (NIST, 2007). Both the control description 
and the supplemental guidance are useful in order to accurately match the NIST and 
CAPEC controls.  The process matches a CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations element and 
one of the NIST details.   
  The process of abstracting Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC Attack Pattern 
Release 1 Dictionary is made up of 4 steps as introduced in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Steps Required to Abstract Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. 
 
The process of abstracting Parent Mitigations starts by breaking down the attack 
pattern‟s Solutions and Mitigation element into a list of individual controls as shown in 
step 1. Step 2 introduces a line item review of each mitigation strategy. Using the control 
definitions outlined in NIST 800-53, we match each CAPEC control to a corresponding 
NIST control. Although we are only interested in the NIST Family control, we map each of 
the current CAPEC mitigations to the detailed controls in NIST 800-53 to ensure accuracy. 
Step 3 allows us to determine the appropriate Family level controls for inclusion into the 
CAPEC standard. The abstracted NIST Family controls are then added to the CAPEC 
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Dictionary as a Parent Mitigation element. Step 4 checks for the repeating of this process 
until each of the Solutions and Mitigations listed in step 1 have been abstracted. 
The detailed steps in Process 1 are listed below.  
 
1. Create a table to create a list of individual controls taken directly from the attack 
pattern‟s Solutions and Mitigations element. Controls should be listed 1 per row 
under the column heading “Solutions and Mitigations”. 
2. Select an individual control from the table created in step 1 and match the CAPEC 
Solutions and Mitigations element to the appropriate 800-53r2 NIST Child 
Mitigation(s). It is possible that individual controls from step 1 will match up with 
more than one NIST Child control. For this reason, it is important to review 
individual CAPEC controls against all of the 800-53r2 NIST controls. When a 
definition match is found, record the NIST Child Mitigation abbreviation under the 
column heading “NIST Child Mitigation”. When multiple matches for a single 
control are found, they should be recorded in the same cell and separated by a 
comma. 
3. Abstract the individual NIST Child Mitigation(s) to its corresponding NIST Family 
Control by removing the specific control number from the recorded Child 
Mitigation. It is important to review the table to verify if this Parent Threat has been 
previously recorded. If not, record the NIST Family Control under the Parent 
Mitigation column heading in the table. 
4. If another Solutions and Mitigations control is listed, repeat steps 2-3. Continue this 
process until all controls for the attack pattern have been abstracted. 
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Table 3 introduces the table which is required to complete this process.  
 
Table 3. Table Used to Abstract the Parent Mitigations. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
    
 
 
Our case study begins with a detailed analysis of attack pattern ID 3: “Using 
Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters”. Attack pattern 3 belongs to 
the Resource Manipulation Threat Family as first introduced in Table 2. Step 1 requires 
that we create a table to list individual controls from the CAPEC definition for attack 
pattern 3. We utilize the first two columns presented in Table 3 to complete step 1. 
Examination of the CAPEC Dictionary provides three individual mitigations for this attack 
as introduced in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Individually Listed Controls for Attack Pattern 3. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations 
Using Leading 
'Ghost' Character 
Sequences to Bypass 
Input Filters 
Perform white list, rather than black list, input validation. 
 
Cononicalize all data prior to validation. 
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth) 
 
 
 Step 2 of Process 1 requires that we select an individual control from step 1 and 
match the control to the appropriate NIST 800-53r2 Child Mitigation(s). Careful review 
and examination is needed to align this control with the appropriate control descriptions 
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provided as part of the NIST 800-53r2 standard. The first individual Solution and 
Mitigation listed in Table 3 is “Perform white list, rather than black list, input validation”. 
The NIST child mitigation definitions which relate to this control are listed below: 
 AC-3 ACCESS ENFORCEMENT 
o Access Enforcement (AC-3) was chosen because “white list” is a type of 
access control enforcement (Chow, Hui, Yiu, Chow, & Lui, 2005). 
Furthermore, examination of the NIST AC-3 Supplemental Guidance 
provides the following detail which aligns closely with the CAPEC control, 
“Access control policies and associated access enforcement mechanisms are 
employed by the organization to control access between users (or processes) 
and objects (e.g., devices, files, records, processes, programs, domains) in 
the information system. In addition to controlling access at the information 
system level, access enforcement mechanisms are employed at the 
application level, when necessary, to provide increased information security 
for the organization.” (NIST, 2007).  
 AC-4 INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT 
o Selection of Information Flow Enforcement (AC-4) can be justified by 
examination of the NIST child control description, “The information system 
enforces assigned authorizations for controlling the flow of information 
within the system and between interconnected systems in accordance with 
applicable policy.” (NIST, 2007) as well as the supplemental guidance 
which provides the following information, “Flow control is based on the 
characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Specific 
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examples of flow control enforcement can be found in boundary protection 
devices (e.g., proxies, gateways, guards, encrypted tunnels, firewalls, and 
routers) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict 
information system services or provide a packet filtering capability” (NIST, 
2007). White list input validation is an effective means of controlling the 
flow of information. 
 CM-7 LEAST FUNCTIONALITY 
o Least functionality (CM-7) was chosen as a result of CAPEC‟s use of the 
terms “white list rather than black list”. White lists are more restrictive in 
nature and employ the concept of least functionality by allowing denying 
any services not explicitly allowed. Black lists are less restrictive by 
allowing any service not explicitly blocked (Emmanuel & Yu). 
 SI-9 INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS 
o Information Input Restrictions (SI-9) present a natural fit with the given 
CAPEC control as the NIST control description provides the following 
definition, “The organization restricts the capability to input information to 
the information system” (NIST, 2007). Both the NIST and CAPEC controls 
are describing an input validation process.  
 SI-10 INFORMATION ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS, VALIDITY, AND 
AUTHENTICITY 
o Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity (SI-10) 
provides the following information in the supplemental guidance, “Checks 
for accuracy, completeness, validity, and authenticity of information are 
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accomplished as close to the point of origin as possible. Rules for checking 
the valid syntax of information system inputs (e.g., character set, length, 
numerical range, acceptable values) are in place to verify that inputs match 
specified definitions for format and content. Inputs passed to interpreters are 
prescreened to prevent the content from being unintentionally interpreted as 
commands.” (NIST, 2007). This description presents another clear example 
of input validation and is therefore included as a match for the prescribed 
CAPEC mitigation.  
 
The completed second step for the first control in attack pattern 3 is introduced in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Using Leading 
'Ghost' Character 
Sequences to 
Bypass Input 
Filters 
Perform white list, rather than black 
list, input validation. 
 
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, SI-9, SI-10  
 
 
Step 3 requires that we abstract the individual Child Mitigations chosen in step 2. 
Step 3 also necessitates that each Parent Mitigation be recorded only one time. Parent 
Mitigations are abstracted by recording a single entry for each unique NIST Family 
mitigation shown under the NIST Child Mitigations column. Table 6 introduces the 
completed table for the first CAPEC mitigation including the abstracted Parent Mitigation 
column. 
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Table 6. Addition of Parent Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Using Leading 
'Ghost' Character 
Sequences to Bypass 
Input Filters 
Perform white list, 
rather than black list, 
input validation. 
 
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, 
SI-9, SI-10 
AC, SI, CM 
 
 
Step 4 of Process 1 mandates that we repeat step 2 if another CAPEC control exists. 
The second control outlined for attack pattern 3 by CAPEC is “Canonicalize all data prior 
to validation”. Using the NIST 800-53 guidelines, we correlate this with the following 
NIST controls:  
 SI-9 INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS 
o Canonicalization is the process by which a potentially flexible data type can 
be altered into one that has guaranteed characteristics. Canonicalization is a 
frequent technique for input data validation and therefore relates well to the 
NIST standard SI-9 (Fithen, 2005).  An example of canonicalization is seen 
when the same input data can be encoded in many ways, such as ASCII or 
Unicode. This transformation of data into a known and expected type is a 
useful form or input validation.  
 SI-10 INFORMATION ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS, VALIDITY, AND 
AUTHENTICITY 
o Canonicalization is a frequent technique for input data validation and 
therefore relates well to the NIST standard SI-10 (Fithen, 2005).  An 
example of canonicalization is seen when the same input data can be 
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encoded in many ways, such as ASCII or Unicode. This transformation of 
data into a known and expected type is a useful form or input validation.  
 
The first two controls for attack pattern 3 and the corresponding NIST Child 
Mitigations are introduced in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First and Second CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Using Leading 
'Ghost' Character 
Sequences to 
Bypass Input 
Filters 
Perform white list, rather than black 
list, input validation. 
 
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, SI-9, SI-10 
Canonicalize all data prior to 
validation 
SI-9, SI-10 
  
 
 
Repeating step 3 requires that we abstract the individual Child Mitigations chosen 
in step 2. Table 8 introduces the completed table for the second CAPEC mitigation 
including the addition of the abstracted Parent Mitigation column and values. Because 
System and Information Integrity (SI) has already been listed in first row, it is not 
necessary to repeat the Parent Mitigation. 
 
Table 8. Addition of Parent Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Using Leading 
'Ghost' Character 
Sequences to Bypass 
Input Filters 
Perform white list, 
rather than black list, 
input validation. 
 
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, 
SI-9, SI-10 
AC, SI, CM 
 Canonicalize all data 
prior to validation 
SI-9, SI-10  
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The final control for attack pattern 3 is listed as: “Take an iterative approach to 
input validation (defense in depth)”. We correlate this CAPEC mitigation with the 
following NIST control. 
 SI-10 INFORMATION ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS, VALIDITY, AND 
AUTHENTICITY 
o Justification for the selection of Information Accuracy, Completeness, 
Validity and Authenticity (SI-10) can be found in both the control 
description, “The information system checks information for accuracy, 
completeness, validity, and authenticity.” as well as the supplemental 
guidance “Rules for checking the valid syntax of information system inputs 
(e.g., character set, length, numerical range, acceptable values) are in place 
to verify that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. 
Inputs passed to interpreters are prescreened to prevent the content from 
being unintentionally interpreted as commands. The extent to which the 
information system is able to check the accuracy, completeness, validity, 
and authenticity of information is guided by organizational policy and 
operational requirements.” (NIST, 2007) Both of these definitions pertain 
directly with input validation. 
 
The three original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations are 
introduced in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for All CAPEC Controls Assigned for Attack Pattern 3. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Using Leading 
'Ghost' Character 
Sequences to 
Bypass Input 
Filters 
Perform white list, rather than black 
list, input validation. 
 
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, SI-9, SI-10 
Canonicalize all data prior to 
validation 
SI-9, SI-10 
Take an iterative approach to input 
validation (defense in depth) 
SI-10 
 
 
Because System and Information Integrity (SI) has already been listed in the Parent 
Mitigation column, we do not relist this information again. 
 
Table 10. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 3. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Using Leading 
'Ghost' Character 
Sequences to Bypass 
Input Filters 
Perform white list, 
rather than black list, 
input validation. 
 
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, 
SI-9, SI-10 
AC, SI, CM 
Canonicalize all data 
prior to validation 
SI-9, SI-10  
Take an iterative 
approach to input 
validation (defense 
in depth) 
SI-10  
 
 
The original CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations element provides three controls for 
attack pattern 3. Our process of abstraction results in the same number of controls needed 
to mitigate the risk. We are not concerned with reducing the number of controls for each 
attack pattern. Our approach reduces the total mitigations from nearly 400 (from CAPEC) 
to no more than 17 (from the NIST “Family”). Adding the “Parent” mitigation into the 
CAPEC dictionary brings a level of consistency. The CAPEC Dictionary‟s mitigation 
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strategies are now standardized into 17 “Parents” at the same level of abstraction. Users are 
less likely to dismiss a particular attack pattern because the mitigation is too detailed or too 
specific. This is currently a risk for CAPEC adopters who believe that they are not at risk 
for a given attack because they do not have the specific technology mentioned in the 
CAPEC mitigation.  
  This same process was followed for attack pattern 75: “Manipulating Writable 
Configuration Files”. Attack pattern 75 belongs to the Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
family. The CAPEC Dictionary provides five individual mitigations for this attack as 
introduced in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Individually Listed Controls for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration Files 
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files 
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files 
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration 
promotion procedures. 
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and 
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD 
 
 
 The first Solution and Mitigation listed in Table 11 is “Design: Enforce principle of 
least privilege”. NIST provides a clear match with this control. 
 AC-6 LEAST PRIVILEGE  
o Least Privilege was chosen as a result of a direct match between the CAPEC 
and NIST controls. The AC-6 NIST control definition provides the 
following definition: “The information system enforces the most restrictive 
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set of rights/privileges or accesses needed by users (or processes acting on 
behalf of users) for the performance of specified tasks.” (NIST, 2007). 
 
The completed process for the first control in attack pattern 75 is introduced in 
Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration 
Files 
Design: Enforce principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  
 
 
Next we abstract the Parent Mitigations from the individual Child Mitigations. 
Table 13 introduces the completed table for the first CAPEC mitigation, including the 
abstracted Parent Mitigation column. 
 
Table 13. Addition of Parent Mitigation Column for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration Files 
Design: Enforce 
principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  AC 
 
 
The second control outlined for attack pattern 75 by CAPEC is “Design: Backup 
copies of all configuration files”. Using the NIST 800-53 guidelines, we correlate this with 
the following NIST controls:  
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 CP-9 INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP 
o Information System Backup (CP-9) was chosen as a counterpart for the 
CAPEC solution because of the direct match between the CAPEC and NIST 
controls. Both mitigations are directly concerned with backups. Specifically, 
NIST provides the following information as part of the control description, 
“The organization conducts backups of user-level and system-level 
information (including system state information) contained in the 
information system” (NIST, 2007). Because configuration files are an 
important component of system backups, the CAPEC and NIST controls 
present a natural fit. 
 CP-10 INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION 
o Information system recovery and reconstitution (CP-10) is included as a 
result of both the NIST control definition as well as the supplemental 
guidance. The NIST control provides the following description,” The 
organization employs mechanisms with supporting procedures to allow the 
information system to be recovered and reconstituted to a known secure 
state after a disruption or failure.” (NIST, 2007). Backup of the 
configuration files is a crucial component of a “mechanism to allow the 
information system to be recovered and reconstituted to a known secure 
state after a disruption or failure.” Without a backup of the current 
configuration file, a complete system restore would result in the loading of a 
default configuration file. 
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 CM-2 BASELINE CONFIGURATION 
o Baseline Configuration (CM-2) was selected as a result of the NIST control 
definition, “The organization develops, documents, and maintains a current 
baseline configuration of the information system.” (NIST, 2007). One 
component of maintaining a baseline configuration is through the backup of 
the configuration.  
 
The first two controls for attack pattern 75, and corresponding NIST Child 
Mitigations are introduced in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First and Second CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration 
Files 
 
Design: Enforce principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  
Design: Backup copies of all 
configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2 
  
 
 
Table 15 introduces the completed table for the second CAPEC mitigation 
including the abstracted Parent Mitigation column and values. Even though “Contingency 
Planning” has two entries (CP-9, CP-10) in the NIST Child Mitigation(s) column, the 
Parent Mitigation is listed only once. 
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Table 15. Addition of Parent Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration Files 
Design: Enforce 
principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  AC 
Design: Backup 
copies of all 
configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2 CP, CM 
 
 
The next CAPEC mitigation for attack pattern 75 is “Implementation: Integrity 
Monitoring for Configuration Files”. We correlate this CAPEC mitigation with the 
following NIST controls. 
 AU-6 AUDIT MONITORING, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING 
o Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting (AU-6) was chosen because of 
its close natural match to the CAPEC solution “monitoring for configuration 
files”. Both mitigations pertain directly to monitoring. Specifically NIST 
uses the following definition, “The organization regularly reviews/analyzes 
information system audit records for indications of inappropriate or unusual 
activity, investigates suspicious activity or suspected violations, reports 
findings to appropriate officials, and takes necessary actions.” (NIST, 2007). 
 CA-7 CONTINUOUS MONITORING 
o Justification for Continuous Monitoring (CA-7) again stems from the key 
mitigation strategy of monitoring. Moreover, the NIST control definition 
provides the following information, “The organization monitors the security 
controls in the information system on an ongoing basis.” and the 
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supplemental guidance for CA-7 offers this insight, “This control is closely 
related to and mutually supportive of the activities required in monitoring 
configuration changes to the information system.” (NIST, 2007).  
 CM-4 MONITORING CONFIGURATION CHANGES 
o Monitoring Configuration Changes (CM-4) is included as a direct match 
between CAPEC‟s solution and NIST‟s control definition, “The 
organization monitors changes to the information system” (NIST, 2007). 
 CM-6 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS 
o Configuration Settings (CM-6) is added to the list of applicable child 
controls because of the NIST supplemental guidance which states 
“Organizations monitor and control changes to the configuration settings in 
accordance with organizational policies and procedures” (NIST, 2007). 
 SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
o Information systems monitoring tools and techniques (SI-4) is justified 
through examination of the following control definition “The organization 
employs tools and techniques to monitor events on the information system” 
(NIST, 2007). Both the CAPEC and NIST controls make use of information 
system monitoring for protection purposes and are therefore directly 
connected.  
 SI-7 SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY 
o The final NIST control selected as a match for the CAPEC solution and 
mitigation element is Software and Information Integrity (SI-7). This control 
was selected based off the NIST supplemental guidance, which directly 
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addresses monitoring the integrity of the information system. Specifically 
NIST provides the following information, “The organization employs 
integrity verification applications on the information system to look for 
evidence of information tampering, errors, and omissions.” (NIST, 2007). 
 
The first three original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations 
are introduced in Table 16. 
 
Table 16. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for Three CAPEC Control Assigned for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration 
Files 
 
Design: Enforce principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  
Design: Backup copies of all 
configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2 
Implementation: Integrity 
monitoring for configuration files 
 
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, SI-
4, SI-7 
 
 
 
Table 17 introduces the complete abstracted table including the Parent Mitigation 
column for CAPEC attack pattern 75.  
 
Table 17. Abstracted Parent Mitigation Table for Three CAPEC Controls for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration Files 
 
Design: Enforce principle 
of least privilege 
AC-6  AC 
Design: Backup copies of 
all configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, 
CM-2 
CP, CM 
Implementation: Integrity 
monitoring for 
configuration files 
AU-6, CA-7, 
CM-4, CM-6, 
SI-4, SI-7 
 
AU, CA, SI 
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The fourth control listed in the CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations element is 
“Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures”. 
We correlate this CAPEC mitigation with the following NIST controls:  
 AU-1 AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
o Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures (AU-1) was selected as a 
result of the NIST control definition, “The organization develops, 
disseminates, and periodically reviews/updates: (i) a formal, documented, 
audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and compliance; and (ii) formal, documented 
procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability 
policy and associated audit and accountability controls.” (NIST, 2007). Both 
of these controls deal directly with auditing and their subsequent 
procedures.  
 AU-2 AUDITABLE EVENTS  
o Auditable Events (AU-2) was selected as a match because of the NIST 
supplemental guidance which states the following, “The purpose of this 
control is to identify important events which need to be audited as 
significant and relevant to the security of the information system. The 
organization specifies which information system components carry out 
auditing activities.” (NIST, 2007). Both the CAPEC and NIST controls are 
focused on the auditing process. 
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 CM-3 CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL 
o Configuration Change Control (CM-3) can be justified by examination of 
both the control definition which states, “The purpose of this control is to 
identify important events which need to be audited as significant and 
relevant to the security of the information system. The organization 
specifies which information system components carry out auditing 
activities.” (NIST, 2007). Additionally, the supplemental guidance offers the 
following information, “Configuration change control includes changes to 
the configuration settings for information technology products (e.g., 
operating systems, firewalls, routers).” and “The organization audits 
activities associated with configuration changes to the information system.” 
(NIST, 2007). Each of these statements lines up with the currently selected 
CAPEC Solution and Mitigation. 
 CM-4 MONITORING CONFIGURATION CHANGES 
o Monitoring Configuration Changes was (CM-4) was selected because of the 
control definition which states, “The organization monitors changes to the 
information system” (NIST, 2007). This correlates well with the CAPEC 
mitigation of logging configuration changes. 
 CM-5 ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE 
o Access Restrictions for Change (CM-5) was chosen as a result of the 
following information provided by NIST for CM-5, “The organization: (i) 
approves individual access privileges and enforces physical and logical 
access restrictions associated with changes to the information system; and 
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(ii) generates, retains, and reviews records reflecting all such changes.” 
(NIST, 2007). This definition clearly aligns itself to the monitoring and 
logging of configuration changes.  
 CM-6 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS 
o NIST‟s Configuration Settings (CM-6) control was selected because of the 
supplemental guidance which provides the following definition, 
“Organizations monitor and control changes to the configuration settings in 
accordance with organizational policies and procedures.” (NIST, 2007). 
Again, clear parallels between the two controls are easily identified. Both 
controls pertain directly with logging and monitoring of configuration 
settings. 
 
The first three original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations 
are introduced in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for Four CAPEC Controls Assigned for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration 
Files 
 
Design: Enforce principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  
Design: Backup copies of all 
configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2 
Implementation: Integrity 
monitoring for configuration files 
 
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, SI-
4, SI-7 
 
Implementation: Enforce audit 
logging on code and configuration 
promotion procedures. 
AU1, AU2, CM3, CM4, CM5, 
CM6 
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Audit and Accountability (AU) and Configuration Management (CM) have already 
been listed under the Parent Mitigation column, so there is no need to fill in this 
information again. Table 19 introduces the complete abstracted table including the Parent 
Mitigation column for CAPEC attack pattern 75. 
 
Table 19. Abstracted Parent Mitigation Table for Four Attack Pattern 75 Solutions.  
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration Files 
 
Design: Enforce 
principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  AC 
Design: Backup 
copies of all 
configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2 CP, CM 
Implementation: 
Integrity monitoring 
for configuration 
files 
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, 
CM-6, SI-4, SI-7 
 
AU, CA, SI 
Implementation: 
Enforce audit 
logging on code and 
configuration 
promotion 
procedures. 
AU1, AU2, CM3, 
CM4, CM5, CM6 
 
 
 
 
 The final Solution and Mitigation listed in Table 10 is “Implementation: Load 
configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a separate physical 
device like a CD”. NIST Child Mitigation definitions which relate to this control are as 
follows: 
 AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES 
o Separation of Duties (AC-5) was chosen as a match for the CAPEC solution 
because of the link between the CAPEC and NIST controls. Specifically 
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NIST provides the following detail in the control definition, “The 
information system enforces separation of duties through assigned access 
authorizations.” (NIST, 2007). Loading the configuration from a separate 
space is an example of separation of process duties. 
 SC-2 APPLICATION PARTITIONING 
o Justification for the selection of Application Partitioning (SC-2) stems from 
the correlation between the CAPEC control and the NIST supplemental 
guidance, “The information system separates user functionality (including 
user interface services) from information system management 
functionality.” (NIST, 2007). Loading the configuration is a clear example 
of application management functionality. 
 SC-3 SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION 
o Security and Function Isolation (SC-3) is included as a result of the NIST 
supplemental guidance which states, “The information system isolates 
security functions from nonsecurity functions by means of partitions, 
domains, etc., including control of access to and integrity of, the hardware, 
software, and firmware that perform those security functions. The 
information system maintains a separate execution domain (e.g., address 
space) for each executing process” (NIST, 2007). Loading the configuration 
file from a separate space is clearly aligned with this NIST control. 
 
All five of the original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations 
are introduced in Table 20. 
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Table 20. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for all CAPEC Controls Assigned for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration 
Files 
 
Design: Enforce principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  
Design: Backup copies of all 
configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2 
Implementation: Integrity 
monitoring for configuration files 
 
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, SI-
4, SI-7 
 
Implementation: Enforce audit 
logging on code and configuration 
promotion procedures. 
AU-1, AU-2, CM-3, CM-4, 
CM-5, CM-6 
 
Implementation: Load 
configuration from separate process 
and memory space, for example a 
separate physical device like a CD 
AC-5, SC-2, SC-3 
 
 
 
Because Access Control (AC) has already been listed under the Parent Mitigation 
column, we are only required to list Systems and Communication Protection (SC) as a new 
entry. Table 21 introduces the complete abstracted table including the Parent Mitigation 
column for CAPEC attack pattern 75. 
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Table 21. Complete Abstracted Parent Mitigation Table for Attack Pattern 75. 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent Mitigation(s) 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration Files 
 
Design: Enforce 
principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  AC 
Design: Backup 
copies of all 
configuration files 
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2 CP, CM 
Implementation: 
Integrity monitoring 
for configuration 
files 
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, 
CM-6, SI-4, SI-7 
 
AU, CA, SI 
Implementation: 
Enforce audit 
logging on code and 
configuration 
promotion 
procedures. 
AU1, AU2, CM3, 
CM4, CM5, CM6 
 
 
Implementation: 
Load configuration 
from separate 
process and memory 
space, for example a 
separate physical 
device like a CD 
AC-5, SC-2, SC-3 
 
SC 
 
 
3.2. Results of Case Study 
In addition to the two attack patterns shown in section 3.1, our case study followed 
each of the required four steps in Process 1 for the nine remaining attack patterns identified 
in Table 2. Table 22 introduces the complete results for attack pattern 87 (“Forceful 
Browsing”).  
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Table 22. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”). 
 
 
Table 23 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 94 (“Man in the 
Middle”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Forceful Browsing: 
87 
Authenticate request to every 
resource. In addition, every page 
or resource must ensure that the 
request it is handling has been 
made in an authorized context. 
AC17, IA2, IA3, 
MA4, SC8, SC23, 
SI10 
AC, IA, MA, 
SC, SI 
Forceful browsing can also be 
made difficult to a large extent by 
not hard coding names of 
application pages or resources. 
This way, the attacker cannot 
figure out, from the application 
alone, the resources available 
from the present context. 
SC18, AT3, CA2, 
CA4, PL2, SA3, 
SA8, SA10 
AT, CA, 
PL,SA 
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Table 23. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”). 
 
 
Table 24 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table 
Password Cracking”). 
 
Table 24. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”). 
 
 
Table 25 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 60 (“Reusing Session 
ID‟s”). 
 
 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Man in the Middle: 
94 
Get your Public Key signed by a 
Certificate Authority 
CA4, IA5, IA7, SC13, 
SC17 
CA, IA, SC 
Encrypt your communication 
using cryptography (SSL,...) 
AC3, AC4, SC7, 
AC17, IA7, SC8, 
SC9, SC12, SC13, 
SI7 
AC ,SI 
Use Strong mutual authentication 
to always fully authenticate both 
ends of any communications 
channel. 
AC17, IA1, IA2, IA3, 
IA4, IA5, SC8, SC11, 
SC23, SI10 
 
Exchange public keys using a 
secure channel 
SC17, SC12, SC13  
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Rainbow Table 
Pswd Cracking: 55 
Use salt when computing 
password hashes. That is, 
concatenate the salt (random bits) 
with the original password prior 
to hashing it. 
SI7, SC13, IA5 SI, SC, IA 
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Table 25. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”). 
 
 
Table 26 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 82 (“XML Denial of 
Service”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Reusing Session 
ID's: 60 
Always invalidate a session ID 
after the user logout. 
AC3, IA5, SC10, 
SC23, IA4 
AC, IA, SC 
Setup a session time out for the 
session IDs. 
AC11, AC12, 
SC23, IA4 
 
Protect the communication 
between the client and server. For 
instance it is best practice to use 
SSL to mitigate man in the 
middle attack. 
AC4, IA2, IA3, 
IA7, SC8, SC9, 
SC11, SC12, SC13, 
SC16, SC17, SC20, 
SC21, SC22, SC23 
SA 
Do not code send session ID with 
GET method, otherwise the 
session ID will be copied to the 
URL. In general avoid writing 
session IDs in the URLs. URLs 
can get logged in log files, which 
are vulnerable to an attacker. 
SC9, SC4, SC14, 
SC16, SA8 
 
Encrypt the session data 
associated with the session ID. 
AC3, SC4, SC7, 
SC23 
 
Use multifactor authentication. IA2  
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Table 26. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 82 (“XMLDoS”). 
 
 
Table 27 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 65 (“Passive 
Sniffing”). 
 
Table 27. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”). 
 
 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
XMLDoS (XDoS): 
82 
Design: Utilize a Security 
Pipeline Interface (SPI) to 
mediate communications between 
service requester and service 
provider The SPI should be 
designed to throttle up and down 
and handle a variety of payloads. 
AC4, SI9, SI10, 
AC3, CM6 
AC, SI, CM 
Design: Utilize clustered and fail 
over techniques, leverage 
network transports to provide 
availability such as HTTP load 
balancers 
AC4, CA3, SC6, 
SI4, CP10, SC5, 
SC22 
CA,SC, CP 
Implementation: Check size of 
XML message before parsing 
SI7, SI9, SI10  
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Passive Sniffing:  
65 
 
Do not store secrets in client code 
 
CM6, PE19, 
RA3, SA8, PL4 
CM, PE, RA, 
SA, PL 
Use Well-Known Cryptography 
Appropriately and Correctly 
AC3, AC17, IA7, 
MA4, SC8, SC9, 
SC12, SC13 
AC, IA, MA, 
SC 
Use Authentication Mechanisms, 
Where Appropriate, Correctly 
IA2, IA7, SC23, 
SI10 
SI 
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Table 28 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 101 (“Server Side 
Includes”). 
 
Table 28. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”). 
 
 
Table 29 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow 
via Environment Variables”). 
 
 
 
 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Server Side 
Includes (SSI): 101 
Set the OPTIONS 
IncludesNOEXEC in the global 
access.conf file or local .htaccess 
(Apache) file to deny SSI 
execution in directories that do 
not need them 
CM1, CM6, CM7, 
SI6, SC3, AC6 
CM, SI, SC, 
AC 
All user controllable input must 
be appropriately sanitized before 
use in the application. This 
includes omitting, or encoding, 
certain characters or strings that 
have the potential of being 
interpreted as part of an SSI 
directive 
SI7, SI9, SI10  
Server Side Includes must be 
enabled only if there is a strong 
business reason to do so. Every 
additional component enabled on 
the web server increases the 
attack surface as well as 
administrative overhead 
AC6  
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Table 29. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”). 
 
 
Table 30 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 29 (“Race Conditions, 
Time of Check and Time of Use”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Buffer Overflow 
via Environment 
Variables: 10 
Do not expose environment 
variable to the user. 
AC6, CM6, RA3, 
RA5, SA10, SA11, 
SC4, SI10 
AC, CM, RA, 
SA, SC, SI 
Do not use untrusted data in your 
environment variables. 
AC3, CM6, IA2, 
SC23, SI17, SI19, 
SI10 
IA,  
Use a language or compiler that 
performs automatic bounds 
checking 
SA8, PL2 PL 
There are tools such as Sharefuzz 
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) 
which is an environment variable 
fuzzer for Unixes that support 
loading a shared library. You can 
use Sharefuzz to determine if you 
are exposing an environment 
variable vulnerable to buffer 
overflow. 
MA3, PL6 RA5, 
SA10, SA11, SI2, 
SI4 
MA 
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Table 30. Process 1Results for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions, Time of Check and Time of Use”). 
 
 
3.3. Discussion and Validation 
While CAPEC‟s Release 1 Dictionary provides a solid framework, the current 
format and presentation of information provided in the Solutions and Mitigations element 
is inconsistent. There are tremendous variations in the depth and breadth of the 
“Mitigations and Solutions” currently outlined for each attack pattern. Some attack patterns 
provide detail that is too granular while others provide information that is vague. This 
chapter introduced the process to add a new Parent Mitigation element to provide 
consistency and mitigation strategies to be used by CAPEC adopters.  
Our approach injects a Parent Mitigation element into the dictionary to provide 
consistency to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. Because the current Mitigation and 
Solutions element provides valuable information, we are not advocating its removal. Our 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Race Conditions 
(TOCTOU): 29 
Use safe libraries to access 
resources such as files. 
SI7, SC18, SI, SC 
Be aware that improper use of 
access function calls such as 
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), 
etc. can cause a race condition. 
AT2, AC3, IA2 AT, AC, IA 
Use synchronization to control 
the flow of execution. 
SC3, AC4  
Use static analysis tools to find 
race conditions. 
SA11,SI10  
Pay attention to concurrency 
problems related to the access of 
resources. 
SA8, SC4 SA 
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intention is to add a Parent Mitigation element to provide a manageable and consistent 
number of more abstracted mitigations.  
There is significant value in completing this abstraction process. Adding the Parent 
Mitigation into the CAPEC dictionary provides a needed level of consistency and 
standardization. The CAPEC Dictionary‟s mitigation strategies are now standardized into 
17 “Parents” (down from the nearly 400) each at the same level of abstraction. By 
abstracting these mitigations into 17 categories, users are less likely to dismiss a particular 
attack pattern because the mitigation is too detailed or too vague. This is currently a risk for 
CAPEC adopters who believe that they are not at risk for a given attack because they do 
not have the specific technology mentioned in the CAPEC mitigation.  
Validation for Process 1 can be found by connecting our work to a strong 
theoretical basis. Overcoming usability issues associated with the organization and 
presentation of large amounts of information is a difficult task (English, Hearst, Sinha, 
Swearingen, & Yee, 2002). Faceted classification analysis can be used to create common 
categories from large amounts of data. Research has shown that these categories can be 
used to organize, manage, and aid in the meaningful classification of large data collections 
(Hearst, 2006).  Similar to the use of faceted classification theory, the inclusion of the 
Parent Mitigation element allows for the categorization and classification of the CAPEC 
standard via common mitigation strategies.  The Parent Mitigation element can be viewed 
as a facet by which the CAPEC standard can be examined and organized.   
Faceted theories make use of classification systems which are organized according 
to specific disciplines. In this regard each facet is unique to the discipline that will utilize 
the classification (Hong). The inclusion of a Parent Mitigation element can be viewed as a 
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facet which is specific to, and accepted by, the information assurance discipline. The NIST 
800-53r2 makes use of a similar classification structure through the use of a Family level 
mitigation.  Prior classification based on the Solutions and Mitigations element was not 
possible.  Individual mitigations were unique to their corresponding attack pattern. The 
inclusion of a Parent Mitigation element allows for creation of classification system based 
off of 17 common mitigations. 
  The use of hierarchical faceted theory allows users to more intuitively access 
subcategories and underlying data (Hearst, 2006). The inclusion of the Parent Mitigation 
element provides similar results. CAPEC users can now access a broad category of 
common mitigation strategies.  These strategies can be further drilled down to find the 
detailed and specific mitigations.   
The use of faceted analysis allows for multiple perspectives of the same unit 
(Kwasnik, 1999). The inclusion of the Parent Mitigation element allows CAPEC users to 
view attack information by attack pattern name as well as by common attack pattern 
mitigation strategies. 
The results from Process 1 are used in the completion of Process 2 and Process 3. 
The creation of a Parent Mitigation element is used by Process 2 to provide attack pattern 
context and serve as the root view in our new model for viewing attack pattern information. 
Parent Mitigations also provide the means for building security metrics which are presented 
in Process 3.  
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4. MODELING HIERARCHY-BASED ATTACK PATTERNS 
 Process 2 presents a new attack pattern model which focuses on the re-inclusion of 
the Parent Threat element and the inclusion of the Parent Mitigation element to logically 
group each of the 101 attack patterns. This model creates a graphical hierarchy for each of 
the attack patterns and groups them not only by Parent Threats (such as “Spoofing” and 
“Injection”), but also by Parent Mitigations (such as “Access Control” and “Configuration 
Management”).  We also provide individual textual attack descriptions for each of the 101 
attack patterns to provide a stand-alone, perspective of each attack pattern. Process 2 
allows individual attack patterns to be traced upward to its Parent Threat and downward to 
its Parent Mitigation in a hierarchical tree.  The traceability from the top of the tree (Parent 
Threat), through the selected elements of the attack patterns, to the roots of the tree (Parent 
Mitigation) eases the introduction of the CAPEC standard to audiences who are not 
familiar with attack patterns. This grouping also allows experienced users to leverage the 
attack information from a standardized set of elements. There is a great amount of 
information in the CAPEC dictionary that we are capturing and documenting with this fan-
in/fan-out approach. 
Process 2 includes four steps as introduced in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. The Required Steps to Complete Process 2. 
 
Step 1 includes Parent Threat information as a required element for each attack 
pattern in the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary. Step 2 reduces the number of the descriptive 
elements used to document each attack pattern.  Step 2 is completed by populating each of 
the selected elements and ensuring that each element has at least one entry. The purpose of 
reducing the element set is to create a user-friendly model for viewing the most critical 
information about each of the 101 attack patterns without overwhelming the user. 
Justification for the selected elements is presented later in this chapter. Step 3 creates a 
graphical hierarchy tree which is used to model each attack pattern.  The elements selected 
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in step 2 will be used in our new model. Step 4 creates a textual attack description which is 
based on the trimmed element set.   
Process 2 begins with the re-inclusion of a Parent Threat element into the CAPEC 
Dictionary to increase the usability of the standard. Currently each attack pattern can be 
traced to one of 11 Parent Threats via a Classification Tree which is available on the 
CAPEC website (capec.mitre.org, 2007). The Parent Threat information is not officially 
included in the CAPEC Dictionary as one of the formally defined attack pattern descriptive 
elements. As a result, finding the Parent Threat and related CAPEC attack patterns is a 
time-consuming and error prone task. This disjointed structure leads to confusion and 
frustration when attempting to make use of the current CAPEC Dictionary because this 
vital element is not included (Engebretson & Pauli, 2008). By including a Parent Threat 
element into the tree, we provide contextual information for the attack patterns and each 
related attack pattern.   
The number of elements used to describe each attack pattern can present a 
significant problem when attempting to make use of the current CAPEC dictionary in an 
applied setting (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).  Step 2 trims the element set to 
provide only meaningful information of the attack pattern without overwhelming the user. 
The full dictionary with all descriptive elements will continue to be available for review. 
Step 3 and 4 utilize the trimmed element set created in Step 2 to build hierarchies 
for presenting attack pattern information and viewing relationships among attack patterns. 
These hierarchies are derived directly from the 11 Parent Threats and are tied together by 
17 Parent Mitigations introduced in chapter 3. 
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4.1. Re-including Parent Threats 
Step 1 of Process 2 is completed by executing the following steps: 
1. Open the completed table for the given attack pattern which was created in Process 
1.  Insert a Parent Threat column to the left of the Attack Pattern column. The new 
Parent Threat column will become the first column in the table.   
2. Navigate to the CAPEC Classification Tree and select the “Expand All” link. 
3. Locate the required attack pattern in the Classification Tree, which is listed under 
the attack pattern column of the chosen table. 
4. Trace up the expanded classification tree to find the top level Threat Family. 
5. Record this top level Family Threat in the Parent Threat column.   
 
A template for this new table is introduced in Table 31. 
 
Table 31. Sample Table Used to Abstract the Parent Threat. 
Parent Threat Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
     
 
 
CAPEC provides the following top level threats in the Classification Tree:  
 Abuse of Functionality 
 Spoofing 
 Probabilistic Techniques 
 Exploration of Authentication 
 Resource Depletion 
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 Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
 Injection 
 Data Structure Attacks 
 Data Leakage Attacks 
 Resource Manipulation 
 Time/State Attacks 
   
The results of our case study for step 1 are presented below where Table 32 
introduces the results of step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 3. 
 
Table 32. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”). 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Resource 
Manipulation 
Using 
Leading 
'Ghost' 
Character 
Sequences to 
Bypass Input 
Filters 
Perform white list, 
rather than black list, 
input validation. 
 
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, 
SI-9, SI-10 
AC, CM, SI 
Canonicalize all data 
prior to validation 
SI-9, SI-10  
Take an iterative 
approach to input 
validation (defense 
in depth) 
SI-10  
 
 
Table 33 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 75. 
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Table 33. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”). 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Exploitation 
of Privilege 
/ Trust 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration 
Files 75 
 
Design: Enforce 
principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  AC 
Design: Backup 
copies of all 
configuration 
files 
CP-9, CP-10, 
CM-2 
CP, CM 
Implementation: 
Integrity 
monitoring for 
configuration 
files 
AU-6, CA-7, 
CM-4, CM-6, 
SI-4, SI-7 
 
AU, CA, SI 
Implementation: 
Enforce audit 
logging on code 
and 
configuration 
promotion 
procedures. 
AU1, AU2, 
CM3, CM4, 
CM5, CM6 
 
 
Implementation: 
Load 
configuration 
from separate 
process and 
memory space, 
for example a 
separate physical 
device like a CD 
AC-5, SC-2, 
SC-3 
 
SC 
 
 
We use attack pattern 101 “Server Side Includes” as an example to introduce one 
benefit of this Process. CAPEC provides the following elements to describe Attack Pattern 
101: 
 Attack Pattern ID, Typical Severity, Description, Attack Pattern Prerequisites, 
Typical Likelihood of Exploit, Methods of Attack, Examples-Instances, Attacker 
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Skill or Knowledge Required, Resources Required, Probing Techniques, Solutions 
and Mitigations, Attack Motivation Consequences, Context Description, Injection 
Vector, Payload, Activation Zone, Payload Activation Impact, Related Weaknesses, 
Related Security Principles, Related Guidelines, Purpose, CIA Impact, Technical 
Context, and Source. 
 
Parent Threat is not listed among the elements currently used to describe the attack. 
In order to determine the general threat classification that attack pattern 101 is derived 
from, a CAPEC user is currently required to search the expanded CAPEC Classification 
Tree for the given attack pattern by Attack Pattern ID or Attack Pattern Title.  The 
Classification Tree document is separate from the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary forcing the 
user to move away from the descriptive elements provided within the dictionary. Within 
the Classification Tree, the user must wade through three levels of detail to uncover 
“Server Side Includes” (attack pattern 101) as a member of the “Injection” Threat Family. 
Step 1 in Process 2 will eliminate this manual process.  
Adding the Parent Threat element to the formal definition set for all 101 of the 
attack patterns provides a context for viewing attack pattern information without having to 
manually interact with both the Full Dictionary and the Classification Tree. Adding Parent 
Threat as a formal element to our hierarchy increases usability by removing this manual 
search.  
Step 1 allows users to quickly and accurately locate related threats. Figure 8 
introduces a side-by-side comparison of the current and proposed steps which are required 
to locate threat-related CAPEC attack patterns.  
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Figure 8. Benefit of Adding Parent Threat Element for Locating Related Threats. 
 
Both approaches in Figure 8 assume the user is currently reviewing the details 
(elements) of a specific attack pattern. Process 2 not only reduces the number of required 
steps, but includes the necessary information needed to know from what Parent Threat the 
chosen attack pattern is derived. There is no heuristic nature to this process as the 
relationship between attack pattern and Parent Threat is already documented in the CAPEC 
Classification Tree.  
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In addition to the Parent Threat element, we considered proposing a “Related 
CAPEC Attack Pattern” element.  However due to the criticism of the large number of 
descriptive elements currently used for each attack pattern, we chose not to create an 
additional element (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).  Adopters who are interested in 
finding related CAPEC attack patterns will be aided by the creation of our new Parent 
Threat element.   
  To demonstrate how this process makes the CAPEC dictionary more usable, we 
introduce attack pattern 98 “Phishing”. It is not possible to find related attacks or a general 
threat for attack pattern 98 in CAPEC‟s current format. By leveraging our process, it is 
now explicitly known that “Phishing” is a type of “Spoofing” attack. Furthermore, CAPEC 
lists the following attack patterns under “Spoofing”. 
 Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths (Attack Pattern 38) 
 Man in the Middle Attack (Attack Pattern 94)  
 Utilizing Rest‟s Trust in the System Resources to Register Man in the Middle 
(Attack Pattern 57)  
 Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol (Attack Pattern 90)  
 Pharming (Attack Pattern 89)  
 
Because the Parent Threat is included as one of the attack pattern elements, it is 
now known what related threats should also be considered in addition to “Phishing” when 
concerned with “Spoofing”. 
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4.2. Trimming the Element Set 
 The current CAPEC Release 1 dictionary includes 101 attack patterns with each 
attack pattern including up to 31 descriptive elements.  The volume of information 
presented in the current CAPEC dictionary presents a major obstacle for the learning and 
application of the standard (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b). Furthermore, the 
currently prescribed element set is inconsistent. For example, attack patterns 17 
(Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files), 33 (HTTP Request Smuggling) and 
67 (String Format Overflow in syslog()) each include the Injection Vector, Payload, and 
Activation Zone elements while attack patterns 1 (Accessing Functionality Not Properly 
Constrained by ACLs), 22 (Exploiting Trust in Client), and 44 (Overflow Binary Resource 
File) do not. Reducing the element set provides a level of consistency and usability by 
leveraging our newly added Parent Threat and Parent Mitigation elements.  
Step 2 of Process 2 is the refining of the CAPEC descriptive elements. The outcome 
of this process is a new model for viewing relevant information about each attack pattern. 
We trim the CAPEC elements by focusing on elements which can be used to portray the 
attack fully and provide a meaningful representation for the user. It is important that our 
new model makes use of a reduced number of elements while still describing the attack 
pattern in totality. We selected the following attack pattern elements: 
 Parent Threat 
 Attack Pattern ID 
 Attack Pattern Name 
 Description 
 Solutions and Mitigations 
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 Parent Mitigation 
 
To complete step 2, we ensure that each element (listed above) for each attack 
pattern has at least one entry. We avoid the large number of descriptive elements which 
lead to information overload when attempting to make use of the CAPEC dictionary (Pauli 
& Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b). The process of trimming the element set from 31 to 6 is 
justified by examining each of the selected elements.  The Parent Threat element is 
included because it increases usability by grouping related attack patterns as introduced in 
step 1.  Leveraging the significant work done in creating the Parent Threat element requires 
the use of the Attack Pattern ID.  As a result, we include both the Attack Pattern ID and the 
Parent Threat.  Parent Mitigation is added because it documents a consistent and usable 
mitigation strategy for each attack pattern.  Parent Mitigation is based on the Solutions and 
Mitigations element so we include both of these elements into our model. Finally, Attack 
Pattern Name and Description are included as they are essential to complete the description 
of the attack pattern. The use of a hierarchy capped by Parent Threat and Parent Mitigation 
elements allows for the tracing of attack patterns from individual Parent Mitigations up to 
Parent Threats and vice versa. 
Previously accepted models have made use of a reduced CAPEC element set for the 
purpose of introducing new audiences to the CAPEC standard without overwhelming them 
(Pauli & Engebretson, 2008b).  However, like the current CAPEC dictionary, previous 
models were inconsistent in their use of the descriptive elements.  Our model requires that 
each of the selected elements is used for all 101 attack patterns.   
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The goal of trimming the element set is not to advocate element set replacement, 
but rather to present CAPEC adopters with a simple, easy-to-use, organized, and uniform 
presentation of all 101 attack patterns. The original CAPEC library will be available for 
further detail review.  
The new hierarchy model will be used to complete steps 3 and 4 of Process 2.  The 
use of a hierarchy makes the graphical trees more usable because it demonstrates 
previously undefined relationships.  The new model allows us to view relationship between 
elements, attack patterns, Parent Threats, and Parent Mitigations.  The use of a graphical 
tree allows users to view details from either the Parent Threat or Parent Mitigation point of 
view. The model will be used to make the textual attack descriptions more usable by 
providing a stand-alone view of each attack pattern.  The use of a textual attack description 
is beneficial for allowing users to view details from an attack pattern-driven point of view. 
Our usable model is consistent because all hierarchy trees and textual descriptions 
are completely populated.   
 
4.3. Building Hierarchy-Based Graphical Trees and Textual Attack Descriptions 
Hierarchy-based representations of attack patterns have been previously used to 
facilitate learning of the CAPEC standard (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a).  One of the major 
categories for learning strategies is the creation or use of a hierarchy (Weinstein & Mayer, 
1986). Information presented in a hierarchical fashion is easier to learn and recall than 
information presented in a format with not clear connection between details (Weinstein & 
Mayer, 1986). Presenting attack pattern elements via a hierarchy allows users to see the 
connections between each of the elements. This knowledge can then be leveraged when 
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analyzing and designing secure software, building networks, or making security related 
decisions.   
Our model includes both a defined graphical tree hierarchy for describing element 
organization, structure and relationships as well as textual attack descriptions for presenting 
readable attack pattern details. The use of a hierarchy can also help to define relationships 
among the 101 attack patterns, 17 Parent Mitigations, and 11 Parent Threats.  
We apply our hierarchy in a fan-in-fan-out manner to the trimmed element set 
selected in section 4.3. The highest level of our hierarchy provides general and wide-
ranging information. The Parent Threat element is used at the top level because it is broad.  
There are only 11 possible Parent Threats.  Subsequent hierarchy levels become specific in 
nature and scope. Attack pattern ID, Attack Pattern Name, Description, and the Solutions 
and Mitigations elements are each specific to a single attack pattern and cannot be 
generalized. The model concludes with a fan-out approach as it abstracts back out to more 
general information in the Parent Mitigation element.  This element represents a direct 
abstraction of the 400+ Solutions and Mitigations into 17 possible mitigations.   Our 
hierarchy model for attack pattern elements is introduced in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Hierarchy Model for Attack Patterns and Elements. 
 
The hierarchical tree is completed by filling in each of the elements described in 
Figure 9.  The purpose of this representation is to show relationships between elements and 
attack patterns. This representation can also be used to group attack patterns by related 
Parent Threats or Parent Mitigations.  The textual attack descriptions, which are presented 
in a tabular format for each attack pattern, aid in documenting all of the selected elements 
and information for each attack pattern.  Textual attack descriptions also provide 
consistency and usability for each attack pattern. 
Step 3 of Process 2 creates both the graphical hierarchies and the textual attack 
descriptions for the attack pattern.  We create the graphical hierarchies by filling in the 
required elements outlined in figure 9.  The case study results for step 3 for Process 2 for 
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attack pattern 3 and 75 are presented below.  The remaining graphical hierarchies for our 
case study are shown in section 4.4. 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack patterns 3 is introduced in Figure 10. 
Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SI
Name: Using ‘Ghost’ Characters to Bypass Input Filters
Description:
The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost characters, and processes the 
attacker‟s input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several 
syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does not take into 
account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms 
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Perform white list rather than black list input validation.
 Canonicalize all data prior to validation.
 Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).
ID: 3
 
 
Figure 10. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack patterns 75 is introduced in Figure 11. 
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege / Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC
Name: Manipulating Writable Configuration Files
Description: 
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that influence/control the operation of the 
target software.  This attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of 
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these files.
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that may have weaker permissions. 
System configuration in distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many administration 
points. 
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
 Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
 Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
 Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures.
 Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a 
separate physical device like a CD
ID: 75
 
Figure 11. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”). 
 
  Step 4 creates a textual attack description which presents attack pattern information 
in a tabular format. This process is completed by extracting information from the 
hierarchies into the textual template provided in table 34. 
 
Table 34.  Example of Textual Attack Description. 
Attack Pattern ID  
Attack Pattern Name  
Description  
Parent Threat  
Solutions and Mitigations  
Parent Mitigation  
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The outcome of step 4 provides a trimmed element set which is usable, readable, 
and presents information from the individual attack pattern perspective for each of the 101 
CAPEC attacks.  The textual attack descriptions for attack patterns 3 and 75 are introduced 
below.  The outcome of step 4 for the remaining attack patterns can be found in section 4.4.  
Table 35 introduces the completed textual attack description for attack pattern 3. 
 
Table 35. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”). 
Attack Pattern ID 3 
Attack Pattern Name Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters 
Description The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost 
characters, and processes the attacker‟s input. This occurs when 
the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic 
forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does 
not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms 
acceptable to the targeted API.    
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Perform white list rather than black list input validation. 
Canonicalize all data prior to validation. 
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in 
depth). 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, SI 
 
 
Table 36 introduces the textual description for attack pattern 75. 
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Table 36.  Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”). 
Attack Pattern ID 75 
Attack Pattern Name Manipulating Writable Configuration Files 
Description An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that 
influence/control the operation of the target software.  This 
attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of 
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these 
files. 
 
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that 
may have weaker permissions. System configuration in 
distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many 
administration points. For example, permissions may be set on 
the administrative GUI, the configuration file for the server as a 
whole, configuration files for specific domains and applications, 
special jar and other class files used to load resources at 
runtime, and even policy specific in .war and .ear files. A 
mistake in permissions setting in either the file acl or the content 
is an opening an attacker can use to elevate privilege. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege / Trust 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files 
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files 
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and 
configuration promotion procedures. 
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and 
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD 
Parent Mitigation AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC 
 
4.4. Results of Case Study  
Our case study presents one attack pattern from each Parent Threat.  The results of 
our case study for Step 1 are presented below where Table 37 introduces the results of Step 
1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 87. 
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Table 37. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”). 
 
 
Table 38 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 94. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Abuse of 
Functionality 
Forceful 
Browsing: 87 
Authenticate request to 
every resource. In 
addition, every page or 
resource must ensure that 
the request it is handling 
has been made in an 
authorized context. 
AC17, IA2, 
IA3, MA4, 
SC8, SC23, 
SI10 
AC, IA, MA, 
SC, SI 
Forceful browsing can 
also be made difficult to a 
large extent by not hard 
coding names of 
application pages or 
resources. This way, the 
attacker cannot figure 
out, from the application 
alone, the resources 
available from the present 
context. 
SC18, AT3, 
CA2, CA4, 
PL2, SA3, 
SA8, SA10 
AT, CA, 
PL,SA 
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Table 38. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”). 
 
 
Table 39 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 55. 
 
Table 39. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”). 
 
 
Table 40 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 60. 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack Pattern Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Spoofing Man the 
Middle: 94 
Get your Public Key 
signed by a Certificate 
Authority 
CA4, IA5, 
IA7, SC13, 
SC17 
CA, IA, SC 
Encrypt your 
communication using 
cryptography (SSL,...) 
AC3, AC4, 
SC7, AC17, 
IA7, SC8, 
SC9, SC12, 
SC13, SI7 
AC ,SI 
Use Strong mutual 
authentication to always 
fully authenticate both 
ends of any 
communications 
channel. 
AC17, IA1, 
IA2, IA3, IA4, 
IA5, SC8, 
SC11, SC23, 
SI10 
 
Exchange public keys 
using a secure channel 
SC17, SC12, 
SC13 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Probabilistic 
Techniques 
Rainbow 
Table Pswd 
Cracking: 55 
Use salt when computing 
password hashes. That is, 
concatenate the salt 
(random bits) with the 
original password prior 
to hashing it. 
SI7, SC13, 
IA5 
SI, SC, IA 
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Table 40. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session Id‟s”). 
 
 
Table 41 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 82. 
 
 
 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Exploitation 
of 
Authorization 
Reusing 
Session 
ID's: 60 
Always invalidate a 
session ID after the user 
logout. 
AC3, IA5, 
SC10, SC23, 
IA4 
AC, IA, SC 
Setup a session time out 
for the session IDs. 
AC11, AC12, 
SC23, IA4 
 
Protect the 
communication between 
the client and server. For 
instance it is best 
practice to use SSL to 
mitigate man in the 
middle attack. 
AC4, IA2, IA3, 
IA7, SC8, SC9, 
SC11, SC12, 
SC13, SC16, 
SC17, SC20, 
SC21, SC22, 
SC23 
SA 
Do not code send session 
ID with GET method, 
otherwise the session ID 
will be copied to the 
URL. In general avoid 
writing session IDs in the 
URLs. URLs can get 
logged in log files, which 
are vulnerable to an 
attacker. 
SC9, SC4, 
SC14, SC16, 
SA8 
 
Encrypt the session data 
associated with the 
session ID. 
AC3, SC4, 
SC7, SC23 
 
Use multifactor 
authentication. 
IA2  
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Table 41. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 82 (XML Denial of Service”). 
 
 
Table 42 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 65. 
 
Table 42. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”). 
 
 
Table 43 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 101. 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Resource 
Depletion 
XMLDoS 
(XDoS): 
82 
Design: Utilize a Security 
Pipeline Interface (SPI) to 
mediate communications 
between service requester 
and service provider The SPI 
should be designed to throttle 
up and down and handle a 
variety of payloads. 
AC4, SI9, 
SI10, AC3, 
CM6 
AC, SI, CM 
Design: Utilize clustered and 
fail over techniques, leverage 
network transports to provide 
availability such as HTTP 
load balancers 
AC4, CA3, 
SC6, SI4, 
CP10, SC5, 
SC22 
CA,SC, CP 
Implementation: Check size 
of XML message before 
parsing 
SI7, SI9, 
SI10 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Data 
Leakage 
Attacks 
Passive 
Sniffing:  
65 
 
Do not store secrets in client code 
 
CM6, PE19, 
RA3, SA8, 
PL4 
CM, PE, RA, 
SA, PL 
Use Well-Known Cryptography 
Appropriately and Correctly 
AC3, AC17, 
IA7, MA4, 
SC8, SC9, 
SC12, SC13 
AC, IA, MA, 
SC 
Use Authentication Mechanisms, 
Where Appropriate, Correctly 
IA2, IA7, 
SC23, SI10 
SI 
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Table 43. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”). 
 
 
Table 44 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Injection Server Side 
Includes (SSI): 
101 
Set the OPTIONS 
IncludesNOEXEC in the 
global access.conf file or 
local .htaccess (Apache) 
file to deny SSI execution 
in directories that do not 
need them 
CM1, CM6, 
CM7, SI6, SC3, 
AC6 
CM, SI, SC, 
AC 
All user controllable input 
must be appropriately 
sanitized before use in the 
application. This includes 
omitting, or encoding, 
certain characters or 
strings that have the 
potential of being 
interpreted as part of an 
SSI directive 
SI7, SI9, SI10  
Server Side Includes must 
be enabled only if there is 
a strong business reason to 
do so. Every additional 
component enabled on the 
web server increases the 
attack surface as well as 
administrative overhead 
AC6  
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Table 44. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”). 
 
 
Table 45 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Data 
Structure 
Attacks 
Buffer 
Overflow via 
Environment 
Variables: 10 
Do not expose environment 
variable to the user. 
AC6, CM6, 
RA3, RA5, 
SA10, SA11, 
SC4, SI10 
AC, CM, 
RA, SA, SC, 
SI 
Do not use untrusted data in your 
environment variables. 
AC3, CM6, 
IA2, SC23, 
SI17, SI19, 
SI10 
IA,  
Use a language or compiler that 
performs automatic bounds 
checking 
SA8, PL2 PL 
There are tools such as Sharefuzz 
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) 
which is an environment variable 
fuzzer for Unixes that support 
loading a shared library. You can 
use Sharefuzz to determine if you 
are exposing an environment 
variable vulnerable to buffer 
overflow. 
MA3, PL6 
RA5, SA10, 
SA11, SI2, 
SI4 
MA 
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Table 45. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions, Time of Check Time of Use”). 
 
 
Step 3 of Process 2 requires us to create both the graphical hierarchies and the 
textual attack descriptions for the attack pattern.  We create the graphical hierarchies by 
filling in the required elements outlined in Figure 9 for each attack pattern. The completed 
graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 87 is introduced in Figure 12. 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack Pattern Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
Time 
and 
State 
Attacks 
Race 
Conditions 
(TOCTOU): 29 
Use safe libraries to access 
resources such as files. 
SI7, SC18, SI, SC 
Be aware that improper use 
of access function calls 
such as chown(), 
tempfile(), chmod(), etc. 
can cause a race condition. 
AT2, AC3, IA2 AT, AC, IA 
Use synchronization to 
control the flow of 
execution. 
SC3, AC4  
Use static analysis tools to 
find race conditions. 
SA11,SI10  
Pay attention to 
concurrency problems 
related to the access of 
resources. 
SA8, SC4 SA 
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigations: IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC
Name: Forceful Browsing
Description:
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable through 
direct URL entry. 
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web 
application. 
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach 
sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or resource must ensure that 
the request it is handling has been made in an authorized context.
 Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by not hardcoding names of 
application pages or resources. This way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application 
alone, the resources available from the present context.
ID: 87
 
Figure 12. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 94 is introduced in Figure 13. 
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Parent Threat: Spoofing
Parent Mitigation: CA, IA, SC, AC, SI
Name: Man in the Middle
Description:
This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The 
attacker places himself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component 
attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the 
attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it 
was never intercepted. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the 
potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an 
implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
 Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
 Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both 
ends of any communications channel.
 Exchange public keys using a secure channel
ID: 94
 
Figure 13. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 55 is introduced in Figure 14. 
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, IA
Name: Rainbow Table Password Cracking
Description:
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored.  He then uses a rainbow table 
of precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password.  Once the original password 
corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system.
        A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various passwords.  A password chain is computed, 
starting from the original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R and a hash function H.  A 
recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 =  R(H(Xi)), X0 = P.  Then the hash chain of length n for the original 
password P can be formed:  X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, H(Xn).  P and H(Xn) are then stored together in 
the rainbow table.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Use salt when computing password hashes.  That is, 
concatenate the salt  (random bits) with the original password 
prior to hashing it.
ID: 55
 
Figure 14. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 94 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 60 is introduced in Figure 15. 
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC, IA
Name: Reusing Session ID’s
Description:
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system 
in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID 
used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session 
hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
 Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
 Protect the communication between the client and server. For instance it is best practice to 
use SSL to mitigate man in the middle attack.
 Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the session ID will be copied to 
the URL. In general avoid writing session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files, 
which are vulnerable to an attacker.
 Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
 Use multifactor authentication.
ID: 60
 
Figure 15. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 82 is introduced in Figure 16. 
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP
Name: XML Denial of Service (XDoS)
Description:
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course, 
most distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most closely associated 
with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post malicious XML payloads to the 
service provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. The main weakness 
in XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to determine 
routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation 
routines that XDoS targets. There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive payload and sends to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory 
representation of XML document, but when document is very large (for example, north of 1 Gb) service provider 
host may exhaust memory trying to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous small files that clog the system.
All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little 
to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate communications between 
service requester and service provider The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down 
and handle a variety of payloads.
 Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage network transports to provide 
availability such as HTTP load balancers
 Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing
ID: 82
 
Figure 16. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 101 is introduced in Figure 17. 
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, AC
Name: Server Side Includes
Description:
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then 
gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross 
Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited 
scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language. 
Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, 
and execute shell commands.
Solutions and Mitigatins:
 Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf file or local .htaccess 
(Apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories that do not need them
 All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before use in the application. This 
includes omitting, or encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of being 
interpreted as part of an SSI directive
 Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong business reason to do so. Every 
additional component enabled on the web server increases the attack surface as well as 
administrative overhead
ID: 101
 
Figure 17. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 10 is introduced in Figure 18. 
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA
Name: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables
Description: 
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through 
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they 
can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated 
buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment 
variables.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Do not expose environment variable to the user.
 Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
 Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking
 There are tools such as Sharefuzz (http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment 
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library. You can use Sharefuzz to 
determine if you are exposing an environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow.
ID: 10
 
Figure 18. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 65 is introduced in Figure 19. 
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks
Parent Mitigation: CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI
Name: Passive Sniffing
Description:
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use it, as-is or 
through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information or exploit the trust 
relationship between the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a 
client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate 
with the server.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Do not store secrets in client code
 Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
 Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, 
Correctly
ID: 65
 
Figure 19. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 29 is introduced in Figure 20. 
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA
Name: Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use)
Description:
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a 
resource and the time of use of a resource. The typical example is the file access. The 
attacker can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that he 
would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file 
and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the attacker 
could do something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of privilege.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
 Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), tempfile(), 
chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
 Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
 Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
 Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.
ID: 29
 
Figure 20. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 65 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”). 
 
Step 4 calls for the creation of a textual attack description and is completed by 
extracting information from the hierarchies into the textual template provided in Table 35. 
Table 46 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 87. 
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Table 46. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”). 
Attack Pattern ID 87 
Attack Pattern Name Forceful Browsing 
Description An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a 
website that are otherwise unreachable through direct URL 
entry.  
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed 
to protect access to portions of a web application.  
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, 
perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of 
the web application that have been improperly protected. 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page 
or resource must ensure that the request it is handling has been 
made in an authorized context.    
  
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by 
not hardcoding names of application pages or resources. This 
way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application alone, 
the resources available from the present context. 
Parent Mitigation IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC 
 
 
Table 47 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 94. 
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Table 47. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”). 
Attack Pattern ID 94 
Attack Pattern Name Man in the Middle 
Description This type of attack targets the communication between two 
components (typically client and server). The attacker places 
himself in the communication channel between the two 
components. Whenever one component attempts to 
communicate with the other (data flow, authentication 
challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the 
opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the 
other component as if it was never intercepted. This 
interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised 
components unaware of the potential corruption or leakeage of 
their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle 
attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or 
identify between two components. 
Parent Threat Spoofing 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority 
Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...) 
Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate 
both ends of any communications channel. 
Exchange public keys using a secure channel 
Parent Mitigation CA, IA, SC, AC, SI 
 
 
Table 48 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 55. 
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Table 48. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”). 
Attack Pattern ID 55 
Attack Pattern Name Rainbow Table Password Cracking 
Description An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of 
passwords are stored.  He then uses a rainbow table of 
precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original 
password.  Once the original password corresponding to the 
hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain 
access to the system. 
         
        A pasword rainbow table stores hash chains for various 
passwords.  A password chain is computed, starting from the 
original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R 
and a hash function H.  A recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 
=  R(H(Xi)), X0 = P.  Then the hash chain of length n for the 
original password P can be formed:  X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-
1, Xn, H(Xn).  P and H(Xn) are then stored together in the 
rainbow table. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Use salt when computing password hashes.  That is, concatenate 
the salt  (random bits) with the original password prior to 
hashing it. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC, IA 
 
 
Table 49 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 60. 
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Table 49. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”). 
Attack Pattern ID 60 
Attack Pattern Name Reusing Session ID‟s 
Description This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the 
target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to 
reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to 
perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this 
type of attack is Session Replay. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Authentication 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.  
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.   
Protect the communication between the client and server. For 
instance it is best practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the 
middle attack.    
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the 
session ID will be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing 
session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files, 
which are vulnerable to an attacker.    
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID. 
Use multifactor authentication.  
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC, SA 
 
 
Table 50 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 82. 
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Table 50. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”). 
Attack Pattern ID 82 
Attack Pattern Name XMLDoS (XDoS) 
Description XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any 
technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course, most 
distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases, 
and so on. XDoS is most closely associated with web services, 
SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post 
malicious XML payloads to the service provider designed to 
exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. 
The main weakness in XDoS is that the service provider 
generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to 
determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. 
It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines 
that XDoS targets. 
 
There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate 
 
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive 
payload and sends to service provider 
 
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses 
DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory representation of 
XML document, but when document is very large (for example, 
north of 1 Gb) service provider host may exhaust memory trying 
to build memory objects. 
 
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous 
small files that clog the system. 
 
All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of 
web services, where the service provider has little to no control 
over the service requester and any messages the service 
requester sends. 
Parent Threat Resource Depletion 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate 
communications between service requester and service provider 
The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down and handle 
a variety of payloads.  
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage 
network transports to provide availability such as HTTP load 
balancers     
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing 
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP 
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Table 51 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 101. 
 
Table 51. Textual Attack  Description for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”). 
Attack Pattern ID 101 
Attack Pattern Name Server Side Includes (SSI) 
Description An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send 
code to a web application that then gets executed by the web 
server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results 
to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and 
information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the 
SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged 
scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently 
gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and 
execute shell commands. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf 
file or local .htaccess (Apache) file to deny SSI execution in 
directories that do not need them   
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized 
before use in the application. This includes omitting, or 
encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of 
being interpreted as part of an SSI directive  
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong 
business reason to do so. Every additional component enabled 
on the web server increases the attack surface as well as 
administrative overhead 
Parent Mitigation CM, SI, SC, AC 
 
 
Table 52 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 10. 
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Table 52. Textual Description for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variable”). 
Attack Pattern ID 10 
Attack Pattern Name Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables 
Description This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through 
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds 
that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to 
overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust 
often placed in environment variables. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Do not expose environment variable to the user.  
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables. 
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking    
There are tools such as Sharefuzz 
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment 
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library. 
You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an 
environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow. 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA 
 
 
Table 53 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 65. 
 
Table 53. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”). 
Attack Pattern ID 65 
Attack Pattern Name Passive Sniffing 
Description Attackers can capture appplication code bound for the client and 
can use it, as-is or through reverse-engineering, to glean 
sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between 
the client and server. 
 
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch 
being applied to a client component or any such interaction 
where the client is authorized to communicate with the server. 
Parent Threat Data Leakage Attack 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Do not store secrets in client code 
Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly 
Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly 
Parent Mitigation CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI 
 
118 
 
 
 
Table 54 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 29. 
 
Table 54. Textual Description for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”). 
Attack Pattern ID 29 
Attack Pattern Name Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use) 
Description This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time 
of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. 
The typical example is the file access. The attacker can leverage 
a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that 
he would modify the resource between the first time the target 
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses 
the file. During that period of time, the attacker could do 
something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of 
privilege. 
Parent Threat Time and State Attacks 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files. 
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as 
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition. 
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution. 
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions. 
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of 
resources. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA 
 
 
4.5. Discussion and Validation 
 While the current CAPEC standard provides a significant amount of valuable 
information, there are tremendous variations in the depth and breadth of the defined 
element set currently outlined for each attack pattern.  Users who are presented with vast 
amounts of information need assistance and a proper plan to avoid feeling overwhelmed, 
lost, or even frustrated (Rockland, 2000). Process 2 includes a Parent Threat element into 
the dictionary to provide consistency and usability to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. We 
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proposed a new model for presenting CAPEC attack patterns which provides a 
standardized element set to provide context and describe how the elements are related. 
Because the current elements provide valuable information, we are not advocating their 
removal. Our intention is to present the data in a manageable and consistent manner. Full 
details of the Release 1 dictionary will be readily available. This is a valuable step to the 
increased adoption and wide spread acceptance of the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. 
Our hierarchies allow CAPEC attack pattern information to be viewed from two 
distinct points of view.  Graphical hierarchies allow for viewing element, attack pattern, 
Parent Threat, and Parent Mitigation relationships.  This allows users to trace both up from 
individual Parent Mitigations or down from individual Parent Threats.  The textual attack 
descriptions present an attack pattern point of view.  The creation of this model provides a 
stand-alone description for understanding the attack pattern. 
Validation for Process 2 was provided through the execution of a controlled 
experiment which produced positive preliminary results to support our claims of increased 
usability and consistency.  Because utilizing subjects who demonstrate an interest in the 
topic being examined is important for usability studies (Borlund & Ingwersen, 1997), we 
included a total of ten participants from the undergraduate Computer and Network Security 
majors at Dakota State University in our experiment. The data from all ten participants was 
used for analysis. Subjects volunteered for participation and were not compensated for their 
time.  All participants were tested in a computer lab environment with identical computer 
hardware and software.  
The ten participants were divided into two groups where the first group was asked 
to examine attack pattern details using the current CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary.  The 
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second group was asked to examine attack pattern details utilizing the trimmed element set 
created as a result of Process 2. Group assignment was based on a coin toss; the first five 
participants to flip “heads” were assigned to the CAPEC group.  The remaining five 
participants were assigned to the trimmed element set group. 
The experiment covered a total of six randomly selected attack patterns.  For each 
attack pattern, participants were given ten minutes to complete an assigned task using their 
predetermined dictionary.  All participants worked individually on the same attack pattern 
at the same time and were asked to complete two tasks per attack pattern.  The first task 
was to locate the selected attack pattern using their assigned dictionary. The second task 
was to count the number of individual prescribed Solutions and Mitigations for the given 
attack pattern. There was a master clock to ensure accurate timing.  The master clock was 
set to 0:00 at the beginning of each new attack pattern. Once the attack pattern was 
revealed to the group, the master clock was started. Participants were asked to record the 
number of mitigations they found and the time it took to complete both tasks.  
Each participant was assigned a number which could be used to track which attack 
dictionary the subject was using.  No other identifying information was collected. Data was 
recorded by individual participants utilizing Microsoft Notepad.  Participants were 
instructed to create a single Microsoft Notepad log; data from each of the attack pattern 
experiments was recorded on a single line.   
At the conclusion of the experiment participants were asked to answer two 
questions.   
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1. “In the process of attempting to locate specific information about specific 
attack patterns, did you think there was too much data, not enough data, or 
just the right amount of data about each attack pattern?” Answers for the 
first question ranged from a low score of, “1 = The dictionary did not 
contain enough data / elements”, a medium score of “5 = The amount of 
information in the dictionary was appropriate”, and a high score of “10 = 
The dictionary contained too much data”.   
2. "Concerning usability (structure, organization, ease of use, format, and 
ability to locate information quickly), how likely are you to use this 
dictionary again?" Answers for the second question ranged from a low score 
of “1 = Not Useable / Will Never Use Again”, a medium score of “5 = 
Indifferent”, and a high score of “10 = Very Useable / Will Definitely Use 
Again”. 
The results of our experiment demonstrate positive preliminary results for both 
usability and consistency as introduced in Tables 55-60 where “Average Time to Complete 
Task” is the mean number of seconds it took to participants to complete the experiment.  
“Average Mitigation Count” is a measurement of the mean number of mitigations found by 
each participant.  “High Mitigation Count” represents the highest number of mitigations 
recorded by any single participant in the group. “Low Mitigation Count” represents the 
lowest number of mitigations recorded by any single participant in the group. “% of Users 
Who Found the Same” represents the percentage of the group member who agreed on the 
number of mitigations listed in dictionary.  CAPEC represents the group who utilized the 
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CAPEC dictionary and TAD represents the group who utilized our textual attack 
descriptions.   
Table 55. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 43. 
 
  CAPEC TAD 
Average Time to Complete Task 61.4 13 
Average Mitigation Count 3.2 3 
High Mitigation Count 5 3 
Low Mitigation Count 2 3 
% of Users Who Found the Same 60 100 
 
 
Table 56. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 67. 
 
  CAPEC TAD 
Average Time to Complete Task 57.4 15.4 
Average Mitigation Count 1.4 1 
High Mitigation Count 2 1 
Low Mitigation Count 1 1 
% of Users Who Found the Same 60 100 
 
 
Table 57. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 34. 
 
  CAPEC TAD 
Average Time to Complete Task 41.8 13.8 
Average Mitigation Count 1.2 1 
High Mitigation Count 2 1 
Low Mitigation Count 1 1 
% of Users Who Found the Same 80 100 
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Table 58. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 86. 
 
  CAPEC TAD 
Average Time to Complete Task 50 19.6 
Average Mitigation Count 8.6 9 
High Mitigation Count 9 9 
Low Mitigation Count 7 9 
% of Users Who Found the Same 80 100 
 
 
Table 59. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 9 
 
  CAPEC TAD 
Average Time to Complete Task 45.2 9.6 
Average Mitigation Count 6.4 7 
High Mitigation Count 7 7 
Low Mitigation Count 4 7 
% of Users Who Found the Same 80 100 
 
 
Table 60. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 6 
 
  CAPEC TAD 
Average Time to Complete Task 29.2 9.2 
Average Mitigation Count 2.8 3 
High Mitigation Count 3 3 
Low Mitigation Count 2 3 
% of Users Who Found the Same 80 100 
 
 
 Participants who used our dictionary were able to complete the assigned tasks 
quicker.  Furthermore, participants who utilized our dictionary were more consistent in 
identifying the number of prescribed mitigations.  Throughout each of the six exercises, 
participants using our approach found the same number of mitigations 100% of the time.  
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In zero of the six exercises did subjects using the original CAPEC dictionary agree 100% 
of the time and they matched what was documented.   
When asked the question “In the process of attempting to locate specific 
information about specific attack patterns, did you think there was too much data, not 
enough data, or just the right amount of data (about each attack pattern)”, CAPEC users 
averaged a 7.4 out of 10 while participants who used our approach averaged a 4.4 out of 
10.  These results are introduced in Table 61. 
 
Table 61. Results from the Amount of Data Question.  
 
Participant CAPEC TAD 
1 9 
 2 9 
 3 8 
 4 3 
 5 8 
 6 
 
5 
7 
 
3 
8 
 
5 
9 
 
5 
10 
 
4 
Average 7.4 4.4 
 
 
As introduced earlier a score of 5 meant that the participant felt there was an 
appropriate amount of data presented in the given dictionary.  Scores above 5 indicated that 
the user felt there was too much information presented in the dictionary while scores below 
5 indicated that there was too little information presented in the dictionary.  The farther 
away from 5 (either higher or lower) means a stronger indicator towards too much / too 
little information. 
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The results from Table 62 show that our When asked the question, "Concerning 
usability (structure, organization, ease of use, format, and ability to locate information 
quickly), how likely are you to use this dictionary again?", CAPEC users averaged a 4.2 
out of 10 while participants who used our dictionary averaged a 9.2 out of 10. These results 
are introduced in Table 62. 
 
Table 62. Results from the Usability / Format Question. 
 
Participant CAPEC TAD 
1 6 
 2 4 
 3 6 
 4 2 
 5 3 
 6 
 
10 
7 
 
9 
8 
 
9 
9 
 
10 
10 
 
8 
Average 4.2 9.2 
 
 
As introduced earlier the higher the score the more usable the participant deemed 
the dictionary to be and the more the likely the participant was to reuse this dictionary 
again in the future.  Scores above 5 indicated that the participant felt the dictionary was 
useable while scores below 5 indicated that the participants felt the dictionary was not 
usable.   
The results of Process 2 are required to complete the final Process of our approach; 
the creation of CAPEC-based security metrics.  Such metrics will be useful in leveraging 
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the vast quantity of information in the current CAPEC dictionary and provide an applied 
metric for assisting in security related decisions.  
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5. CREATING CAPEC-BASED SECURITY METRICS 
 Our third process creates two security metrics to measure NIST-based mitigation 
strategies when applied to the CAPEC dictionary. This approach re-organizes the work 
from chapter 4 into a usable hierarchy that is based on the 11 Parent Threats. Leveraging 
the hierarchy model introduced in chapter 4, we group the entire attack dictionary by the 17 
Parent Mitigations presented in chapter 3. The creation of CAPEC-based security metrics is 
useful in leveraging the vast quantity of information in the current CAPEC dictionary as 
well as providing an easy-to-use metric for assisting in security related decisions.  
The security metrics are created at two distinct levels. The first metric, Knockout 
Effect (KOE), is at the individual attack pattern level. The second metric, Parent Mitigation 
Power (PMP), encompasses all 101 attack patterns viewed as a whole. These metrics assist 
users in making security decisions when attempting to mitigate a single attack pattern or 
determining how effective a single mitigation is across multiple attack patterns.  
Knock-out Effect (KOE) is a measure of how many Parent Mitigation strategies are 
needed to fully mitigate a detailed attack pattern. Each of the 101 attack patterns has a 
KOE calculated and stored as part of the graphical hierarchy and the textual attack 
description. The addition of KOE aids in the consistency and usability of CAPEC by 
allowing users to quickly determine the number of Parent Mitigations required to fully 
mitigate a given attack pattern. 
Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) is a measure of the total number of unique attack 
patterns that were partially mitigated by an individual Parent Mitigation strategy and the 
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total number of Child Mitigation strategies that can be traced to the Parent Mitigation. It is 
important to note that KOE for each of the 101 attack patterns must be completed before 
the PMP can be computed. We continue our case study to illustrate our approach to 
leveraging these metrics by including 1 attack pattern from each of the 11 Parent Threats.  
Process 3 builds on the work outlined in Process 1 and Process 2 and is introduced in 
Figure 21 where KOE is calculated before PMP.  Once these two metrics are calculated our 
entire approach is complete. The values calculated for KOE and PMP will not change 
regardless of the chosen system implementation. 
 
Figure 21. Individual Steps to Complete Process 3. 
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5.1. Knock-Out Effect (KOE) 
Process 3 begins by calculating the Knock-out Effect for the current attack pattern.  
This is a numeric value created by adding the total number of Parent Mitigations which 
were previously abstracted for the attack pattern in Process 2. The KOE value is recorded 
in both the graphical hierarchy as well as the textual attack description for each attack 
pattern. Step 1 of Process 3 is repeated for any remaining attack patterns.  The detailed 
actions needed to create the KOE are listed below. 
1. Open the completed table for the given attack pattern which was updated in Process 
2 (Table 30).  Insert a KOE column to the right of the Parent Mitigation column. 
The new KOE column will become the last column in the table.   
2. Count the total number of entries in the Parent Mitigation column for the attack 
pattern. Enter this value in the newly created KOE column. 
3. Add the KOE to the previously created graphical hierarchy by appending the KOE 
value to the Attack Pattern Name field. 
4. Add KOE to the textual attack description by appending the KOE value to the 
Attack Pattern Name field.  
5. Repeat steps 2-4 for any remaining attack patterns. 
 
After a KOE value for all 101 attack patterns has been successfully processed we 
move to step 3 of Process 3.  Step 3 introduces a new security metric (PMP) which is based 
off of the data resulting from the conglomeration of all 101 attack patterns into a hierarchy.   
An example of the new table used in step 1 is introduced in Table 55. 
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Table 63. Sample Table Used to Complete Step 1 of Process 3. 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions 
and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
      
 
 
Step 1 of Process 3 adds the KOE value to the previously used attack pattern tables.  
KOE counts the total number Parent Mitigations necessary to fully mitigate/prevent the 
attack pattern from harming the implementation. KOE measures Parent Mitigations 
because they are easily understood by all users and do not provide too much detail that may 
intimidate users into non-action. The underlying Child Mitigations that are needed to 
adequately mitigate the attack pattern are readily available for review as part of the 
hierarchy. KOE is a count of the total number of Parent Mitigations listed. Table 56 
introduces the results of steps 1 and 2 Process 3 for attack pattern 3 “Using Leading 
„Ghost‟ Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters”. 
 
Table 64. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using Leading „Ghost‟ Character Sequences to Bypass Input 
Filters”). 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation 
KOE 
Resource 
Manipulation 
Using 
Leading 
'Ghost' 
Character 
Sequences 
to Bypass 
Input 
Filters 
Perform white 
list, rather than 
black list, input 
validation. 
AC-3, AC-4, 
CM-7, SI-9, 
SI-10 
AC, CM, SI 3 
Canonicalize all 
data prior to 
validation 
SI-9, SI-10  
Take an iterative 
approach to 
input validation 
(defense in 
depth) 
SI-10  
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Table 57 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 75 
“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”. 
 
Table 65. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”). 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Exploitation 
of Privilege 
/ Trust 
Manipulating 
Writable 
Configuration 
Files 75 
 
Design: Enforce 
principle of least 
privilege 
AC-6  AC 7 
Design: Backup 
copies of all 
configuration 
files 
CP-9, CP-10, 
CM-2 
CP, CM 
Implementation: 
Integrity 
monitoring for 
configuration 
files 
AU-6, CA-7, 
CM-4, CM-6, 
SI-4, SI-7 
 
AU, CA, SI 
Implementation: 
Enforce audit 
logging on code 
and configuration 
promotion 
procedures. 
AU1, AU2, 
CM3, CM4, 
CM5, CM6 
 
 
Implementation: 
Load 
configuration 
from separate 
process and 
memory space, 
for example a 
separate physical 
device like a CD 
AC-5, SC-2, 
SC-3 
 
SC 
 
 
Step 3 adds the KOE value to the graphical hierarchy trees created for each attack 
pattern. The KOE for each attack pattern is shown as part of the Attack Pattern Name field. 
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This allows the total number of Parent Mitigations to be known early in the hierarchy 
without having to manually count the bottom of the hierarchy. The completed graphical 
hierarchy tree with KOE for attack pattern 3 is introduced in Figure 22. 
 
Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SI
Name: Using ‘Ghost’ Characters to Bypass Input Filters (3)
Description:
The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost characters, and processes the 
attacker‟s input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several 
syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does not take into 
account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms 
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Perform white list rather than black list input validation.
 Canonicalize all data prior to validation.
 Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).
ID: 3
 
 
Figure 22. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy with KOE for attack pattern 75 is introduced in 
Figure 23. 
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege / Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC
Name: Manipulating Writable Configuration Files (7)
Description: 
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that influence/control the operation of the 
target software.  This attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of 
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these files.
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that may have weaker permissions. 
System configuration in distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many administration 
points. 
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
 Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
 Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
 Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures.
 Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a 
separate physical device like a CD
ID: 75
 
Figure 23. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”). 
 
Step 4 updates each of the textual attack descriptions with the KOE value.  The 
addition of this step adds significant value by allowing users to quickly ascertain the KOE 
without having to navigate away from the textual attack descriptions. KOE is appended to 
the Attack Pattern Name field of each textual attack description. The results of step 4 for 
attack pattern 3 and 75 are introduced in Tables 58 and 59, respectively.  
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Table 66. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input 
Filters”). 
Attack Pattern ID 3 
Attack Pattern Name Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters (3) 
Description The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost 
characters, and processes the attacker‟s input. This occurs when 
the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic 
forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does 
not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms 
acceptable to the targeted API.    
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Perform white list rather than black list input validation. 
Canonicalize all data prior to validation. 
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in 
depth). 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, SI 
 
 
Table 59 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 75 
“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”. 
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Table 67. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”). 
Attack Pattern ID 75 
Attack Pattern Name Manipulating Writable Configuration Files (7) 
Description An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that 
influence/control the operation of the target software.  This 
attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of 
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these 
files. 
 
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that 
may have weaker permissions. System configuration in 
distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many 
administration points. For example, permissions may be set on 
the administrative GUI, the configuration file for the server as a 
whole, configuration files for specific domains and applications, 
special jar and other class files used to load resources at 
runtime, and even policy specific in .war and .ear files. A 
mistake in permissions setting in either the file acl or the content 
is an opening an attacker can use to elevate privilege. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege / Trust 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files 
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files 
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and 
configuration promotion procedures. 
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and 
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD 
Parent Mitigation AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC 
 
 
Step 5 requires the repeating of steps 2-4 for any remaining attack patterns.   
 
5.2. Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) 
Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) is a two part metric designated in the “x.y” 
notation. “x” counts the number of unique Attack Patterns that the Parent Mitigation helped 
mitigate. “y” counts the total number of Child Mitigations that can be traced to back to the 
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Parent Mitigation. This provides the ability to measure the impact provided by each of the 
17 Parent Mitigations. This can useful for answering “what-if” scenarios such as “Which 
mitigation provides the most „bang for the buck‟?” and “If I only have „x‟ number of 
security dollars to spend, which mitigations should I invest in?”  
The PMP security metric mandates a single graphical hierarchy model of all 101 
attack patterns. Because of the exhaustive nature of the CAPEC definition of each attack 
pattern, there is severe fan-out as Child Mitigations and Parent Mitigations are listed. Once 
all the graphical hierarchies are compiled into a single view, it is obvious that there is an 
abundance of mapped Child Mitigations (with their NIST details) and Parent Mitigations.  
The hierarchy model introduced in chapter 4 (Figure 9) can also be expanded to 
incorporate the entire CAPEC dictionary into a single hierarchy structure.  This process 
allows us to leverage the vast mappings created in earlier steps by providing a “forest” 
view of all 101 CAPEC attack patterns.  This forest view is the basis for our PMP metric. 
When the hierarchy model is used to view individual attack patterns, the model again uses 
a fan-in-fan-out approach.  Our forest view also utilizes this approach by providing abstract 
details at the top and bottom of the model while providing specific attack pattern 
information in the middle. The forest view is useful for examining relationship between 
attack patterns as a whole. Figure 24 introduces the forest view hierarchy along with the 
maximum number of entries for each level. Section 5.3 will show the completed results of 
this table for the 11 attack patterns used in our case study. 
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Figure 24. Attack Pattern Forest View with Maximum Number of Entries for Each Level. 
 
For readability purposes we modify Figure 24 to include an additional level. This is 
accomplished by adding a new row at the bottom to list each of the 17 Parent Mitigations 
once.  This allows us to tie each of the Parent Mitigations into a single Parent Mitigation 
instance. This value will serve as the “x” value for our PMP metric. This process also 
provides a location to record the PMP values and fits in with the fan-in-fan-out approach 
we have made use of throughout our research. Figure 25 introduces the new hierarchy with 
PMP level included, and the maximum number of entries for each field. 
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Figure 25. Forest View Hierarchy with Additional PMP and Maximum Number of Entries for Each Level. 
 
Using a model of all 101 attack patterns as outlined in Figure 25 allows for the 
review of each attack pattern from both a top-down or bottom-up perspective. From the 
top-down perspective, the Parent Threat (such as “Spoofing”) shows all of the attack 
patterns derived from it. Similarly, the bottom-up perspective shows all of the attack 
patterns that a Parent Mitigation (such as “Auditing and Accountability”) helps to prevent.  
An abbreviated outline of this model is introduced in Figure 26.  
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Attack Pattern ID
Description
Attack Pattern 
Name (KOE)
Child Mitigation
Parent Mitigation
PMP
Attack Pattern ID
Description
Attack Pattern 
Name (KOE)
Child Mitigation
Parent Mitigation
Attack Pattern ID
Description
Attack Pattern 
Name (KOE)
Child Mitigation
Parent Mitigation
PMPPMPPMP
Parent 
Threat
Parent 
Threat
 
Figure 26. Sample of the Forest View Including Multiple Hierarchies Funneling From Parent Threat to PMP. 
 
Adding PMP to the bottom of our hierarchy groups all of the individual Parent 
Mitigations into no more than 11 Parent Threats at the top and no more than 17 Parent 
Mitigations at the bottom.  Adding a single instance of Parent Mitigation at the bottom of 
our figure rids the hierarchies of repeating Parent Mitigations and summarizes what 
mitigation strategies are needed to protect the implementation. 
 After all of the attack patterns have been added to the forest view presented in 
Figure 26, we connect each of the individually listed Parent Mitigations to a single instance 
of the newly added PMP level. This is completed by connecting every attack pattern Parent 
Mitigation into a single instance of Parent Mitigation at the bottom of our hierarchy. Upon 
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completion of this work we are ready to calculate PMP.  The detailed steps required to 
calculate PMP are listed below. 
1. Calculate the PMP by recording the number of attack patterns each Parent 
Mitigation traces back to. Record this value in the “x” position of the metric. 
2. Utilize a “.” To separate the two-part metric.   
3. Calculate the “y” value by adding the total number of entries (across all 101 attack 
patterns) found in the NIST Child Mitigation(s) column, which relates to the Parent 
Mitigation. Record this value in the “y” position of the PMP metric. 
4. Record the Parent Mitigation and its corresponding PMP in a new table for 
readability. 
 
Step 1 of PMP creation calculates the initial “x” PMP value by adding the total 
number of attack patterns each Parent Mitigation helps to mitigate.  This is the total number 
of attack patterns which can be partially or fully mitigated by the given Parent Mitigation. 
This process can be accomplished by manually counting the total number of times each 
Parent Mitigation is used in the Parent Mitigation Row or by counting the total number of 
arrows coming out of the PMP row for each Parent Mitigation. This value is recorded in 
place of the “x” for PMP.  
We calculate the “y” value by adding the total number of times that a related NIST 
Child Mitigation appears across all 101 attack Patterns.  This information is found by 
reviewing the NIST Child Mitigation column for each attack pattern, as shown in Table 53. 
Both the “x” and “y” values (along with the Parent Mitigation name) are recorded in the 
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PMP level of the hierarchy introduced in Figure 26. Complete results of these steps will be 
shown in section 5.3. 
 The final step in Process 3 is to review the PMP values and present them in a two 
column table for ease of use and readability. This table will allow users to quickly review 
PMP without having to review the graphical hierarchies or the textual attack descriptions. 
An outline of this table is introduced in table 60. 
 
Table 68. Tabular Format for Presenting PMP Results. 
Parent Mitigation PMP 
  
 
 
5.3. Case Study Results 
Table 61 introduces the results of Steps 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 87 
where the KOE column and values are added to the right side of to the individual attack 
pattern tables. 
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Table 69. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”). 
 
 
Table 62 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Abuse of 
Functionality 
Forceful 
Browsing: 
87 
Authenticate 
request to every 
resource. In 
addition, every 
page or resource 
must ensure that 
the request it is 
handling has been 
made in an 
authorized context. 
AC17, IA2, 
IA3, MA4, 
SC8, SC23, 
SI10 
AC, IA, MA, 
SC, SI 
9 
Forceful browsing 
can also be made 
difficult to a large 
extent by not hard 
coding names of 
application pages 
or resources. This 
way, the attacker 
cannot figure out, 
from the 
application alone, 
the resources 
available from the 
present context. 
SC18, AT3, 
CA2, CA4, 
PL2, SA3, 
SA8, SA10 
AT, CA, 
PL,SA 
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Table 70. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”). 
 
 
Table 63 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 55. 
 
Table 71. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”). 
 
 
Table 64 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 60. 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Spoofing Man the 
Middle: 94 
Get your Public Key 
signed by a Certificate 
Authority 
CA4, IA5, 
IA7, SC13, 
SC17 
CA, IA, SC 5 
Encrypt your 
communication using 
cryptography (SSL,...) 
AC3, AC4, 
SC7, AC17, 
IA7, SC8, 
SC9, SC12, 
SC13, SI7 
AC ,SI 
Use Strong mutual 
authentication to 
always fully 
authenticate both ends 
of any 
communications 
channel. 
AC17, IA1, 
IA2, IA3, 
IA4, IA5, 
SC8, SC11, 
SC23, SI10 
 
Exchange public keys 
using a secure channel 
SC17, SC12, 
SC13 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Probabilistic 
Techniques 
Rainbow 
Table 
Pswd 
Cracking: 
55 
Use salt when 
computing password 
hashes. That is, 
concatenate the salt 
(random bits) with 
the original 
password prior to 
hashing it. 
SI7, SC13, 
IA5 
SI, SC, IA 3 
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Table 72. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 60 (“Resuing Session ID‟s”). 
 
 
Table 65 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 82. 
 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Exploitation 
of 
Authorization 
Reusing 
Session 
ID's: 60 
Always invalidate a 
session ID after the 
user logout. 
AC3, IA5, 
SC10, SC23, 
IA4 
AC, IA, SC 4 
Setup a session time 
out for the session 
IDs. 
AC11, AC12, 
SC23, IA4 
 
Protect the 
communication 
between the client 
and server. For 
instance it is best 
practice to use SSL 
to mitigate man in 
the middle attack. 
AC4, IA2, 
IA3, IA7, 
SC8, SC9, 
SC11, SC12, 
SC13, SC16, 
SC17, SC20, 
SC21, SC22, 
SC23 
SA 
Do not code send 
session ID with GET 
method, otherwise 
the session ID will be 
copied to the URL. In 
general avoid writing 
session IDs in the 
URLs. URLs can get 
logged in log files, 
which are vulnerable 
to an attacker. 
SC9, SC4, 
SC14, SC16, 
SA8 
 
Encrypt the session 
data associated with 
the session ID. 
AC3, SC4, 
SC7, SC23 
 
Use multifactor 
authentication. 
IA2  
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Table 73. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”). 
 
 
Table 66 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 2 for attack pattern 65. 
 
Table 74. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”). 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Resource 
Depletion 
XMLDoS 
(XDoS): 
82 
Design: Utilize a Security 
Pipeline Interface (SPI) 
to mediate 
communications between 
service requester and 
service provider The SPI 
should be designed to 
throttle up and down and 
handle a variety of 
payloads. 
AC4, SI9, 
SI10, AC3, 
CM6 
AC, SI, CM 6 
Design: Utilize clustered 
and fail over techniques, 
leverage network 
transports to provide 
availability such as 
HTTP load balancers 
AC4, CA3, 
SC6, SI4, 
CP10, SC5, 
SC22 
CA,SC, CP 
Implementation: Check 
size of XML message 
before parsing 
SI7, SI9, 
SI10 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Data 
Leakage 
Attacks 
Passive 
Sniffing
:  65 
 
Do not store secrets in 
client code 
 
CM6, PE19, 
RA3, SA8, 
PL4 
CM, PE, RA, 
SA, PL 
10 
Use Well-Known 
Cryptography 
Appropriately and 
Correctly 
AC3, AC17, 
IA7, MA4, 
SC8, SC9, 
SC12, SC13 
AC, IA, MA, 
SC 
Use Authentication 
Mechanisms, Where 
Appropriate, Correctly 
IA2, IA7, 
SC23, SI10 
SI 
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Table 67 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 101. 
 
Table 75. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”). 
 
 
Table 68 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 10. 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Injection Server Side 
Includes 
(SSI): 101 
Set the OPTIONS 
IncludesNOEXEC in 
the global access.conf 
file or local .htaccess 
(Apache) file to deny 
SSI execution in 
directories that do not 
need them 
CM1, CM6, 
CM7, SI6, 
SC3, AC6 
CM, SI, SC, 
AC 
4 
All user controllable 
input must be 
appropriately 
sanitized before use 
in the application. 
This includes 
omitting, or 
encoding, certain 
characters or strings 
that have the 
potential of being 
interpreted as part of 
an SSI directive 
SI7, SI9, SI10  
Server Side Includes 
must be enabled only 
if there is a strong 
business reason to do 
so. Every additional 
component enabled 
on the web server 
increases the attack 
surface as well as 
administrative 
overhead 
AC6  
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Table 76. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”). 
 
 
Table 69 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Data 
Structure 
Attacks 
Buffer 
Overflow 
via 
Environment 
Variables: 
10 
Do not expose 
environment variable 
to the user. 
AC6, CM6, 
RA3, RA5, 
SA10, SA11, 
SC4, SI10 
AC, CM, RA, 
SA, SC, SI 
9 
Do not use untrusted 
data in your 
environment 
variables. 
AC3, CM6, 
IA2, SC23, 
SI17, SI19, 
SI10 
IA,  
Use a language or 
compiler that 
performs automatic 
bounds checking 
SA8, PL2 PL 
There are tools such 
as Sharefuzz 
(http://sharefuzz.sour
ceforge.net/) which is 
an environment 
variable fuzzer for 
Unixes that support 
loading a shared 
library. You can use 
Sharefuzz to 
determine if you are 
exposing an 
environment variable 
vulnerable to buffer 
overflow. 
MA3, PL6 
RA5, SA10, 
SA11, SI2, 
SI4 
MA 
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Table 77. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”). 
 
 
 Step 3 of Process 3 appends KOE to the graphical hierarchy trees. Figure 27 
introduces the KOE metric included as part of the “Name” field in the graphical hierarchy 
trees.   
 
Parent 
Threat 
Attack 
Pattern 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
NIST Child 
Mitigation(s) 
Parent 
Mitigation(s) 
KOE 
Time 
and 
State 
Attacks 
Race 
Conditions 
(TOCTOU): 
29 
Use safe libraries to 
access resources such 
as files. 
SI7, SC18, SI, SC 6 
Be aware that improper 
use of access function 
calls such as chown(), 
tempfile(), chmod(), 
etc. can cause a race 
condition. 
AT2, AC3, 
IA2 
AT, AC, IA 
Use synchronization to 
control the flow of 
execution. 
SC3, AC4  
Use static analysis 
tools to find race 
conditions. 
SA11,SI10  
Pay attention to 
concurrency problems 
related to the access of 
resources. 
SA8, SC4 SA 
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigations: IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC
Name: Forceful Browsing (9)
Description:
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable through 
direct URL entry. 
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web 
application. 
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach 
sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or resource must ensure that 
the request it is handling has been made in an authorized context.
 Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by not hardcoding names of 
application pages or resources. This way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application 
alone, the resources available from the present context.
ID: 87
 
Figure 27. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack patterns 94 is introduced in Figure 28. 
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Parent Threat: Spoofing
Parent Mitigation: CA, IA, SC, AC, SI
Name: Man in the Middle (5)
Description:
This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The 
attacker places himself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component 
attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the 
attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it 
was never intercepted. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the 
potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an 
implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
 Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
 Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both 
ends of any communications channel.
 Exchange public keys using a secure channel
ID: 94
 
 
Figure 28. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 55 is introduced in 
Figure 29. 
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, IA
Name: Rainbow Table Password Cracking (3)
Description:
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored.  He then uses a rainbow table 
of precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password.  Once the original password 
corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system.
        A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various passwords.  A password chain is computed, 
starting from the original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R and a hash function H.  A 
recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 =  R(H(Xi)), X0 = P.  Then the hash chain of length n for the original 
password P can be formed:  X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, H(Xn).  P and H(Xn) are then stored together in 
the rainbow table.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Use salt when computing password hashes.  That is, 
concatenate the salt  (random bits) with the original password 
prior to hashing it.
ID: 55
 
 
Figure 29. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 94 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 60 is introduced in 
Figure 30. 
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC, IA
Name: Reusing Session ID’s (4)
Description:
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system 
in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID 
used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session 
hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
 Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
 Protect the communication between the client and server. For instance it is best practice to 
use SSL to mitigate man in the middle attack.
 Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the session ID will be copied to 
the URL. In general avoid writing session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files, 
which are vulnerable to an attacker.
 Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
 Use multifactor authentication.
ID: 60
 
 
Figure 30. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 82 is introduced in 
Figure 31. 
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP
Name: XML Denial of Service (XDoS) (6)
Description:
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course, 
most distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most closely associated 
with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post malicious XML payloads to the 
service provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. The main weakness 
in XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to determine 
routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation 
routines that XDoS targets. There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive payload and sends to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory 
representation of XML document, but when document is very large (for example, north of 1 Gb) service provider 
host may exhaust memory trying to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous small files that clog the system.
All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little 
to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.
Solutions and Mitigations
 Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate communications between 
service requester and service provider The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down 
and handle a variety of payloads.
 Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage network transports to provide 
availability such as HTTP load balancers
 Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing
ID: 82
 
 
Figure 31. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 101 is introduced in 
Figure 32. 
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, AC
Name: Server Side Includes (4)
Description:
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then 
gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross 
Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited 
scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language. 
Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, 
and execute shell commands.
Solutions and Mitigatins:
 Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf file or local .htaccess 
(Apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories that do not need them
 All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before use in the application. This 
includes omitting, or encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of being 
interpreted as part of an SSI directive
 Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong business reason to do so. Every 
additional component enabled on the web server increases the attack surface as well as 
administrative overhead
ID: 101
 
 
Figure 32. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 10 is introduced in 
Figure 33. 
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA
Name: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables (9)
Description: 
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through 
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they 
can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated 
buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment 
variables.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Do not expose environment variable to the user.
 Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
 Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking
 There are tools such as Sharefuzz (http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment 
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library. You can use Sharefuzz to 
determine if you are exposing an environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow.
ID: 10
 
Figure 33. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 65 is introduced in 
Figure 34. 
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks
Parent Mitigation: CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI
Name: Passive Sniffing (10)
Description:
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use it, as-is or 
through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information or exploit the trust 
relationship between the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a 
client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate 
with the server.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Do not store secrets in client code
 Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
 Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, 
Correctly
ID: 65
 
 
Figure 34. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”). 
 
The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 29 is introduced in 
Figure 35. 
157 
 
 
Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA
Name: Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use) (6)
Description:
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a 
resource and the time of use of a resource. The typical example is the file access. The 
attacker can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that he 
would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file 
and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the attacker 
could do something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of privilege.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
 Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), tempfile(), 
chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
 Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
 Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
 Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.
ID: 29
 
 
Figure 35. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 65 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of 
Use”). 
 
Step 4 of Process 3 appends KOE to the textual attack descriptions for each attack 
pattern. KOE is show in the textual attack descriptions in order to increase usability. Users 
who are reviewing textual attack descriptions are not required to look outside of the 
descriptions for the KOE value. The KOE is included as part of the “Attack Pattern Name” 
for each of the results below. Table 70 introduces the textual attack description with KOE 
for attack pattern 87. 
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Table 78. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”). 
Attack Pattern ID 87 
Attack Pattern Name Forceful Browsing (9) 
Description An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a 
website that are otherwise unreachable through direct URL 
entry.  
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed 
to protect access to portions of a web application.  
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, 
perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of 
the web application that have been improperly protected. 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page 
or resource must ensure that the request it is handling has been 
made in an authorized context.    
  
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by 
not hardcoding names of application pages or resources. This 
way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application alone, 
the resources available from the present context. 
Parent Mitigation IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC 
 
 
Table 71 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 94. 
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Table 79. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”). 
Attack Pattern ID 94 
Attack Pattern Name Man in the Middle (5) 
Description This type of attack targets the communication between two 
components (typically client and server). The attacker places 
himself in the communication channel between the two 
components. Whenever one component attempts to 
communicate with the other (data flow, authentication 
challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the 
opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the 
other component as if it was never intercepted. This 
interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised 
components unaware of the potential corruption or leakeage of 
their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle 
attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or 
identify between two components. 
Parent Threat Spoofing 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority 
Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...) 
Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate 
both ends of any communications channel. 
Exchange public keys using a secure channel 
Parent Mitigation CA, IA, SC, AC, SI 
 
 
Table 72 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 55. 
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Table 80. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”). 
Attack Pattern ID 55 
Attack Pattern Name Rainbow Table Password Cracking (3) 
Description An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of 
passwords are stored.  He then uses a rainbow table of 
precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original 
password.  Once the original password corresponding to the 
hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain 
access to the system. 
         
 A pasword rainbow table stores hash chains for various 
passwords.  A password chain is computed, starting from the 
original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R 
and a hash function H.  A recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 
=  R(H(Xi)), X0 = P.  Then the hash chain of length n for the 
original password P can be formed:  X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-
1, Xn, H(Xn).  P and H(Xn) are then stored together in the 
rainbow table. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Use salt when computing password hashes.  That is, concatenate 
the salt  (random bits) with the original password prior to 
hashing it. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC, IA 
 
 
Table 73 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 60. 
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Table 81. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”). 
Attack Pattern ID 60 
Attack Pattern Name Reusing Session ID‟s (4) 
Description This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the 
target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to 
reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to 
perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this 
type of attack is Session Replay. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Authentication 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.  
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.   
Protect the communication between the client and server. For 
instance it is best practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the 
middle attack.    
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the 
session ID will be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing 
session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files, 
which are vulnerable to an attacker.    
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID. 
Use multifactor authentication.  
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC, SA 
 
 
Table 74 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 82. 
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Table 82. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”). 
Attack Pattern ID 82 
Attack Pattern Name XMLDoS (XDoS) (6) 
Description XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any 
technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course, most 
distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases, 
and so on. XDoS is most closely associated with web services, 
SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post 
malicious XML payloads to the service provider designed to 
exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. 
The main weakness in XDoS is that the service provider 
generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to 
determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. 
It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines 
that XDoS targets. 
 
There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate 
 
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive 
payload and sends to service provider 
 
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses 
DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory representation of 
XML document, but when document is very large (for example, 
north of 1 Gb) service provider host may exhaust memory trying 
to build memory objects. 
 
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous 
small files that clog the system. 
 
All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of 
web services, where the service provider has little to no control 
over the service requester and any messages the service 
requester sends. 
Parent Threat Resource Depletion 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate 
communications between service requester and service provider 
The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down and handle 
a variety of payloads.  
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage 
network transports to provide availability such as HTTP load 
balancers     
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing 
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP 
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Table 75 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 101. 
 
Table 83. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”). 
Attack Pattern ID 101 
Attack Pattern Name Server Side Includes (SSI) (4) 
Description An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send 
code to a web application that then gets executed by the web 
server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results 
to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and 
information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the 
SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged 
scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently 
gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and 
execute shell commands. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf 
file or local .htaccess (Apache) file to deny SSI execution in 
directories that do not need them   
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized 
before use in the application. This includes omitting, or 
encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of 
being interpreted as part of an SSI directive  
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong 
business reason to do so. Every additional component enabled 
on the web server increases the attack surface as well as 
administrative overhead 
Parent Mitigation CM, SI, SC, AC 
 
 
Table 76 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 10. 
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Table 84. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variable”). 
Attack Pattern ID 10 
Attack Pattern Name Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables (9) 
Description This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through 
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds 
that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to 
overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust 
often placed in environment variables. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Do not expose environment variable to the user.  
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables. 
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking    
There are tools such as Sharefuzz 
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment 
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library. 
You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an 
environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow. 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA 
 
 
Table 77 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 65. 
 
Table 85. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”). 
Attack Pattern ID 65 
Attack Pattern Name Passive Sniffing (10) 
Description Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and 
can use it, as-is or through reverse-engineering, to glean 
sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between 
the client and server. 
 
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch 
being applied to a client component or any such interaction 
where the client is authorized to communicate with the server. 
Parent Threat Data Leakage Attack 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Do not store secrets in client code 
Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly 
Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly 
Parent Mitigation CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI 
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Table 78 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 29. 
 
Table 86. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”). 
Attack Pattern ID 29 
Attack Pattern Name Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use) (6) 
Description This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time 
of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. 
The typical example is the file access. The attacker can leverage 
a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that 
he would modify the resource between the first time the target 
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses 
the file. During that period of time, the attacker could do 
something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of 
privilege. 
Parent Threat Time and State Attacks 
Solutions and 
Mitigations 
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files. 
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as 
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition. 
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution. 
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions. 
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of 
resources. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA 
 
 
 This concludes the work for calculating and documenting KOE. Before we can 
calculate the PMP metric we are required to compile each of the individual attack patterns 
into a forest view as introduced in Figure 36.  
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87
Description
Forceful 
Browsing 
(9)
Child 
Mitigation
IA, MA, SC, 
SI, AT, CA, 
PL, SA, AC
Spoofing
Exploitation 
of Priv / 
Trust
Probabalistc 
Techniques
Exploitation of 
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Figure 36. Forest Hierarchy View Including all 11 Attack Patterns from Case Study. 
  
In order to conserve space, the “Description” and “Child Mitigations” are labeled 
generically.  The details for these fields can be found in the textual attack descriptions and 
the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary. 
More work is required before we can calculate PMP. We next add each of the 17 
Parent Mitigations at the bottom of Figure 36. This additional level will be used to tie each 
of the individually listed Parent Mitigations into a single instance.  The result of this 
process is introduced in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37. Forest Hierarchy View Including all 11 Attack Patterns from Case Study with 17 Parent Mitigations. 
 
 Before we can calculate the PMP metric we must cross reference each of the 
individually listed Parent Mitigations for each attack pattern back to a single Parent 
Mitigation (added in Figure 37). Figure 38 introduces the completed process of each Parent 
Mitigation cross referenced to a single Parent Mitigation. 
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Figure 38. Complete results of Case Study in Forest View. 
 
 Figure 38 completes the work necessary to calculate the PMP values. The first step 
in PMP creation requires that we calculate the PMP “x” value by counting the number of 
arrows entering each PMP field. Figure 39 zooms in on the first 4 entries of Figure 38 in 
order to clarify the counting process. 
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Figure 39. Zoomed in View of Forest View for Purpose of Calculating PMP “x” Value. 
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Figure 39 shows ten arrows entering the AC Parent Mitigation.  This Value is 
recorded as the “x” value in PMP.  Figure 39 shows two arrows entering the AT box, one 
entering AU, and four entering CA. Each of these values are recorded in the bottom level 
(PMP) of the hierarchy.  The complete results of step 1, are introduced in Figure 40.  
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Figure 40. Complete Case Study Results for PMP “x” Value 
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 Step 2 separates the “x” and “y” values with the use of a period. Step 3 calculates 
the PMP “y” value by examining the number of directly related NIST Children to each 
Parent Mitigation.  This value is calculated by examining the previously created KOE 
tables (Tables 56-57 and 61-69).  Figure 41 introduces the complete case study results for 
KOE and PMP value.  
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Figure 41. Complete Case Study Results Including KOE and PMP 
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Figure 41 is different from each of the previous figures because it includes a 
complete PMP value as show in the bottom level of the hierarchy. Step 4 creates a new 
table summarizing the complete PMP values for our case study. This allows users to 
quickly and accurately review PMP values without being overwhelmed by the Forest view 
presented in Figure 41. Table 79 introduces the PMP summary table. 
   
Table 87. Summarized Parent Mitigation Power. 
PM PMP 
AC 10.25 
AT 2.11 
AU 1.3 
CA 4.5 
CM 6.15 
CP 2.3 
IA 5.23 
MA 2.3 
PE 1.1 
PL 2.4 
RA 2.4 
SA 5.12 
SC 10.54 
SI 9.33 
 
 
Access Control (AC), System and Communication Protection (SC), System and 
Information Integrity (SI), and Identification and Authentication (IA) were the most 
common “x” values.  These four Parent Mitigations account for 35 total attack pattern 
touches.  The remaining 13 Parent Mitigations account for only 26 total attack pattern 
touches.  PMP is useful for security managers and decision makers to better leverage where 
and when to allocate resources. 
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System and Communication Protection (SC), System and Information Integrity 
(SI), Access Control (AC), and Identification and Authentication (IA) were the most used 
“y” values. The “y” values from these four Parent Mitigations make up 135 NIST Child 
Mitigation touches, while the remaining 13 Parent Mitigations are used a total of 61 times.  
These findings conclude that System and Communication Protection (SC) is the most 
commonly recommended NIST mitigation for the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary. 
5.4. Discussion and Results 
The Knock-Out Effect (KOE) security metric allows for the necessary mitigation 
strategies for each attack pattern to be calculated and documented. The higher the KOE, the 
more Child Mitigations it will take to fully prevent and/or recover from a specific attack. 
KOE is not a listing of necessary mitigation strategies, but rather a numeric count as to how 
many Child Mitigations are necessary. The exact listing of the Child Mitigations is 
included as part of the “solutions and mitigation” element for each attack pattern in the full 
release of the CAPEC dictionary.  
The creation of the Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) security metric is a measurable 
score associated with the chosen mitigation strategies of a specific implementation. 
Depending on what Parent and Child Threats are to be mitigated, a specific set of Child 
Mitigations will be employed. Because every Child Mitigation can be traced to a Parent 
Mitigation, we are able to measure how big of an impact each Parent Mitigation is having 
on the overall security posture of the system.  
Validation for Process 3 can be found through an analytical evaluation of our 
results with other relevant findings.  In January of 2009 SANS released a list of the “Top 
25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors”. This list is the result of a collaborative effort 
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between the SANS Institute, MITRE, and prominent software security experts from the 
United States and Europe (Christey, 2009). The intended purpose of the list is to raise 
awareness and educate consumers, programmers, and IT managers about the most common 
programmatic mistakes which lead to serious software vulnerabilities.  The vulnerabilities 
are considered serious because they allow attackers to steal data, compromise systems, or 
deny access to critical resources (Christey, 2009). Specific details for each of the Top 25 
errors are provided which include Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) ID, Name, 
Supporting Data Fields, Discussion, Prevention and Mitigations, Related CWEs, Related 
Attack Patterns, Attack Frequency, Ease of Detection, Remediation Cost, and Attacker 
Awareness.   
KOE in our approach is a count of the number of Parent Mitigations needed to fully 
mitigate a given attack pattern.  Attack patterns with larger KOE scores require more effort 
to mitigate than attack patterns with smaller KOE scores.  One of the descriptive fields 
provided for each of the Top 25 Programming Errors is “Remediation Cost”.  Remediation 
Cost is defined as “the amount of effort required to fix the weakness” (Christey, 2009).  
Given the structure of the SANS Top 25 Programming Errors, it is possible to correlate our 
KOE scores with the SANS Top 25 list.  Correlation of data between the KOE and SANS 
list can be used to provide validation for our metric.    
The completion of Process 3 for all 101 attack patterns resulted in KOE scores 
ranging from 1-10.  The SANS Institute ranks Remediation Cost on a 5 point scale with the 
following values:  Low, Low-Medium, Medium, Medium-High, High in the new Top 25. 
Table 80 introduces the corresponding KOE and Remediation Cost for each of matching 
attacks between CAPEC and the Top 25.   
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Table 88. SANS Remediation Cost versus Process 3 KOE. 
  
Error / Attack  Remediation Cost KOE 
Error Message Info Leak / 54 Low 2 
SQL Injection / 66 Low 3 
OS Command Injection / 88 Medium 3 
Race Condition / 29 Medium-High 8 
Cross Site Request Forgery / 62 High 6 
  
            Table 80 shows a high degree of correlation between our newly generate KOE and 
SANS Remediation Cost ranking.  It is important to note that only the Errors which had a 
directly matching name from the CAPEC Dictionary list were considered for comparison.   
Our research resulted in the full creation of 101 graphical hierarchies and 101 
textual attack descriptions.  Our approach also calculated and documented the KOE for 
each of the 101 attack patterns.  We combined each of the graphical hierarchies into a 
single forest view and calculated the PMP values for all 17 Parent Mitigations across each 
of the 101 attack patterns.  This work is significant as the results will not have to be 
completed again to be useful.  Our approach and subsequent metrics can be used 
immediately to aid in security related decisions.   
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Contributions and Applicability 
 
 Our main contribution is an approach which meets the objectives of the problem 
definition.  Our approach makes CAPEC more useable and consistent and is made up of 
three processes. 
1. Abstracting Parent Mitigations 
2. Creation of Trimmed Hierarchies for Modeling Attack Patterns 
3. Creation of Security Metrics  
 
A breakdown of our approach is introduced in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42. Detailed Diagram of Our Approach 
 
Our approach introduces a Parent Mitigation element to provide consistency and 
usability to the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary by incorporating the 800:53r2 NIST control 
repository directly into the CAPEC dictionary. Utilization of the existing NIST control 
group is important because it provides an accepted level of standardization. There is 
significant value in completing the abstraction process because CAPEC provides nearly 
400 individual controls listed in the current attack pattern dictionary.  Each of the 
mitigation strategies are now standardized into 17 Parent Mitigations at the same level of 
abstraction thus allowing adopters to make better use of the CAPEC dictionary. By 
abstracting these mitigations into 17 categories, users are less likely to dismiss a particular 
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attack pattern because the mitigation is too detailed or too vague. This is currently a risk for 
CAPEC adopters who believe that they are not at risk for a given attack because they do 
not have the specific technology mentioned in the CAPEC mitigation.  
Modeling hierarchy-based attack patterns begins by re-including a Parent Threat 
element into the dictionary to provide consistency and usability to the CAPEC Release 1 
Dictionary. We presented a new model for viewing CAPEC attack patterns which creates a 
standardized element set that provides context for how the elements are related. Because 
the current elements provide valuable information, we are not advocating their removal. 
Rather our intention is to present the data in a manageable and consistent manner and full 
details of the Release 1 dictionary will be readily available. Because the current dictionary 
can easily overwhelm users, creating consistent and useable views for each attack pattern is 
a valuable step to increasing the adoption and wide spread acceptance of the CAPEC 
standard.  
Our models allow CAPEC attack pattern information to be viewed from two 
distinct points of view.  Graphical hierarchies allow for viewing element, attack pattern, 
Parent Threat and Parent Mitigation relationships.  This allows users to trace both up from 
individual Parent Mitigations or down from individual Parent Threats.  The textual attack 
descriptions present an attack pattern point of view.  The creation of this model provides a 
stand-alone description for understanding the attack pattern. 
The ability to accurately implement controls and answer security questions like: “Is 
my security better this year?”, “What am I getting for my security dollars?” and “How do I 
compare with my peers?” requires the use of security metrics (Geer, Hoo, & Jaquith, 2003). 
Metrics are also required to gauge the suitability and effectiveness of controls (Geer et al., 
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2003). The creation of the Knock-Out Effect (KOE) security metric allows for the 
necessary mitigation strategies for each attack pattern to be calculated and documented. 
The higher the KOE, the more Child Mitigations it will take to fully prevent and/or recover 
from a specific attack. KOE is not a listing of necessary mitigation strategies, but rather a 
numeric count as to how many Child Mitigations are necessary. The exact listing of the 
Child Mitigations is included as part of the “solutions and mitigation” element for each 
attack pattern in the full release of the CAPEC dictionary and the textual attack 
descriptions. 
The creation of the Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) security metric is a score 
associated with the chosen mitigation strategies of a specific implementation. Depending 
on what Parent and Child Threats are to be mitigated, a specific set of Child Mitigations 
will be employed. Because every Child Mitigation can be traced to a Parent Mitigation, we 
are able to measure the impact each Parent Mitigation is having on the overall security 
posture of the system.  
Our research resulted in the creation of a hierarchy including all 101 attack patterns, 
101 textual attack descriptions, calculated the KOE for each of the 101 attack patterns, and 
calculated the PMP values for all 17 Parent Mitigations. Our approach can be used 
immediately to aid security related decisions. It is important to note that the results from 
our approach will always be the same regardless of who is completing the processes as 
long as they are followed explicitly.   
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6.2. Limitations  
 
  During Process 1 (Abstracting Parent Mitigations) it may be possible for others to 
reach different conclusions when matching CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations to NIST 
Parent Mitigations. Repeating this process several times and accumulating the results 
would help to alleviate this risk. Rigorous research methods need to be employed to ensure 
the elements and views proposed in Process 2 are appropriate for the target audience.  Our 
approach justified the selection of each element and view, but need to be justified in an 
applied setting.  The use of surveys and qualitative research method tools would ensure that 
each element and view is appropriate when applied outside of an academic environment.  
 Another identified limitation of our current approach is the lack of an automated 
tool for presenting CAPEC attack pattern information. While our approach has made 
CAPEC more consistent and usable, the implementation of CAPEC in an applied 
environment still requires manual review of the documentation. This causes the amount of 
time required to appropriately use CAPEC to be long. Automated tools would help in 
reducing the time factor of our approach and reduce or eliminate human error. 
 Due to the severe fan-in-fan-out and abundance of mappings, the completed Forest 
view, containing all 101 attack patterns, is overwhelming.  New views, which include 
subsets of the tree, are needed if the Forest view is to be useful. The use of an automated 
tool would be beneficial for showing various components of the Forest view.    
 
6.3. Future Work 
Incorporating our work into an automated system would allow for a much quicker 
way of interacting with the standard.  For example, a tool that assisted in managing and 
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displaying the various views would be of great benefit because of the static nature of our 
work. Such a tool would allow security “what-if” scenarios to be quickly and accurately 
answered. The tool would present a variety of views and information including: full attack 
pattern information, graphical hierarchy trees, textual attack descriptions, attacks related by 
Parent Threat,  KOE and PMP values, and a full forest view. The ability to quickly and 
accurately switch between each of these views would be a positive because time would be 
saved and human error avoided. 
The work completed here needs to be forwarded on to the CAPEC community for 
review and consideration. Our research shares a common goal with the CAPEC organizers:  
increasing usability and consistency of the standard.  The CAPEC community may be able 
to make use of both the Parent Threat and Parent Mitigations elements as well as the KOE 
and PMP metrics. 
Other future work includes addressing the issues outlined in 6.2.  Specifically, 
future work calls for ensuring that the views and metrics are both useful and accurate for 
end users and adopters.  The use of surveys and other quantitative research methods needs 
to be employed to be certain that the appropriate elements and the appropriate number of 
elements are being used.  The use of research methods also need to be applied to measure 
the appropriateness and effectiveness of our security metrics. 
Given the vast repository of information which can be leveraged between the NIST 
and CAPEC standards, other future work could be conducted to include new security 
metrics. 
 
  
182 
 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
Ali, M., Hilton, E. R., & Peter, S. B. (1985). Bayesian Probabilistic Risk Analysis. 13(1), 
5-12. 
Arce, I. (2004). More Bang For the Bug: An Account of 2003's Attack Trends. Attack 
Trends. 
Barnum, S. (2007). Attack Patterns as a Knowledge Resource for Building Secure 
Software. In A. Sethi (Ed.). OMG Software Assurance Workshop: Cigital. 
Barnum, S. (2007). Attack Patterns: Knowing Your Enemy in Order to Defeat Them. Paper 
presented at the Black Hat DC 2007. 
Barnum, S. (2008). Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) 
Schema Description. 
Barnum, S., & Amit, S. (2006a). Further Information on Attack Patterns. Build Security In 
Setting a Higher Standard for Software Assurance, from https://buildsecurityin.us-
cert.gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/attack/589.html 
Barnum, S., & Amit, S. (2006b, 2006-11-07). Introduction to Attack Patterns. from 
https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/attack/585-BSI.html 
Barnum, S., & Sethi, A. Attack Pattern Glossary. Build Security In. https://buildsecurityin. 
uscert. gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/attack/590. pdf. 
Bedford, T., & Cooke, R. (2001). Probabilistic Risk Analysis: Foundations and Methods: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bell, D. (1996). The Bell-LaPadula Model. Journal of Computer Security, 4(2), 3. 
Benioff, M. R., & Lazowska, E. D. (2005). Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization. 
President's Information Technology Advisory Committee  
Benoit, A. A., Michel, P., & Suzanne, R. (2005). A Framework for Information 
Technology Outsourcing Risk Management. 36(4), 9-28. 
Bishop, M. (2003). What Is Computer Security? University of California,Davis. 
Blakley, B., McDermott, E., & Geer, D. (2001). Information Security is Information Risk 
Management. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2001 workshop on New 
security paradigms. 
Booch, G., Rumbaugh, J., & Jacobson, I. (1999). The unified modeling language user 
guide: Addison-Wesley Reading Mass. 
183 
 
 
Borlund, P., & Ingwersen, P. (1997). The Development of a Method for the Evaluation of 
Interactive Information Retrieval Systems. Journal of Documentation, 53, 225-250. 
Brenner, J. (2007). ISO 27001: Risk management and compliance. Risk Management 
Magazine, 54(1), 24-29. 
Burger, A. K. (2006). US Mobile Security, Part 1: How Great Is the Risk? 
Byres, E. J., Franz, M., & Miller, D. (2004). The Use of Attack Trees in Assessing 
Vulnerabilities in SCADA Systems. International Infrastructure Survivability 
Workshop (IISW'04), IEEE, Lisbon, Portugal, December, 4. 
Calder, A. (2006). Information Security Based on ISO 27001/ISO 17799: A Management 
Guide: Van Haren Publishing. 
capec.mitre.org. (2007). CAPEC - Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC). from http://capec.mitre.org/ 
Cavusoglu, H., Mishra, B., & Raghunathan, S. (2004). A Model for Evaluating IT Security 
Investments. 47(7), 87-92. 
CERT. (2007). Vulnerability Remediation Statistics. Full Statistics, from 
http://www.cert.org/stats/fullstats.html 
Chakrabarti, A., & Manimaran, G. (2002). Internet Infrastructure Security: a Taxonomy. 
Network, IEEE, 16(6), 13-21. 
Chow, S. S. M., Hui, L. C. K., Yiu, S. M., Chow, K. P., & Lui, R. W. C. (2005). A Generic 
Anti-Spyware Solution by Access Control List at Kernel Level. The Journal of 
Systems & Software, 75(1-2), 227-234. 
Christey, S. (2009). CWE/SANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors. SANS 
Institute    
Ciampa, M. (2005). Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals (2nd ed.): 
Thomson Course Technology. 
Coleman, T., & Jamieson, M. (1991). Information systems: evaluating intangible benefits 
at the feasibility stage of project appraisal. Unpublished MBA thesis, City 
University Business School, London. 
Daley, K., Larson, R., & Dawkins, J. (2002). A structural framework for modeling multi-
stage network attacks. Parallel Processing Workshops, 2002. Proceedings. 
International Conference on, 5-10. 
DeLooze, L. L. (2004). Classification of Computer Attacks Using a Self-Organizing Map. 
Information Assurance Workshop, 2004. Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE 
SMC, 365-369. 
184 
 
 
Ellison, R. J., Fisher, D., Linger, R. C., Lipson, H. F., Longstaff, T., & Mead, N. R. (1997). 
Survivable Network Systems: An Emerging Discipline. Software Engineering 
Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, CMU/SEI-97-TR-013, November. 
Ellison, R. J., Fisher, D. A., Linger, R. C., Lipson, H. F., Longstaff, T. A., & Mead, N. R. 
An Approach to Survivable Systems. NATO 1 stSymposium on Protecting Inform. 
Systems in the 21 stCentury, 25-27. 
Ellison, R. J., Fisher, D. A., Linger, R. C., Lipson, H. F., Longstaff, T. A., & Mead, N. R. 
(1999). Survivability: Protecting Your Critical Systems. 
Emmanuel, W., & Yu, S. Protecting Networks: Introduction to Network Security. 
cng.ateneo.net: Ateneo de Manila University. 
Engebretson, P., & Pauli, J. (2008, November, 2008). Realizing Knock-Out Effect and 
Parent Mitigation Power for Detailed Attack Patterns: A Case Study. Paper 
presented at the Software Engineering and Applications (SEA 08), Orlando, FL, 
USA. 
Engebretson, P., Pauli, J., & Streff, K. (2008, July, 2008). Abstracting Parent Mitigations 
from the CAPEC Attack Pattern Dictionary. Paper presented at the Security and 
Management (SAM 08), Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
English, J., Hearst, M., Sinha, R., Swearingen, K., & Yee, K. P. (2002). Hierarchical 
Faceted Metadata in Site Search Interfaces. 
Fadia, A. (2002). Network Security: A Hacker's Perspective: Course Technology. 
Farbey, B., Land, F., & Targett, D. (1992). Evaluating investments in IT. JIT. Journal of 
information technology(Print), 7(2), 109-122. 
Fithen, W. (2005). Ensure that Input Is Properly Canonicalized. Retrieved. from. 
Flowerday, S., & Von Solms, R. (2005). Real-Time Information Integrity = Systems 
Integrity + Data Integrity + Continuous Assurances. Computers & Security, 24(8), 
604-613. 
Fong, E., Gaucher, R., Okun, V., Black, P. E., & Dalci, E. (2008). Building a Test Suite for 
Web Application Scanners. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
Proceedings of the 41st Annual, 478-478. 
Fung, C., Chen, Y. L., Wang, X., Lee, J., Tarquini, R., Anderson, M., et al. (2005). 
Survivability Analysis of Distributed Systems Using Attack Tree Methodology. 
Military Communications Conference, 2005. MILCOM 2005. IEEE, 1-7. 
Fung, P., & Longley, D. (2003). Electronic Information Security Documentation. 25-31. 
185 
 
 
Futoransky, A., Notarfrancesco, L., Richarte, G., & Sarraute, C. Building Computer 
Network Attacks: Technical report, CoreLabs. 
Gamma, E., Helm, R., Johnson, R., & Vlissides, J. (1995). Design Patterns: Elements of 
Reusable Object-Oriented Software: Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., 
Inc. Boston, MA, USA. 
Gautam, B., Kenneth, A. D., & Kazuhiko, K. (1989). Applications of Qualitative Modeling 
to Knowledge-Based Risk Assessment Studies. Paper presented at the Proceedings 
of the 2nd international conference on Industrial and engineering applications of 
artificial intelligence and expert systems - Volume 1. 
Geer, D., Hoo, K. S., & Jaquith, A. (2003). Information Security: Why the Future Belongs 
to the Quants. IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, 24-32. 
Gegick, M., & Williams, L. (2005). Matching attack patterns to security vulnerabilities in 
software-intensive system designs. 1-7. 
Grance, T., Hash, J., & Stevens, M. (2003). NIST Special Publication 800-64, Security 
Considerations in the Information System Development Life Cycle. October, 
Retrieved on, 26, 800-864. 
Haasl, D. F., Roberts, N. H., Vesely, W. E., & Goldberg, F. F. (1981). Fault Tree 
Handbook: NUREG-0492, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
(USA). Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. 
Hamdi, M., & Boudriga, N. (2003). Algebraic Specification of Network Security Risk 
Management. 52-60. 
Hansche, S., Berti, J., & Hare, C. (2003). Official (ISC) 2 Guide to the CISSP Exam: 
Auerbach Publications. 
Hansman, S., & Hunt, R. (2005). A taxonomy of network and computer attacks. Computers 
& Security, 24(1), 31-43. 
Hearst, M. A. (2006). Clustering Versus Faceted Categories for Information Exploration. 
49(4), 59-61. 
Hevner, A. R., March, S. T., Park, J., & Ram, S. (2004). Design Science in Information 
Systems Research (Vol. 28, pp. 75-106): MIS RESEARCH CENTER-SCHOOL 
OF MANAGEMENT. 
Hoglund, G., & McGraw, G. (2004). Exploiting Software: How to Break Code: Pearson 
Higher Education. 
Holden, G. (2003). Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures: Course Technology 
Press United States. 
186 
 
 
Hong, M. A Phenomenon Approach to Faceted Classification. Paper presented at the 53rd 
Conference of the Japan Society of Library and Information Science (JSLIS). 
ISACA. (2008). COBIT 4.1. from www.isaca.org/cobit/ 
ISO. (2005). 27002:2005. from 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=
50297 
Jajodia, S. (2007). Topological analysis of network attack vulnerability. Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security: Proceedings of the 2 nd ACM symposium 
on Information, computer and communications security, 20(22), 2-2. 
Jones, K., Shema, M., & Johnson, B. C. (2002). Anti-Hacker Tool Kit: McGraw-Hill 
Osborne Media. 
Koziol, J., Litchfield, D., Aitel, D., Anley, C., Eren, S., Mehta, N., et al. (2004). The 
Shellcoder's Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Kwasnik, B. H. (1999). The Role of Classification in Knowledge Representation and 
Discovery. Library Trends   48(1), 22-47. 
Lewis, T. G. (2006). Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a 
Networked Nation: Wiley-Interscience. 
Lindqvist, U., & Jonsson, E. (1997). How to Systematically Classify Computer Security 
Intrusions. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 83-99. 
Logan, P. Y., & Clarkson, A. (2005). Teaching students to hack: curriculum issues in 
information security. Proceedings of the 36th SIGCSE technical symposium on 
Computer science education, 157-161. 
Mauw, S., & Oostdijk, M. (2005). Foundations of attack trees. Information Security and 
Cryptography (LNCS 3935), D. Won and S. Kim (Eds.), Springer, Berlin-
Heidelberg, Germany, 186–198. 
McClure, S., Scambray, J., & Kurtz, G. (2005). Hacking Exposed 5th Edition (Hacking 
Exposed): McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. 
McCumber, J. (2004). Assessing and Managing Security Risk in It Systems: A Structured 
Methodology: Auerbach Pub. 
McGraw, G. (2006). Software Security: Building Security In: Addison-Wesley 
Professional. 
187 
 
 
Moore, A. P., Ellison, R. J., & Linger, R. C. (2001). Attack Modeling for Information 
Security and Survivability: Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering 
Institute. 
Myerson, J. M. (2002). Identifying Enterprise Network Vulnerabilities. 12(3), 135-144. 
Neumann, P. G. (2004). Principled Assuredly Trustworthy Composable Architectures. 
Final Report, DARPA, 1. 
NIST. (2002). 800-30. Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, 800-
830. 
NIST. (2006). 800-53. Retrieved. from. 
NIST. (2007). 800-53 Rev. 2. Retrieved. from. 
Pauli, J., & Engebretson, P. (2008a). Hierarchy-Drive Approach for Attack Patterns in 
Software Security Education. Paper presented at the 5th International Conference 
on Information Technology : New Generations, Las Vegas. 
Pauli, J., & Engebretson, P. (2008b). Towards a Specification Prototype for Hierarchy-
Driven Attack Patterns. Paper presented at the 5th International Conference on 
Information Technology : New Generations (ITNG 2008), Las Vegas. 
Peltier, T. R. (2005). Information Security Risk Analysis: Auerbach Pub. 
Recipes, S. Gray Hat Hacking: The Ethical Hacker‟s Handbook. 
Rinaldi, S. M., Peerenboom, J. P., & Kelly, T. K. (2001). Identifying, Understanding, and 
Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies. Control Systems Magazine, 
IEEE, 21(6), 11-25. 
Rockland, R. H. (2000). Reducing the information overload: a method on helping students 
research engineering topics using the Internet. Education, IEEE Transactions on, 
43(4), 420-425. 
Rowe, W. D. (1977). An Anatomy of Risk. New York et al. 
Russell, R. (2002). Hack Proofing Your Network: Syngress. 
Salter, C., Saydjari, O. S., Schneier, B., & Wallner, J. (1998). Toward a secure system 
engineering methodolgy. Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security 
paradigms, 2-10. 
Schechter, S. E. (2005). Toward Econometric Models of the Security Risk from Remote 
Attacks. 
Scheer, A. W., & Habermann, F. (2000). Enterprise resource planning: making ERP a 
success. Communications of the ACM, 43(4), 57-61. 
188 
 
 
Schneier, B. (1999). Attack Trees. Dr. Dobb’s Journal, 24(12), 21-29. 
Schneier, B. (2000). Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. New York, NY, USA. 
Skoudis, E., & Liston, T. (2006). Counter Hack Reloaded A Step-by-Step Guide to 
Computer Attacks and Effective Defenses (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River: Prentice 
Hall. 
Steffan, J., & Schumacher, M. (2002). Collaborative attack modeling. Paper presented at 
the Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing. 
Stoneburner, G., Goguen, A., & Feringa, A. (2002). Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems. NIST Special Publication, 800-830. 
Swiderski, F., & Snyder, W. (2004). Threat Modeling: Microsoft Press. 
Templeton, S. J., & Levitt, K. (2001). A requires/provides model for computer attacks. 
Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms, 31-38. 
Tidwell, T., Larson, R., Fitch, K., & Hale, J. (2001). Modeling Internet Attacks. 
Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security, 
59. 
Viega, J., & McGraw, G. (2002). Building Secure Software: Addison-Wesley Boston. 
Visintine, V. (2003). An Introduction to Information Risk Assessment. SANS institute, 8. 
von Solms, B. (2005). Information Security governance: COBIT or ISO 17799 or both? 
Computers & Security, 24(2), 99-104. 
Wang, H., & Wang, C. (2003). Taxonomy of Security Considerations and Software 
Quality. Communications of the ACM, 46(6), 75-78. 
Weinstein, C. E., & Mayer, R. E. (1986). The Teaching of Learning Strategies. Handbook 
of research on teaching, 3, 315-327. 
Whitman, M. E., & Mattord, H. J. (2003). Principles of information security: Boston, 
Mass.; London: Thomson/Course Technology. 
Willcocks, L. (1992). Evaluating Information Technology Investments: Research Findings 
and Reappraisal. Information Systems Journal, 2(4), 243-268. 
Woerner, R. (2007). Security Friday Fast Fact: Risky Business (without Tom Cruise). 
Ye, Y., Barry, B., & Betsy, C. (2006). Assessing COTS Integration Risk Using Cost 
Estimation Inputs. Paper presented at the Proceeding of the 28th international 
conference on Software engineering. 
 
189 
 
 
 
 
  
190 
 
 
APPENDIX I: 101 Attack Patterns: Complete 
 
Textual Attack Descriptions 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 1 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs (2) 
Description In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is 
mitigated by the authorization framework, whose job it is to map ACLs 
to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for 
web apps. In the case that the application deployer failed to specify an 
ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with 
impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not 
properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and 
possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can 
access resources that must be available only to users at a higher 
privilege level, can access management sections of the application or 
can run queries for data that he is otherwise not supposed to. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. In a J2EE setting, deployers can associate a role that is impossible 
for the authenticator to grant users, such as "NoAccess", with all 
Servlets to which access is guarded by a limited number of servlets 
visible to, and accessible by, the user.. Having done so, any direct 
access to those protected Servlets will be prohibited by the web 
container. In a more general setting, the deployer must mark every 
resource besides the ones supposed to be exposed to the user as 
accessible by a role impossible for the user to assume. The default 
security setting must be to deny access and then grant access only 
to those resources intended by business logic. 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 2 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Inducing Account Lockout, (2) 
Description An attacker leverages the security functionality of the system aimed at 
thwarting potential attacks to launch a denial of service attack against a 
legitimate system user.  Many systems, for instance, implement a 
password throttling mechanism that locks an account after a certain 
number of incorrect log in attempts.  An attacker can leverage this 
throttling mechanism to lock a legitimate user out of their own 
account.  The weakness that is being leveraged by an attacker is the 
very security feature that has been put  in place  to counteract attacks. 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. implement intelligent password throttling mechanisms such as 
those which take IP address into account, in addition to the login 
name. 
2. When implementing security features, consider how they can be 
misused and made to turn on themselves. 
 
Parent Mitigation IA, PL 
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Attack Pattern ID 3 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters (3) 
Description An attacker intentionally introduces leading characters that enable 
getting the input past the filters. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Perform white list rather than black list input validation. 
2. Canonicalize all data prior to validation. 
3. Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth). 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, SL 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 4 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Alternative IP Address Encodings (3) 
Description This attack relies on the attacker using unexpected formats for 
representing IP addresses. Networked applications may expect network 
location information in a specific format, such as fully qualified 
domains names, URL, IP address, or IP Address ranges. The issue that 
the attacker can exploit is that these design assumptions may not be 
validated against a variety of different possible encodings and network 
address location formats. Applications that use naming for creating 
policy namespaces for managing access control may be susceptible to 
queryin directly by IP addresses, which is ultimately  a more generally 
authoritative way of communicating on a network. 
Alternative IP addresses can be used by the attacker to bypass 
application access control in order to gain access to data that is only 
protected by obscuring its location.  
In addition this type of attack can be used as a reconnaissance 
mechansim to provide entry point information that the attacker gathers 
to penetrate deeper into the system. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Default deny access control policies 
2. Design: Input validation routines should check and enforce both 
input data types and content against a positive specification. In 
regards to IP addresses, this should include the authorized manner 
for the application to represent IP addresses and not accept user 
specified IP addresses and IP address formats (such as ranges) 
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
Parent Mitigation AC SC SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 5 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing) (2) 
Description This attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been 
around for decades. The signal is sent by the attacker to impersonate a 
supervisor signal. This has the effect of rerouting or usurping 
command of the line and call. While the US infrastructure proper may 
not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many 
companies are connected globally through call centers and business 
process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in 
countries which have not upgraded telco infrastructure and so are 
vulnerable to Blue boxing. 
 
Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce 
strong authentication for administrative functions. While the 
infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web 
applications, there are hisotrical lessons to be learned to upgrade the 
access control for administrative functions. 
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Implementation: Upgrade phone lines. Note this may be 
prohibitively expensive  
2. Use strong access control such as two factor access control for 
adminsitrative access to the switch 
Parent Mitigation AC, MA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 6 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Argument Injection (2) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows 
an attacker's commands to be directly or indirectly applied as 
arguments, for example as shell commands. This may allow an attacker 
access to files, network resources, media, and in short anything 
accessible through the shell. 
The argument injection attack uses the exposed service or method as a 
launch pad to invoke other programs. If the service does not validate or 
filter the input data then the client program is granted access to execute 
commands using the server's privileges. The OS commands can be 
appended to standard input for shell programs, HTTP Requests, and 
XML messages.  
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Do not program input values directly on command shell, 
instead treat user input as guilty until proven innocent. Build a 
function that takes user input and converts it to applications 
specific types and values, stripping or filtering out all unauthorized 
commands and characters in the process.  
2. Design: Limit program privileges, so if metacharcters or other 
methods circumvent program input validation routines and shell 
access is attained then it is not running under a privileged account. 
chroot jails create a sandbox for the application to execute in, 
making it more difficult for an attacker to elevate privilege even in 
the case that a compromise has occurred.  
3. Implementation: Implement an audit log that is written to a 
separate host, in the event of a compromise the audit log may be 
able to provide evidence and details of the compromise.  
Parent Mitigation AT, PL 
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Attack Pattern ID 7  
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Blind SQL Injection (2) 
Description Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL 
Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are 
considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to 
prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection 
that overcomes the lack of error messages.  Without the error messages 
that facilitate SQL Injection, the attacker constructs input strings that 
probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions.  The 
attacker can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was 
successful based on whether the query was executed or not.  Applied 
iteratively, the attacker determines how and where the target is 
vulnerable to SQL Injection. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Security by Obscurity is not a solution to preventing SQL 
Injection. Rather than suppress error messages and exceptions, the 
application must handle them gracefully, returning either a custom 
error page or redirecting the user to a default page, without 
revealing any information about the database or the application 
internals. 
2. Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be 
validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. 
Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered 
in addition to characters such as a single-quote(') or SQL-
comments (--) based on the context in which they appear. 
Parent Mitigation SI, CM 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 8  
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Buffer Overflow in an API Call (2) 
Description This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are 
vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An attacker who has access to an 
API may try to embed malicious code in the API function call and 
exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability in the function's 
implementation. All clients that make use of the code library thus 
become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on 
security across a system, usually affecting more than one software 
process. 
Parent Threat Buffer Overflow, API Abuse, Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking. 
2. Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow. 
3. If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do 
boundary checking. 
4. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, 
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this 
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution. 
5. Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution. 
Parent Mitigation AT, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 9 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities (5) 
Description This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of 
shells. An attacker can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-
line utility to escalate privilege to root. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Carefully review the service's implementation before making it 
available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated 
code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow. 
2. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking. 
3. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a 
complete solution. 
4. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, 
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this 
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution. 
5. Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a 
complete solution. 
6. Apply the latest patches to your user exposed services. This may 
not be a complete solution, specially against zero day attack. 
7. Do not unnecessarily expose services. 
Parent Mitigation RA, SI, CM, SA, AC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 10  
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Buffer Overflow Via Environment Variables (4) 
Description This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through 
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that 
they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow 
associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in 
environment variables. 
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Do not expose environment variable to the user. 
2. Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables. 
3. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking 
4. You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an 
environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow 
Parent Mitigation SI,AC,CM, RA 
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Attack Pattern ID 11 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Cause Web Server Misclassification  (2) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a Web server's decision to take action 
based on filename or file extension. Because different file types are 
handled by different server processes, misclassification may force the 
Web server to take unexpected action, or expected actions in an 
unexpected sequence. This may cause the server to exhaust resources, 
supply debug or system data to the attacker, or bind an attacker to a 
remote process. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Implementation: Server routines should be determined by content 
not determined by filename or file extension. 
Parent Mitigation CM, IA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 12 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/Multicast Channel 
(2) 
Description Attackers aware that more data is being fed into a multicast or public 
information distribution means can 'select' information bound only for 
another client, even if the distribution means itself forces users to 
authenticate in order to connect initally. 
Doing so allows the attacker to gain access to possibly privileged 
information, possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution 
means by impersonation. 
If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output 
mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of 
attack could change its identifier from a less privileged to more so 
privileged channel or command. 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Associate some ACL (in the form of a token) with an 
authenticated user which they provide middleware. The 
middleware uses this token as part of its channel/message selection 
for that client, or part of a discerning authorization decision for 
privileged channels/messages. The purpose is to architect the 
system in a way that associates proper authentication/authorization 
with each channel/message. 
2. Rearchitect system input/output channels as appropriate to 
distribute self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise 
protect) channels/messages so that only authorized readers can see 
them. 
Parent Mitigation IA, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 13 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Subverting Environment Variable Values (3) 
Description The attacker directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used 
by or controlling the target software.  The attacker‟s goal is to cause 
the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner 
that benefits the attacker. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Protect environment variables against unauthorized read and write 
access. 
2. Protect the configuration files which contain environment 
variables against illegitimate read and write access. 
3. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list 
should not be permitted to enter into the system. 
4. Apply the least privilege principles. If a process has no legitimate 
reason to read an environment variable do not give that privilege. 
Parent Mitigation AC, SM, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 14 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Client-side Induction-induced Buffer Overflow (10) 
Description This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted 
client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-
built hostile service.  
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. The client software should not install untrusted code from a non 
authenticated server. 
2. The client software should have the latest patches and should be 
audited for vulnerabilities before being used to communicate with 
potentially hostile servers. 
3. Perform input validation for length of buffer inputs. 
4. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking. 
5. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a 
complete solution. 
6. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, 
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this 
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution. 
7. Ensure all buffer uses are consistently bounds-checked. 
8. Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution. 
 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, IA SA, SI, AU, CA, MA, RA, AT 
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Attack Pattern ID 15 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Command Delimiters (4) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows 
an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command 
with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or 
database. The system that uses a filter or a blacklist input validation, as 
opposed to whitelist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who 
predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the 
filter or blacklist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the 
command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the 
application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell 
commands, network scanning, and so on. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Perform whitelist validation against a positive 
specification for command length, type, and parameters.  
2. Design: Limit program privileges, so if commands circumvent 
program input validation or filter routines then commands do not 
running under a privileged account  
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.  
4. Implementation: Use type conversions such as JDBC prepared 
statements.  
 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, SA, RA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 16 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Dictionary-based Password Attack (10) 
Description An attacker tries each of the words in a dictionary as passwords to gain 
access to  the system via some user's account.  If the password chosen 
by the user was a word within the dictionary, this attack will be 
successful (in the absence of other mitigations). This is a specific 
instance of the password brute forcing attack pattern.   
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system 
enforces this policy.  
2. Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care 
must be taken to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively 
enable account lockout attacks such as CAPEC-02.  
Parent Mitigation AC, AT, AU, CA, CM, IA, MP, PL, PS, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 17 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files(3) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an 
attacker to either directly access an executable file, for example 
through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an attacker to 
upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message 
oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are 
particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the 
administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct 
privileges for each interface. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege  
2. Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or 
utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain 
privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.  
3. Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and 
vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and 
interfaces that grant direct access to executables.  
Parent Mitigation AC, AU, IA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 18 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Embedding Scripts in Nonscript Elements (5) 
Description This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious 
scripts are embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts 
such as image tags (<img>), comments in XML documents (< !-
CDATA->), etc. These tags may not be subject to the same input 
validation, output validation, and other content filtering and checking 
routines, so this can create an opportunity for an attacker to tunnel 
through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through 
other elements. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side 
scripting.  
2. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is 
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.  
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.  
4. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.  
5. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in 
browser  
6. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host  
7. Implementation: Service provider should not use the 
XMLHttpRequest method to create a local proxy for content from 
other sites, because the client will not be able to discern what 
content comes from which host. 
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, SC, IA, MP 
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Attack Pattern ID 19 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Embedding Scripts within Scripts (6) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are 
brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts. The attacker 
leverages this capability to execute scripts to execute his/her own script 
by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to 
execute. The attacker must have the ability to inject script into script 
that is likely to be executed. If this is done, then the attacker can 
potentially launch a variety of probes and attacks against the web 
server's local environment, in many cases the so-called DMZ, back end 
resources the web server can communicate with, and other hosts.  
 
With the proliferation of intermediaries, such as Web App Firewalls, 
network devices, and even printers having JVMs and Web servers, 
there are many locales where an attacker can inject malicious scripts. 
Since this attack pattern defines scripts within scripts, there are likely 
privileges to execute said attack on the host. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side 
scripting.  
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement  
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR 
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the 
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where 
the data is originating from.  
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is 
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.  
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.  
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.  
7. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in 
browser  
8. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host  
9. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors 
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities 
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in 
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS 
countermeasures mitigates this.  
10. Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, 
ensure system runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode 
Parent Mitigation PL, SC, AC, RA, AC, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 20 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Encryption Brute Force(4) 
Description An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm 
used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to 
determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. In theory a brute force attack performing an exhaustive keyspace 
search will always succeed, so the goal is to have computational 
security. Moore's law needs to be taken into account that suggests 
that computing resources double every eighteen months. 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, PS, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 21 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Exploitation of Session IDs,Resource IDs, Trusted Credentials (3) 
Description Attacks on session IDs and resource IDs take advantage of the fact that 
some software accepts user input without verifying its authenticity. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Authentication 
Solutions and Mitigations 
1. Design: utilize strong federated identity such as SAML to encrypt 
and sign identity tokens in transit.  
2. Implementation: Use industry standards session key generation 
mechanisms that utilize high amount of entropy to generate the 
session key. Many standard web and application servers will 
perform this task on your behalf.  
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 22 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Exploitation Trust in Client (aka make client invisible) (3) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in 
client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privlege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 
1. Design: Ensure that client process and/or message is authenticated 
so that anonymous communications and/or messages are not 
accepted by the system.  
Parent Mitigation AC, IA,SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 23 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) File System Function Injection, Content Based (7) 
Description An attack of this type exploits the host's trust in executing remote 
content including binary files. The files are poisoned with a malicious 
payload (targeting the file systems accessible by the target software) by 
the attacker and may be passed through standard channels such as via 
email, and standard web content like PDF and multimedia files. The 
attacker exploits known vulnerabilities or handling routines in the 
target processes. Vulnerabilities of this type have been found in a wide 
variety of commercial applications from Microsoft Office to Adobe 
Acrobat and Apple Safari web browser. When the attacker knows the 
standard handling routines and can identify vulnerabilities and entry 
points they can be exploited by otherwise seemingly normal content. 
Once the attack is executed, the attacker's program can access relative 
directories such as C:\Program Files or other standard system 
directories to launch further attacks. In a worst case scenario, these 
programs are combined with other propagation logic and work as a 
virus. 
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Enforce principle of least privilege 
2. Validate all input for content including files. Ensure that if files 
and remote content must be accepted that once accepted, they are 
placed in a sandbox type location so that lower assurance clients 
cannot write up to higher assurance processes (like Web server 
processes for example) 
3. Execute programs with constrained privileges, so parent process 
does not open up further vulnerabilities. Ensure that all directories, 
temporary directories and files, and memory are executing with 
limited privileges to protect against remote execution. 
4. Proxy communication to host, so that communications are 
terminated at the proxy, sanitizing the requests before forwarding 
to server host. 
5. Virus scanning on host 
6. Host integrity monitoring for critical files, directories, and 
processes. The goal of host integrity monitoring is to be aware 
when a security issue has occurred so that incident response and 
other forensic activities can begin. 
Parent Mitigation AC, CA, CM, CP, SI, SC, IR 
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Attack Pattern ID 24 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Filter Failure Through Buffer Overflow (3) 
Description In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an 
oversized transaction.  An attacker may try to feed overly long input 
strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing 
a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. 
lets the user input into the system unfiltered). 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Make sure that ANY failure occurring in the filtering or input 
validation routine is properly handled and that offending input is 
NOT allowed to go through. Basically make sure that the vault is 
closed when failure occurs.  
2. Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic 
bounds checking. 
3. Pre-design through Build: Compiler-based canary mechanisms 
such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio 
/GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not 
a complete solution. 
4. Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a 
complete solution. 
5. Design: Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. 
Not a complete solution. 
Parent Mitigation IR, SI, CM 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 25 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Forced Deadlock (2) 
Description This attack attempts to trigger and exploit a deadlock condition in the 
target software to cause a denial of service. A deadlock can occur when 
two or more competing actions are waiting for each other to finish, and 
thus neither ever does. Deadlock condition are not easy to detect. 
Parent Threat Time and State Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use known algorithm to avoid deadlock condition (for instance 
non-blocking synchronization algorithms). 
2. For competing actions use well known libraries which implement 
synchronization 
Parent Mitigation SC, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 26 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Leveraging Race Conditions (5) 
Description This attack targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes 
access and manipulate the same resource concurrently and the outcome 
of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access 
takes place. The attacker can leverage a race condition by "running the 
race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution 
flow.  
Parent Threat Time and State Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use safe libraries to access resources such as files. 
2. Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as 
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition. 
3. Use synchronization to control the flow of execution. 
4. Use static analysis tools to find race conditions. 
5. Pay attention to concurrency problems  
Parent Mitigation AC,MP,SA,SI,CM 
 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 27 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links (3) 
Description This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to 
write to sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target 
file not otherwise accessible to her. When the privileged program tries 
to create a temporary file with the same name as the Symlink link, it 
will actually write to the target file pointed to by the attacker's Symlink 
link. If the attacker can insert malicious content in the temporary file 
she will be writing to the sensitive file by using the Symlink. The race 
occurs because the system checks if the temporary file exists, then 
creates the file. The attacker would typically create the Symlink during 
the interval between the check and the creation of the temporary file. 
Parent Threat Time and State Attack 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use safe libraries when creating temporary files. For instance the 
standard library function mkstemp can be used to safely create 
temporary files. For shell scripts, the system utility mktemp does 
the same thing. 
2. Access to the directories should be restricted as to prevent 
attackers from manipulating the files. Denying access to a file can 
prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a 
sensitive file. 
3. Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights 
to files. 
4. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide 
protected areas that can be trusted. 
Parent Mitigation SA, MP, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 28 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Fuzzing (4) 
Description Fuzzing is a software testing method that feeds randomly constructed 
input to the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response 
to that input has occured.  Fuzzing treats the system as a blackbox and 
is totally free from any preconceptions or assumptions about the 
system.   
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Test to ensure that the software behaves as per specification and 
that there are no unintended side effects. Ensure that no 
assumptions about the validity of data are made. 
2. Use fuzz testing during the software QA process to uncover any 
surprises, uncover any assumptions or unexpected behavior. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SA, AC, RA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 29 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race 
Conditions (8) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an 
attacker to either directly access an executable file, for example 
through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an attacker to 
upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message 
oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are 
particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the 
administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct 
privileges for each interface. 
Parent Threat Time and State Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use safe libraries to access resources such as files 
2. Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as 
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition 
3. Use synchronization to control the flow of execution 
4. Use static analysis tools to find race conditions. 
5. Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of 
resources. 
Parent Mitigation AC, AU, CM, MP, RA, SA, SC, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 30 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution (3) 
Description Attackers can sometimes hijack a privileged thread from the 
underlying system through synchronous (calling a privileged function 
that returns incorrectly) or asynchronous (callbacks, signal handlers, 
and similar) means. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Application Architects must be careful to design callback, signal, 
and similar asynchronous constructs such that they shed excess 
privilege prior to handing control to user-written (thus untrusted) 
code. 
2. Application Architects must be careful to design privileged code 
blocks such that upon return (successful, failed, or unpredicted) 
that privilege is shed prior to leaving the block/scope. 
Parent Mitigation AC, SA, CM 
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Attack Pattern ID 31 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Accessing / Intercepting / Modifying HTTP Cookies (3) 
Description This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state 
information and other critical data on client systems.   
The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine 
for potentially sensitive data contained therein. 
The second form of this attack involves intercepting this data as it is 
transmitted from client to server.  This intercepted information is then 
used by the attacker to impersonate the remote user/session.   
The third form is when the cookie‟s content is modified by the attacker 
before it is sent back to the server.  Here the attacker seeks to convince 
the target server to operate on this falsified information. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use input validation for cookies 
2. Generate and validate MAC for cookies 
3. Use SSL/TLS to protect cookie in transit 
4. Ensure the web server implements all relevant security patches, 
many exploitable buffer overflows are fixed in patches issued for 
the software. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC, CA 
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Attack Pattern ID 32 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query Strings (4) 
Description A variant of cross-site scripting called "reflected" cross-site scripting, 
the HTTP Query Strings attack consists of passing a malicious script 
inside an otherwise valid HTTP request query string. This is of 
significant concern for sites that rely on dynamic, user-generated 
content such as bulletin boards, news sites, blogs, and web enabled 
administration GUIs. The malicious script may steal session data, 
browse history, probe files, or otherwise execute attacks on the client 
side. Once the attacker has prepared the malicious HTTP query it is 
sent to a victim user (perhaps by email, IM, or posted on an online 
forum), who clicks on a normal looking link that contains a poison 
query string. This technique can be made more effective through the 
use of services like http://tinyurl.com/, which makes very small URLs 
that will redirect to very large, complex ones. The victim will not know 
what he is really clicking on. 
 
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side 
scripting.  
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement  
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR 
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the 
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where 
the data is originating from.  
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is 
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.  
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, 
including remote and user-generated content  
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.  
7. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in 
browser  
8. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host  
9. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors 
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities 
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in 
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS 
countermeasures mitigates this.  
10. Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, 
ensure system runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode 
Parent Mitigation SI, AC, CM, AU 
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Attack Pattern ID 33 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) HTTP Request Smuggling (3) 
Description HTTP Request Smuggling results from the discrepancies in parsing 
HTTP requests between HTTP entities such as web caching proxies or 
application firewalls. Entities such as web servers, web caching 
proxies, application firewalls or simple proxies often parse HTTP 
requests in slightly different ways. Under specific situations where 
there are two or more such entities in the path of the HTTP request, a 
specially crafted request is seen by two attacked entities as two 
different sets of requests. This allows certain requests to be smuggled 
through to a second entity without the first one realizing it. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. HTTP Request Smuggling is usually targeted at web servers. 
Therefore, in such cases, careful analysis of the entities must occur 
during system design prior to deployment. If there are known 
differences in the way the entities parse HTTP requests, the choice 
of entities needs consideration. 
2. Employing an application firewall can help. However, there are 
instances of the firewalls being susceptible to HTTP Request 
Smuggling as well. 
Parent Mitigation SA, SI, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 34 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) HTTP Response Splitting (2) 
Description This attack uses a maliciously-crafted HTTP request in order to cause a 
vulnerable web server to respond with an HTTP response stream that 
will be interpreted by the client as two separate responses instead of 
one. This is possible when user-controlled input is used unvalidated as 
part of the response headers. The target software, the client, will 
interpret the injected header as being a response to a second request, 
thereby causing the maliciously-crafted contents be displayed and 
possibly cached. 
Parent Threat Schema Poisoning 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. To avoid HTTP Response Splitting, the application must not rely 
on user-controllable input to form part of its output response 
stream. Specifically, response splitting occurs due to injection of 
CR-LF sequences and additional headers. All data arriving from 
the user and being used as part of HTTP response headers must be 
subjected to strict validation that performs simple character-based 
as well as semantic filtering to strip it of malicious character 
sequences and headers. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 35 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Leverage Executable Code in Nonexecutable Files (4) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and 
resource files, when the executable loads the resource (such as an 
image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to 
either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process 
(e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious 
configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated 
mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of 
this attack occurring is high. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege  
2. Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or 
utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain 
privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.  
3. Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and 
vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and 
interfaces that grant direct access to executables.  
4. Implementation: Implement host integrity monitoring to detect any 
unwanted altering of configuration files.  
5. Implementation: Ensure that files that are not required to execute, 
such as configuration files, are not over-privileged, i.e. not allowed 
to execute. 
Parent Mitigation AC, CA, CP, CM 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 36 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Unpublished Web Service APIs (5) 
Description An attacker searches for and invokes Web Services APIs that the target 
system designers did not intend to be publicly available.  If these APIs 
fail to authenticate requests the attacker may be able to invoke services 
and/or gain privileges they are not authorized for. 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Authenticating both services and their discovery, and protecting 
that authentication mechanism simply fixes the bulk of this 
problem. Protecting the authentication involves the standard 
means, including: 1) protecting the channel over which 
authentication occurs, 2) preventing the theft, forgery, or 
prediction of authentication credentials or the resultant tokens, or 
3) subversion of password reset and the like. 
Parent Mitigation AC, CA, CM, IA, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 37 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions (4) 
Description An attacker can resort to stealing data embedded in client distributions 
or client code in order to gain certain information. This information can 
reveal confidential contents, such as account numbers, or can be used 
as an intermediate step in a larger attack (such as by stealing 
keys/credentials). 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Never Use Unvalidated Input as Part of a Directive to any Internal 
Component 
2. Treat the Entire Inherited Process Context as Unvalidated Input 
3. Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 38 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths (8) 
Description This attack loads a malicious resource into a program's standard path 
used to bootstrap and/or provide contextual information for a program 
like a path variable or classpath. J2EE applications and other 
component based applications that are built from mutliple binaries can 
have very long list of dependencies to execute. If one of these libraries 
and/or references is controllable by the attacker then application 
controls can be circumvented by the attacker. 
A standard UNIX path looks similar to this 
/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin 
If the attacker modifies the path variable to point to a locale that 
includes malicious resources then the user unwittingly can execute 
commands on the attacker's behalf: 
/evildir/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin 
This is a form of usurping control of the program and the attack can be 
done on the classpath, database resources, or any other resources built 
from compound parts. At runtime detection and blocking of this attack 
is nearly impossible, because the configuration allows execution. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Enforce principle of least privilege  
2. Ensure that the program's compound parts, including all system 
dependencies, classpath, path, and so on, are secured to the same 
or higher level assurance as the program 
3. Host integrity monitoring 
Parent Mitigation AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, RA, SC, SI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 39 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens (6) 
Description In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side 
in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be 
manipulated. If client 
or server-side application components reinterpret that data as 
authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet 
information) then even opaquely manipulating 
that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker 
undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been 
adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or 
obfuscation. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. One solution to this problem is to protect encrypted data with a 
CRC of some sort. If knowing who last manipulated the data is 
important, then using a cryptographic "message authentication 
code" (or hMAC) is prescribed. However, this guidance is not a 
panecea. In particular, any value created by (and therefore 
encrypted by) the client, which itself is a "malicous" value, all the 
protective cryptography in the world can't make the value 'correct' 
again. Put simply, if the client has control over the whole process 
of generating and encoding the value--then simply protecting its 
integrity doesn't help.  
2. Make sure to protect client side authentication tokens for 
confidentiality (encryption) and integrity (signed hash)  
3. Make sure that all session tokens use a good source of randomness  
4. Perform validation on the server side to make sure that client side 
data tokens are consistent with what is expected. 
Parent Mitigation AU, IA, SI, CM, SA, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 40 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices (4) 
Description This attack exploits terminal devices that allow themselves to be 
written to by other users.  The attacker sends command strings to the 
target terminal device hoping that the target user will hit enter and 
thereby execute the malicious command with their privileges. The 
attacker can send the results (such as copying /etc/passwd) to a known 
directory and collect once the attack has succeeded. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, AC-6 
Parent Mitigation IA, AC 
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Attack Pattern ID 41 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads 
(4) 
Description This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in 
email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. 
 
Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. 
In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to 
the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As 
the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, 
they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in 
routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from 
the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email 
applications do not list email header information by default, however 
the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to 
exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is 
known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can containt 
scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's 
system. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Perform validation on email header data  
2. Implementation: Implement email filtering solutions on mail 
server or on MTA, relay server.  
3. Implementation: Mail servers that perform strict validation may 
catch these attacks, because metacharacters are not allowed in 
many header variables such as dns names 
Parent Mitigation AU, IA, SC, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 42 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) MIME Conversion(1) 
Description An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to 
cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server 
machine.  The MIME system is designed to allow various different 
information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points 
exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Stay up to date with third party vendor patches 
2. Disable the 7 to 8 bit conversion. This can be done by removing 
the F=9 flag from all Mailer specifications in the sendmail.cf file. 
3. Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh)  
4. Use mail.local 
Parent Mitigation SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 43 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers (4) 
Description An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains 
sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation 
logic.  This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over 
the input data and processing a “layer” of special characters with each 
pass.  In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would 
otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of 
special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing 
steps. 
        The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer 
executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go 
through the following logic in an application: <<parser1>> --> <<input 
validator>> --> <<parser2>>. In such cases, the attacker will need to 
provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after 
passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the 
input validator was supposed to stop. 
Parent Threat Leverage Alternate Encoding 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. An iterative approach to input validation may be required to 
ensure that no dangerous characters are present. It may be 
necessary to implement redundant checking across different input 
validation layers. Ensure that invalid data is rejected as soon as 
possible and do not continue to work with it.  
2. Make sure to perform input validation on canonicalized data (i.e. 
data that is data in its most standard form). This will help avoid 
tricky encodings getting past the filters.  
3. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list 
should not be permitted to enter into the system.  
 
Parent Mitigation SI, RA, CM, AT 
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Attack Pattern ID 44 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Overflow Binary Resource File (6) 
Description An attack of this type exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the 
handling of binary resources. Binary resources may includes music 
files like MP3, image files like JPEG files, and any other binary file. 
These attacks may pass unnoticed to the client machine through normal 
usage of files, such as a browser loading a seemingly innocent JPEG 
file. This can allow the attacker access to the execution stack and 
execute arbitrary code in the target process. This attack pattern is a 
variant of standard buffer overflow attacks using an unexpected vector 
(binary files) to wrap its attack and open up a new attack vector. The 
attacker is required to either directly serve the binary content to the 
victim, or place it in a locale like a MP3 sharing application, for the 
victim to download. The attacker then is notified upon the download or 
otherwise locates the vulnerability opened up by the buffer overflow. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Perform appropriate bounds checking on all buffers. 
2. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
3. Design: Static code analysis 
4. Implementation: Execute program in less trusted process space 
environment, do not allow lower integrity processes to write to 
higher integrity processes 
5. Implementation: Keep software patched to ensure that known 
vulnerabilities are not available for attackers to target on host. 
Parent Mitigation CA, MA, AC, RA, SC, SI  
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 45 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links (7) 
Description This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer 
overflows. An attacker can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link 
file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target 
software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow 
internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Enforce principle of least privilege 
2. Protect files, secure location (of files), encryption 
3. Data sanitization 
4. Abstraction, obfuscation, library checking 
Parent Mitigation AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, SI, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 46 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Overflow Variables and Tags (4) 
Description This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a 
formatted configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The attacker 
crafts a malicious HTML page or configuration file that includes 
oversized strings, thus causing an overflow. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking. 
2. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a 
complete solution. 
3. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, 
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this 
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution. 
4. Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution. 
5. Do not trust input data from user. Validate all user input. 
 
Parent Mitigation SC,AC,SI,RA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 47 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion (5) 
Description In this attack, the target software is given input that the attacker knows 
will be modified and expanded in size during processing.  This attack 
relies on the target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data 
may exceed some internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Ensure that when parameter expansion happens in the code that 
the assumptions used to determine the resulting size of the 
parameter are accurate and that the new size of the parameter is 
visible to the whole system 
Parent Mitigation CP, CM, CA, PL, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 48 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL  (4) 
Description This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources 
instead of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string, 
but instead receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to 
occur in the browser process space with the browser's authority to local 
files. The attacker can send the results of this request to the local files 
out to a site that they control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive 
authentication data (either local or remote), or to gain system profile 
information to launch further attacks. 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is 
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.  
2. Implementation: Ensure all configuration files and resource are 
either removed or protected when promoting code into production.  
3. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side 
scripting.  
4. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.  
5. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.  
6. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in 
browser  
Parent Mitigation SI, CM, SA, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 49 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Password Brute Forcing  (4) 
Description In this attack, the attacker tries every possible value for a password 
until they succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, 
will always be successful because it will essentially go through all 
possible passwords given the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper 
case letters, numbers, symbols, etc.) and the maximum length of the 
password. 
 A system will be particularly vulnerable to this type of an attack if it 
does not have a proper enforcement mechanism in place to ensure that 
passwords selected by users are strong passwords that comply with an 
adequate password policy. 
 In practice a pure brute force attack on passwords is rarely used, 
unless the password is suspected to be weak.  Other password cracking 
methods exist that are far more effective (e.g. dictionary attacks, 
rainbow tables, etc.). 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Implement a password throttling mechanism. This mechanism 
should take into account both the IP address and the log in name of 
the user.  
2. Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user 
created passwords comply with it. Alternatively automatically 
generate strong passwords for users.  
3. Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once 
in a while a new password must be chosen.  
Parent Mitigation IA, AC, CM, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 50 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Password Recovery Exploitation  (2) 
Description An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users 
recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the 
system with the same privileges as the original user.  Generally 
password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.  Most of 
them use only one security question .  For instance, mother's maiden 
name tends to be a fairly popular one.  Unfortunately in many cases 
this information is not very hard to find, especially if the attacker 
knows the legitimate user.   
These generic security questions are also re-used across many 
applications, thus making them even more insecure.  An attacker could 
for instance overhear a coworker talking to a bank representative at the 
work place and supplying their mother's maiden name for verification 
purposes.  An attacker can then try to log in into one of the victim's 
accounts, click on "forgot password" and there is a good chance that 
the security question there will be to provide mother's maiden name.   
A weak password recovery scheme totally undermines the 
effectiveness of a strong password scheme. 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use multiple security questions (e.g. have three and make the user 
answer two of them correctly). Let the user select their own 
security questions or provide them with choices of questions that 
are not generic.  
2. E-mail the temporary password to the registered e-mail address of 
the user rather than letting the user reset the password online.  
3. Ensure that your password recovery functionality is not vulnerable 
to an injection style attack.  
Parent Mitigation IA, SA 
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Attack Pattern ID 51 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Poison Web Service Registry (7) 
Description SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get 
schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry 
can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a 
malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or 
metadata (to effect a denial of service), and delete information about 
service provider interfaces. 
WS-Addressing is used to virtualize services, provide return addresses 
and other routing information, however, unless the WS-Addressing 
headers are protected they are vulnerable to rewriting. The attacker that 
can rewrite WS-addressing information gains the ability to route 
service requesters to any service providers, and the ability to route 
service provider response to any service.  
Content in a registry is deployed by the service provider. The registry 
in an SOA or Web Services system can be accessed by the service 
requester via UDDI or other protocol. The basic flow for the attacker 
consists of either altering the data at rest in the registry or uploading 
malicious content by spoofing a service provider. The service requester 
is then redirected to send its requests and/or responses to services the 
attacker controls. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Enforce principle of least privilege  
2. Harden registry server and file access permissions 
3. Implement communications to and from the registry using secure 
protocols 
Parent Mitigation AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, SI, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 52 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Embedding NULL Bytes (1) 
Description An attacker embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target 
software.  This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a 
string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain 
components of the target software to stop processing the input when it 
encounters the null byte(s). 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Properly handle the NULL characters supplied as part of user 
input prior to doing anything with the data. 
Parent Mitigation SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 53 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash (3) 
Description If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal 
NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL 
allows an attacker to embed the NULL midstring while postfixing the 
proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that 
looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but 
the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in midstring may 
be used. 
Parent Threat Input Data Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Properly handle Null characters. Make sure canonicalization is 
properly applied. Do not pass Null characters to the underlying 
APIs. 
2. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list 
should not be permitted to enter into the system. 
Parent Mitigation SI, AC, CM 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 54 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Probing an Application Through Targeting its Error Reporting (2) 
Description An attacker, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized 
to use the application) can probe the application's structure and 
evaluate its robustness by probing its error conditions (not unlike one 
would during a 'fuzz' test, but more purposefully here) in order to 
support attacks such as blind SQL injection, or for the more general 
task of mapping the application to mount another subsequent attack. 
Parent Threat Data Leakage Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Application designers can construct a 'code book' for error 
messages. When using a code book, application error messages 
aren't generated in string or stack trace form, but are cataloged and 
replaced with a unique (often integer-based) value 'coding' for the 
error. Such a technique will require helpdesk and hosting 
personnel to use a 'code book' or similar mapping to decode 
application errors/logs in order to respond to them normally. 
2. Application designers can wrap application functionality 
(preferably through the underlying framework) in an output 
encoding scheme that obscures or cleanses error messages to 
prevent such attacks. Such a technique is often used in conjunction 
with the above 'code book' suggestion. 
Parent Mitigation SC, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 55 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Rainbow table password cracking (3) 
Description         An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of 
passwords are stored.  He then uses a rainbow table of precomputed 
hash chains to attempt to look up the original password.  Once the 
original password corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker 
uses the original password to gain access to the system. 
         
        A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various 
passwords.  A password chain is computed, starting from the original 
password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R and a hash 
function H.  A recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 =  R(H(Xi)), X0 = 
P.  Then the hash chain of length n for the original password P can be 
formed:  X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, H(Xn).  P and H(Xn) are 
then stored together in the rainbow table. 
         
        Constructing the rainbow tables takes a very long time and is 
computationally expensive.  A separate table needs to be constrcuted 
for the various hash algorithms (e.g. SHA1, MD5, etc.).  However, 
once a rainbow table is computed, it can be very effective in cracking 
the passwords that have been hashed without the use of salt. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use salt when computing password hashes. That is, concatenate 
the salt (random bits) with the original password prior to hashing 
it. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC, IA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 56 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' (2) 
Description Attackers can, in some cases, get around logic put in place to 'guard' 
sensitive functionality or data. 
The attack may involve gaining access to and calling protected 
functionality (or accessing protected data) directly, may involve 
subverting some aspect of the guard's implementation, or outright 
removal of the guard, if possible. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly 
2. Use Authorization Mechanisms Correctly 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA 
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Attack Pattern ID 57 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the 
Middle (3) 
Description This attack utlizes a Rest(REpresentational State Transfer)-style 
applications' trust in the system resources and environment to place 
man in the middle once SSL is terminated. Rest applications premise is 
that they leverage existing infrastructure to deliver web services 
functionality. 
Parent Threat Spoofing 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Implementation: Implement message level security such as HMAC 
in the HTTP communication 
2. Design: Utilize defense in depth, do not rely on a single security 
mechanism like SSL 
3. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Parent Mitigation SA, SI, AC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 58 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Restful Privilege Elevation  (2) 
Description Rest uses standard HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permissions methods, 
but these are not necessarily correlated generally with back end 
programs. Strict interpretation of HTTP get methods means that these 
HTTP Get services should not be used to delete information on the 
server, but there is no access control mechanism to back up this logic. 
This means that unless the services are properly ACL'd and the 
application's service implementation are following these guidelines 
then an HTTP request can easily execute a delete or update on the 
server side. 
The attacker identifies a HTTP Get URL such as 
http://victimsite/updateOrder, which calls out to a program to update 
orders on a database or other resource. The URL is not idempotent so 
the request can be submitted multiple times by the attacker, 
additionally, the attacker may be able to exploit the URL published as 
a Get method that actually performs updates (instead of merely 
retrieving data). This may result in malicious or inadvertant altering of 
data on the server. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege  
2. Implementation: Ensure that HTTP Get methods only retrieve 
state and do not alter state on the server side  
3. Implementation: Ensure that HTTP methods have proper ACLs 
based on what the funcitonality they expose 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 59 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Session Credential Falsification through Prediction (3) 
Description This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. 
The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to 
perform spoofing and session hijacking. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Authentication 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use a strong source of randomness to generate a session ID. 
Use adequate length session IDs. 
2. Do not use information available to the user in order to generate 
session ID (e.g., time)… 
3. Encrypt the session ID if you expose it to the user. For instance 
session ID can be stored in a cookie in encrypted format. 
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 60 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Reusing Session ID‟s (aka Session Replay) (6) 
Description This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target 
system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen 
session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing 
and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session 
Replay. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Authentication 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout. 
2. Setup a session time out for the session IDs. 
3. Protect the communication between the client and server. For 
instance it is best practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the 
middle attack 
4. Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the 
session ID will be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing 
session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files, which 
are vulnerable to an attacker. 
5. Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID. 
6. Use multifactor authentication 
 
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, PS, SC, IA, SA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 61 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Session Fixation (3) 
Description The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target 
software using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the 
user successfully authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses 
the (now privileged) session identifier in their own transactions 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Authentication 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use a strict session management mechanism that only accepts 
locally generated session identifiers of their own choice. 
2. Regenerate and destroy session identifiers when there is a change 
in the level of privilege:  
3. Use session identifiers that are difficult to guess or brute-force: 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 62 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding) (6) 
Description An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web 
pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce 
users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some 
third-party application.  If successful, the action embedded in the 
malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted 
application with the users‟ privilege level. 
         
        This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust 
placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such 
an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a 
session cookie is created on the user's system, all following 
transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie 
including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" 
the existing session cookie. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Authentication 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use cryptographic tokens to associate a request with a specific 
action. The token can be regenerated at every request so that if a 
request with an invalid token is encountered, it can be reliably 
discarded. The token is considered invalid if it arrived with a 
request other than the action it was supposed to be associated with. 
2. Although less reliable, the use of the optional HTTP Referer 
header can also be used to determine whether an incoming request 
was actually one that the user is authorized for, in the current 
context. 
3. Additionally, the user can also be prompted to confirm an action 
every time an action concerning potentially sensitive data is 
invoked. This way, even if the attacker manages to get the user to 
click on a malicious link and request the desired action, the user 
has a chance to recover by denying confirmation. This solution is 
also implicitly tied to using a second factor of authentication 
before performing such actions. 
4. In general, every request must be checked for the appropriate 
authentication token as well as authorization in the current session 
context. 
Parent Mitigation AC, CA, CM, IA, SC, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 63 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Simple Script Injection (5) 
Description An attacker embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to 
web browsers.  The goal of the attack is for the target software, the 
client-side browser, to execute the script with the users‟ privilege level. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side 
scripting. 
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement 
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR 
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the 
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where 
the data is originating from. 
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is 
sanitized against an acceptable content specification. 
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. 
7. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host 
8. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors 
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities 
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in 
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS 
countermeasures mitigates this. 
Parent Mitigation CM, SI, SC, MP, AC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 64 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation 
Logic (3) 
Description This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the 
encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the 
multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the 
URL. An URL may contain special character that need special syntax 
handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented 
using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the 
octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE).  
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. 
2. When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using 
the “GET” method to submit data 
3. Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded 
and validated as correct data format 
 
Parent Mitigation SI, AC, CM 
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Attack Pattern ID 65 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code bound for Authorized 
Clients (7) 
Description Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use 
it, as-is or through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information 
or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. 
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being 
applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client 
is authorized to communicate with the server. 
Parent Threat Data Leakage Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Do not store secrets in client code 
2. All potentially sensitive data, including code, transmitted to the 
client must be encrypted 
Parent Mitigation AT, SA, SC, SI, CA, IA, PL 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 66 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) SQL Injection (3) 
Description This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements 
based on user input.  An attacker crafts input strings so that when the 
target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the 
resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the 
application intended. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be 
validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. 
Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered 
in addition to characters such as a single-quote(') or SQL-
comments (--) based on the context in which they appear. 
2. Use of parameterized queries or stored procedures - 
Parameterization causes the input to be restricted to certain 
domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside such 
domains is considered invalid and the query fails. Note that SQL 
Injection is possible even in the presence of stored procedures if 
the eventual query is constructed dynamically. 
3. Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about 
the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input 
validation must be coupled with customized error pages that 
inform about an error without disclosing information about the 
database or application. 
Parent Mitigation SI, AC, MP 
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Attack Pattern ID 67 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) String Format Overflow in syslog() (2) 
Description This attack targets the format string vulnerabilities in the syslog() 
function. An attacker would typically inject malicious input in the 
format string parameter of the syslog function. This is a common 
problem, and many public vulnerabilities and associated exploits have 
been posted. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. The code should be reviewed for misuse of the Syslog function 
call. Manual or automated code review can be used. The reviewer 
needs to ensure that all format string functions are passed a static 
string which cannot be controlled by the user and that the proper 
number of arguments are always sent to that function as well. If at 
all possible, do not use the %n operator in format strings. The 
following code shows a correct usage of Syslog(): ... 
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s", cmdBuf); ... The following code shows a 
vulnerable usage of Syslog(): ... syslog(LOG_ERR, cmdBuf); // 
the buffer cmdBuff is taking user supplied data. ... 
Parent Mitigation SI, AC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 68 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Subvert Code-signing Facilities (1) 
Description Because languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's 
identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an 
environment, subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an 
attacker escalating privilege.  
Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code 
signing classifies for this style of attack. This pattern does not include 
circumstances through which a signing key has been stolen. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. A given code signing scheme may be fallible due to improper use 
of cryptography 
2. avoid reliance on flags or environment variables that are user-
controllable    
Parent Mitigation IA  
226 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 69 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Target Programs with Elevated Privileges (5) 
Description This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The 
attacker would try to leverage a bug in the running program and get 
arbitrary code to execute with elevated privileges. For instance an 
attacker would look for programs that write to the system directories or 
registry keys (such as HKLM, which stores a number of critical 
Windows environment variables). 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Apply the principle of least privilege. 
2. Validate all untrusted data 
3. Apply the latest patches. 
4. Scan your services and disable the ones which are not needed and 
are exposed unnecessarily.  
5. Avoid revealing information about your system (e.g., version of 
the program) to anonymous users.  
6. Make sure that your program or service fail safely.  
7. If possible use a sandbox model which limits the actions that 
programs can take.  
8. Check your program for buffer overflow and format String 
vulnerabilities which can lead to execution of malicious code. 
9. Monitor traffic and resource usage and pay attention if resource 
exhaustion occurs. 
10. Protect your log file from unauthorized modification and log 
forging. 
Parent Mitigation AC,SI,RA,PS,SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 70 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords (2) 
Description An attacker may try certain common (default) usernames and 
passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized 
actions. An attacker may try an intelligent brute force using known 
vendor default credentials as well as a dictionary of common 
usernames and passwords. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Delete all default account credentials that may be put in by the 
product vendor.  
2. Implement a password throttling mechanism.  
3. Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user 
created passwords comply with it.  
4. Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once 
in a while a new password must be chosen. 
Parent Mitigation AC,IA 
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Attack Pattern ID 71 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Unicode encoding to Bypass Validation Logic (3) 
Description An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that 
is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the 
classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request.  
That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter 
and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Ensure that the system is Unicode aware and can properly process 
Unicode data. Do not make an assumption that data will be in 
ASCII. 
2. Ensure that filtering or input validation is applied to canonical data 
3. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against white list should 
not be permitted to enter the system. 
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, CM 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 72 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) URL encoding (8) 
Description This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An attacker can take 
advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the 
interpretation of the URL. An URL may contain special character that 
need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special 
characters are represented using a percentage character followed by 
two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-
CODE).  For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented 
with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-
encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may 
restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out 
the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with 
a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server 
will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect 
against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding 
such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc. The attacker could 
also subvert the meaning of the URL string request by encoding the 
data being sent to the server through a GET request. For instance an 
attacker may subvert the meaning of parameters used in a SQL request 
and sent through the URL string (See Example section). 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Refer to the RFCS to safely decode URL 
2. Regular expression can be used to match safe URL patterns. May 
discard valid patterns if too restrictive. 
3. Tools available to scan HTTP requests to the server 
4. Security checks should occur after data is decoded and validated 
for format. Bad chars result in validation failure. 
5. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list of acceptable 
input. Test it yourself. 
6. Be aware of alternative encoding such as IP encoding 
7. In web-forms, avoid using “Get” and use “Post” when possible 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, SA, SI, SC, CA, PL 
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Attack Pattern ID 73 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) User-controlled Filename (4) 
Description An attack of this type involves an attacker inserting malicious 
characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or 
indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML 
text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on 
user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, 
filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this 
attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client 
browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker 
owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit 
these vulnerabilities. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use browser technologies that do not allow client side script 
2. Ensure all content delivered to client is sanitized 
3. Validate input for all remote content 
4. Validate output for all remote content 
5. Disable scripts in browser 
6. Scan dynamically generated content 
7.  Disable scripts in browser 
Parent Mitigation AC, CM, MP, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 74 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Manipulating User State (6) 
Description An attacker modifies state information maintained by the target 
software in user-accessible locations.  If successful, the target software 
will use this tainted state information and execute in an unintended 
manner. 
 
State management is an important function within an application. User 
state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment 
information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents 
such as items in a shopping cart. 
Manipulating user state can be employed by an attacker to elevate 
privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow 
of the application to derive certain benefits. 
Parent Threat Time and State Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Do not rely solely on user-controllable locations, such as cookies 
or URL parameters, to maintain user state  
2. Do not store sensitive information, such as usernames or 
authentication and authorization information, in user-controllable 
locations.  
3. At all times sensitive information that is part of the user state must 
be appropriately protected to ensure confidentiality and integrity at 
each request 
Parent Mitigation CM, CP, IA, MP, SA, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 75 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files (8) 
Description An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that 
influence/control the operation of the target software.  This attack 
exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of 
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these files. 
 
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that may 
have weaker permissions. System configuration in distributed systems 
such as J2EE servers have many administration points. For example, 
permissions may be set on the administrative GUI, the configuration 
file for the server as a whole, configuration files for specific domains 
and applications, special jar and other class files used to load resources 
at runtime, and even policy specific in .war and .ear files. A mistake in 
permissions setting in either the file acl or the content is an opening an 
attacker can use to elevate privilege. 
 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privelage/Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege  
2. Design: Backup copies of all configuration files  
3. Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files  
4. Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration 
promotion procedures.  
5. Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and 
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD 
Parent Mitigation AC, AU, CA, CM, CP, IR, SC, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 76 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Manipulating Input to File System Calls(4) 
Description An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target 
software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain 
access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target 
software did not intend to be accessible. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege.  
2. Design: Ensure all input is validated, and does not contain file 
system commands  
3. Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or 
utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain 
privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.  
4. Design: For interactive user applications, consider if direct file 
system interface is necessary, instead consider having the 
application proxy communication.  
5. Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and 
vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and 
interfaces that grant direct access to executables.  
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, CM, RA 
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Attack Pattern ID 77 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Manipulating User-Controlled Variables (4) 
Description This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, 
and So Forth). An attacker can override environment variables 
leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the 
application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the 
attacker can change variables controlling the business logic of the 
application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly 
set default configurations may allow the user to override variables. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Do not allow override of global variables and do Not Trust Global 
Variables. If the register_globals option is enabled, PHP will 
create global variables for each GET, POST, and cookie variable 
included in the HTTP request. This means that a malicious user 
may be able to set variables unexpectedly. For instance make sure 
that the server setting for PHP does not expose global variables. 
2. A software system should be reluctant to trust variables that have 
been initialized outside of its trust boundary. Ensure adequate 
checking is performed when relying on input from outside a trust 
boundary. 
3. Separate the presentation layer and the business logic layer. 
Variables at the business logic layer should not be exposed at the 
presentation layer. This is to prevent computation of business logic 
from user controlled input data. 
4. Use encapsulation when declaring your variables. This is to lower 
the exposure of your variables. 
5. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list 
should be rejected by the program. 
Parent Mitigation CM, SI, SC, AC 
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Attack Pattern ID 78 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding (5) 
Description This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An 
attacker can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a 
parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an 
escape. By using that trick, the attacker tries to exploit alternate ways 
to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens 
avenues to attack. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Verify that the user-supplied data does not use backslash character 
to escape malicious characters. 
2. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list 
should not be permitted to enter into the system. 
3. Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding. 
4. Regular expressions can be used to filter out backslash. Make sure 
you decode before filtering and validating the untrusted input data. 
5. In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege 
when determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users 
to access directories/files that they should not access. 
6. Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded 
and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding 
process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the 
data as suspicious, and fail the validation process. 
7. Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if 
those resources can have alternate names. 
Parent Mitigation SI,  MA, AC, CM, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 79 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding (3) 
Description This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An attacker 
would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of 
the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. 
Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically 
use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other 
container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a 
result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX 
world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic 
result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both 
forms of the slash. This gives the attacker many opportunities to 
discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal 
of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to 
one version, but not the other. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded 
and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding 
process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the 
data as suspicious, and fail the validation process. Refer to the 
RFCs to safelly decode URL. 
2. When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using 
the “GET” method to submit data, as the method causes the form 
data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead, 
use the “POST method whenever possible. 
3. There are tools to scan HTTP requests to the server for valid URL 
such as URLScan from Microsoft 
(http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx) 
4. Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding and 
obfuscation technique such as IP address endoding. (See related 
guideline section) 
5. Test your path decoding process against malicious input. 
6. In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege 
when determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users 
to access directories/files that they should not access. 
7. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the application based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list 
should not be permitted to enter into the system. 
Parent Mitigation SI, SC, AC 
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Attack Pattern ID 80 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic (1) 
Description This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to 
bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode 
potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not 
expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making 
input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation 
Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal 
UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of 
the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it 
permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use 
the ``shortest possible'' encoding, but naive decoders may accept 
encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, 
a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against  a 
parser which performs security-critical validity checks against 
the  UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet 
sequences as characters. 
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. The Unicode Consortium recognized multiple representations to 
be a problem and has revised the Unicode Standard to make 
multiple representations of the same code point with UTF-8 
illegal.  
2. For security reasons, a UTF-8 decoder must not accept UTF-8 
sequences that are longer than necessary to encode a character. If 
you use a parser to decode the UTF-8 encoding, make sure that 
parser filter the invalid UTF-8 characters (invalid forms or 
overlong forms). 
3. Look for overlong UTF-8 sequences starting with malicious 
pattern. You can also use a UTF-8 decoder stress test to test your 
UTF-8 parser (See Markus Kuhn's UTF-8 and Unicode FAQ in 
reference section) 
4. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all 
valid input to the software system based on the requirements 
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list 
should not be permitted to enter into the system. Test your 
decoding process against malicious input. 
 
Parent Mitigation SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 81 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Web Logs Tampering (3) 
Description Protection services in security are vulnerable so they are backstopped 
by detection in the so-called protect-detect-respond model. A key 
element in detection is log files, to identify a threat impact, for audit 
purposes, or simply responding to a crash. Since most requests to web 
servers are logged (at least header request response data) the attacker 
literally has the ability to generate log data in every request 
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or 
otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs. 
Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, 
reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous 
attack pattern. 
Parent Threat Resource Location Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Use input validation before writing to web log  
2. Design: Validate all log data before it is output  
Parent Mitigation AC, AU, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 82 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Violating Implicit Assumptions Regarding XML Content (aka XMl 
Denial of Service (XDoS)) (5) 
Description XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that 
utilizes XML data. This is, of course, most distributed systems 
technology including Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most 
closely associated with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote 
service requesters can post malicious XML payloads to the service 
provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, 
and/or disk space. 
Parent Threat Resource Depletion 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate 
communications between service requester and service provider 
The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down and handle a 
variety of payloads. 
2. Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage 
network transports to provide availability such as HTTP load 
balancers 
3. Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing 
Parent Mitigation SC, IR, PE, RA, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 83 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) XPath Injection (2) 
Description An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of 
XPath expressions to inject the XML database and bypass 
authentication or glean information that he normally would not be able 
to. XPath Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the XML 
database, thus bypassing the application completely. XPath Injection 
results form the failure of an application to properly sanitize input used 
as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to query an XML database.  
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be 
validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as content that 
can be interpreted in the context of an XPath expression. 
Characters such as a single-quote(') or operators such as or (|), and 
(&) and such should be filtered if the application does not expect 
them in the context in which they appear. If such content cannot be 
filtered, it must at least be properly escaped to avoid them being 
interpreted as part of XPath expressions. 
2. Use of parameterized XPath queries - Parameterization causes the 
input to be restricted to certain domains, such as strings or 
integers, and any input outside such domains is considered invalid 
and the query fails. 
3. Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about 
the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input 
validation must be coupled with customized error pages that 
inform about an error without disclosing information about the 
database or application. 
Parent Mitigation SC, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 84 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) XQuery Injection (3) 
Description This attack utilizes XQuery to probe and attack server systems; in a 
similar manner that SQL Injection allows an attacker to exploit SQL 
calls to RDBMS, XQuery Injection uses improperly validated data that 
is passed to XQuery commands to traverse and execute commands that 
the XQuery routines have access to. XQuery injection can be used to 
enumerate elements on the victim's environment, inject commands to 
the local host, or execute queries to remote files and data sources. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Perform input white list validation on all XML input 
2. Implementation: Run xml parsing and query infrastructure with 
minimal privileges so that an attacker is limited in their ability to 
probe other system resources from xql.  
Parent Mitigation SI, SA, AC 
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Attack Pattern ID 85 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Client Network Footprinting (using AJAX/XSS) (4) 
Description This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax 
conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new 
vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of 
view. In many XSS attacks the attacker must get a "hole in one" and 
successfully exploit the vulnerability on the victim side the first time, 
once the client is redirected the attacker has many chances to engage in 
follow on probes, but their is only one first chance. In a widely used 
web application this is not a major problem because 1 in a 1,000 is 
good enough in a widely used application. 
A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the environment to 
understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on 
enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and 
responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to 
look for many vulnerabilities, well known ports, network locations and 
so on. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side 
scripting 
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement 
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
4. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. 
5. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in 
browser  
6. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors 
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities 
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in 
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS 
countermeasures mitigates this. 
Parent Mitigation AC, SC, SI, RA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 86 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Embedding Script (XSS) in HTTP Headers (4) 
Description An attack of this type exploits web applications that generate web 
content, such as links in a HTML page, based on unvalidated or 
improperly validated data submitted by other actors.  XSS in HTTP 
Headers attacks target the HTTP headers which are hidden from most 
users and may not be validated by web applications. As with all XSS 
attacks, there are a number of possible targets: 
1. Launch attack on web browser clients and client machine 
2. Launch attacks on client machines environment, such as LAN or 
Intranet 
3. Launch attack on web server, including remote web servers 
Web 2.0 technologies rely heavily on mashups and other plug in 
technologies like multi media players which are effectively composed 
of content generated by other systems and are vulnerable due to the 
fact that an attacker may use the HTTP header information that these 
technologies consume and display as an attack launch pad. 
Beyond Web 2.0, increasingly system administration software uses 
web front ends, from firewall administration to application servers, to 
blogging software, many tools are administered through web browsers. 
This gives the administrator the ability to administer in a highly 
distributed environment, but this comes at the cost of exposing the 
command and control software for the system to web attacks. 
Additionally, because the rich functionality required these 
administration applications, many rely on scripting languages. So an 
attacker can insert HTTP links into logs, audit functionality, error logs, 
and message queues, then, for example, a Javascript-enabled web 
browser with administrator rights can be redirected to execute a wide 
variety of attacks, including those listed here. 
 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side 
scripting. 
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement  
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR 
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the 
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where 
the data is originating from.  
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is 
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.  
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.  
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.  
7. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in 
browser  
8. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host  
9. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors 
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities 
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in 
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS 
countermeasures mitigates this. 
Parent Mitigation AC, SC, SI, RA 
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Attack Pattern ID 87 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Forceful Browsing (3) 
Description An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website 
that are otherwise unreachable through direct URL entry.  
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or 
resource must ensure that the request it is handling has been made 
in an authorized context. 
2. Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by 
not hard-coding names of application pages or resources. This 
way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application alone, the 
resources available from the present context. 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 88 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) OS Command Injection (3) 
Description An attacker can leverage OS command injection in an application to 
elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the 
underlying operating system. 
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use language APIs rather than relying on passing data to the 
operating system shell or command line. Doing so ensures that the 
available protection mechanisms in the language are intact and 
applicable. 
2. Filter all incoming data to escape or remove characters or strings 
that can be potentially misinterpreted as operating system or shell 
commands 
3. All application processes should be run with the minimal 
privileges required. Also, processes must shed privileges as soon 
as they no longer require them. 
Parent Mitigation SI, AC, CM 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 89  
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Pharming (8) 
Description Pharming attacks occur when victims provide sensitive information to 
websites that do not possess a valid certificate from well-known 
certificate authorities. 
 
Parent Threat Spoofing 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. All sensitive information must be handled over a secure 
connection. 
2. Known vulnerabilities in DNS or router software or in operating 
systems must be patched as soon as a fix has been released and 
tested. 
3. End users must ensure that they provide sensitive information only 
to websites that they trust, over a secure connection with a valid 
certificate issued by a well-known certificate authority. 
Parent Mitigation AC, CA, CM, CP, IA, RA,SI, SC 
 
 
239 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 90 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol (4) 
Description A single sign-on solution for a network uses a fixed preshared key with 
its clients to initiate the signon process in order to avoid eavesdropping 
on the initial exchanges. 
Parent Threat Exploitation of Privilege or Trust 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. The server must initiate the handshake by issuing the challenge. 
This ensures that the client has to respond before the exchange can 
move any further. 
2. The use of HMAC to hash the response from the server can also be 
used to thwart reflection. The server responds by returning its own 
challenge as well as hashing the client's challenge, its own 
challenge and the preshared secret. Requiring the client to respond 
with the HMAC of the two challenges ensures that only the 
possessor of a valid preshared secret can successfully hash in the 
two values. 
3. Introducing a random nonce with each new connection ensures 
that the attacker can not employ two connections to attack the 
authentication protocol 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 91 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) XSS in IMG Tags (1) 
Description Image tags are an often overlooked, but convenient, means for a Cross 
Site Scripting attack. The attacker can inject script contents into an 
image (IMG) tag in order to steal information from a victim's browser 
and execute malicious scripts. 
Parent Threat Injection 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. In addition to the traditional input fields, all other user controllable 
inputs, such as image tags within messages or the likes, must also 
be subjected to input validation. Such validation should ensure that 
content that can be potentially interpreted as script by the browser 
is appropriately filtered. 
2. All output displayed to clients must be properly escaped. Escaping 
ensures that the browser interprets special scripting characters 
literally and not as script to be executed 
Parent Mitigation SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 92 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Forced Integer Overflow (4) 
Description This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer 
variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or 
similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such 
variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in 
question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap 
to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very 
incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the 
attacker can execute arbitrary code. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking. 
2. Carefully review the service's implementation before making it 
available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated 
code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as integer overflow. 
3. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a 
complete solution. 
4. Always do bound checking before consuming user input data. 
Parent Mitigation CA, RA, SC, SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 93 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Log Injection-Tampering-Forging(5) 
Description This attack targets the log files of the target host. The attacker injects, 
manipulates or forges malicious log entries in the log file, allowing him 
to mislead a log audit, cover traces of attack, or perform other 
malicious actions. The target host is not properly controlling log 
access. As a result tainted data is resulting in the log files leading to a 
failure in accoutability, non-repudiation and incident forensics 
capability. 
Parent Threat Audit Log Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Carefully control access to physical log files. 
2. Do not allow tainted data to be written in the log file without prior 
input validation. Whitelisting may be used to properly validate the 
data. 
3. Use synchronization to control the flow of execution. 
4. Use static analysis tools to identify log forging vulnerabilities. 
5. Avoid viewing logs with tools that may interpret control characters 
in the file, such as command-line shells. 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC, AU, RA 
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Attack Pattern ID 94 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Man in the Middle (3) 
Description This type of attack targets the communication between two 
components (typically client and server). The attacker places himself in 
the communication channel between the two components. Whenever 
one component attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, 
authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who 
has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the 
other component as if it was never intercepted. This interposition is 
transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the 
potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The potential 
for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in 
communication or identify between two components. 
Parent Threat Spoofing 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority 
2. Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...) 
3. Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both 
ends of any communications channel. 
4. Exchange public keys using a secure channel 
Parent Mitigation AC, IA, SC 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 95 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) WSDL Scanning (3) 
Description This attack targets the WSDL interface made available by a web 
service. The attacker may scan the WSDL interface to reveal sensitive 
information about invocation patterns, underlying technology 
implementations and associated vulnerabilities. This type of probing is 
carried out to perform more serious attacks (e.g. parameter tampering, 
malicious content injection, command injection, etc.). WSDL files 
provide detailed information about the services ports and bindings 
available to consumers. For instance, the attacker can submit special 
characters or malicious content to the Web service and can cause a 
denial of service condition or illegal access to database records. In 
addition, the attacker may try to guess other private methods by using 
the information provided in the WSDL files. 
 
Parent Threat Abuse of Functionality 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. It is important to protect WSDL file or provide limited access to it. 
2. Review the functions exposed by the WSDL interface (specially if 
you have used a tool to generate it). Make sure that none of them 
is vulnerable to injection. 
3. Ensure the WSDL does not expose functions and APIs that were 
not intended to be exposed. 
4. Pay attention to the function naming convention (within the 
WSDL interface). Easy to guess function name may be an entry 
point for attack. 
5. Validate the received messages against the WSDL Schema. 
Incomplete solution 
Parent Mitigation AC, SI, AU 
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Attack Pattern ID 96 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Block Access to Libraries (5) 
Description An application typically makes calls to functions that are a part of 
libraries external to the application.  These libraries may be part of the 
operating system or they may be third party libraries.  It is possible that 
the application does not handle situations properly where access to 
these libraries has been blocked.  Depending on the error handling 
within the application, blocked access to libraries may leave the system 
in an insecure state that could be leveraged by an attacker.  
Parent Threat Resource Manipulation 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Ensure that application handles situations where access to APIs in 
external libraries is not available securely. If the application 
cannot continue its execution safely it should fail in a consistent 
and secure fashion. 
Parent Mitigation CM, SA, SC, SI, RA 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 97 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Cryptanalysis (2) 
Description Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic 
algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext 
without knowing the secret key (instance deduction).  Sometimes the 
weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how 
it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful.  An attacker may have 
other goals as well, such as:    
1.  Total Break - Finding the secret key 
2.  Gobal Deduction - Finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for 
encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the 
secret key. 
 3.  Information Deduction - Gaining some information about 
plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known 
 4.  Distinguishing Algorithm - The attacker has the ability to 
distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random 
permutation of bits 
The goal of the attacker performing cryptanalysis will depend on the 
specific needs of the attacker in a given attack context.  In most cases, 
if cryptanalysis is successful at all, an attacker will not be able to go 
past being able to deduce some information about the plaintext (goal 
3).  However, that may be sufficient for an attacker, depending on the 
context. 
Parent Threat Probabilistic Techniques 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use proven cryptographic algorithms with recommended key 
sizes.  
2. Ensure that the algorithms are used properly. That means: 1. Not 
rolling out your own crypto; Use proven algorithms and 
implementations. 2. Choosing initialization vectors with 
sufficiently random numbers 3. Generating key material using 
good sources of randomness and avoiding known weak keys 4. 
Using proven protocols and their implementations. 5. Picking the 
most appropriate cryptographic algorithm for your usage context 
and data  
Parent Mitigation IA, SC 
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Attack Pattern ID 98 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Phishing (4) 
Description Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker 
masquerades as a legitimate entity with which the victim might do 
business in order to prompt the user to reveal some confidential 
information (very frequently authentication credentials) that can later 
be used by an attacker.  Phishing is essentially a form of information 
gathering or "fishing" for information. 
Parent Threat Spoofing 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Do not follow any links that you receive within your e-mails and 
certainly do not input any login credentials on the page that they 
take you too. Instead, call your Bank, Paypal, Ebay, etc., and 
inquire about the problem. A safe practice would also be to type 
the URL of your bank in the browser directly and only then log in. 
Also, never reply to any e-mails that ask you to provide sensitive 
information of any kind. 
Parent Mitigation AT, SA, SI, PL 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 99 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) XML Parser Attack (3) 
Description Applications often need to transform data in and out of the XML 
format by using an XML parser.  It may be possible for an attacker to 
inject data that may have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it 
is being processed.  These adverse effects may include the parser 
crashing, consuming too much of a resource, executing too slowly, 
executing code supplied by an attacker, allowing usage of unintenteded 
system functionality, etc.   An attacker's goal is to leverage parser 
failure to his or her advantage.  In some cases it may be possible to 
jump from the data plane to the control plane via bad data being passed 
to an XML parser [1]. 
Parent Threat Resource Depletion 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Carefully validate and sanitize all user-controllable data prior to 
passing it to the XML parser routine. Ensure that the resultant data 
is safe to pass to the XML parser.  
2. Perform validation on canonical data.  
3. Pick a robust implementation of an XML parser.  
4. Validate XML against a valid schema or DTD prior to parsing. 
Parent Mitigation IR, SA, SI 
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Attack Pattern ID 100 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) Overflow Buffers (2) 
Description Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking 
on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an 
attacker. As a consequence, an attacker is able to write past the 
boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program 
crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the attacker's 
choice. 
Parent Threat Data Structure Attacks 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking. 
2. Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow. 
3. If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do 
boundary checking. 
4. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, 
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this 
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution. 
5. Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution. 
6. Utilize static source code analysis tools to identify potential buffer 
overflow weaknesses in the software. 
Parent Mitigation SC,SI 
 
 
Attack Pattern ID 101 
Attack Pattern Name (KOE) (SSI) Server Side Include Injection (4) 
Description Consider a website hosted on a server that permits Server Side Includes 
(SSI), such as Apache with the "Options Includes" directive enabled. 
Whenever an error occurs, the HTTP Headers along with the entire 
request are logged, which can then be displayed on a page that allows 
review of such errors. A malicious user can inject SSI directives in the 
HTTP Headers of a request designed to create an error. 
When these logs are eventually reviewed, the server parses the SSI 
directives and executes them. 
Parent Threat Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane) 
Solutions and Mitigations 1. Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEX in the global access.conf file 
or local .htaccess (apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories 
that do not need them 
2. All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before 
use in the application. This includes omitting, or encoding, certain 
characters or strings that have the potential of being interpreted as 
part of an SSI directive 
3. Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong 
business reason to do so. Every Additional component enabled on 
the web server increases the attack surface as well as 
administrative overhead 
Parent Mitigation SI, CM, RA, SA 
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Graphical Attack Trees 
 
Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA
Attack Pattern Name: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by 
ACLs (2)
Description: 
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is 
mitigated by the authorization framework, whose job it is to map ACLs to 
elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In 
the case that the application deployer failed to specify an ACL for a particular 
element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with 
the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain 
sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an 
attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher 
privilege level, can access management sections of the application or can run 
queries for data that he is otherwise not supposed to.
Solutions and Mitigations:
In a J2EE setting, deployers can associate a role that is impossible for the 
authenticator to grant users, such as "NoAccess", with all Servlets to which 
access is guarded by a limited number of servlets visible to, and accessible by, 
the user.. Having done so, any direct access to those protected Servlets will be 
prohibited by the web container. In a more general setting, the deployer must 
mark every resource besides the ones supposed to be exposed to the user as 
accessible by a role impossible for the user to assume. The default security 
setting must be to deny access and then grant access only to those resources 
intended by business logic
Attack Pattern ID: 1
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigation: IA, PL
Attack Pattern Name: Inducing Account Lockout (2)
Description: 
An attacker leverages the security functionality of the system aimed at 
thwarting potential attacks to launch a denial of service attack against a 
legitimate system user.  Many systems, for instance, implement a 
password throttling mechanism that locks an account after a certain 
number of incorrect log in attempts.  An attacker can leverage this 
throttling mechanism to lock a legitimate user out of their own 
account.  The weakness that is being leveraged by an attacker is the very 
security feature that has been put  in place  to counteract attacks.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Implement intelligent password throttling mechanisms such as those 
which take IP address into account, in addition to the login name.
When implementing security features, consider how they can be 
misused and made to turn on themselves.
Attack Pattern ID: 2
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SL
Attack Pattern Name: Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass 
Input Filters (3)
Description:
An attacker intentionally introduces leading characters that enable getting the 
input past the filters.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Perform white list rather than black list input validation.
Canonicalize all data prior to validation
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).
Attack Pattern ID: 3
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Parent Mitigation: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC SC SI
Attack Pattern Name: Using Alternative IP Address Encodings (3)
Description:
This attack relies on the attacker using unexpected formats for representing IP 
addresses. Networked applications may expect network location information in 
a specific format, such as fully qualified domains names, URL, IP address, or 
IP Address ranges. The issue that the attacker can exploit is that these design 
assumptions may not be validated against a variety of different possible 
encodings and network address location formats. Applications that use naming 
for creating policy namespaces for managing access control may be susceptible 
to queryin directly by IP addresses, which is ultimately  a more generally 
authoritative way of communicating on a network.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Design: Default deny access control policies
Design: Input validation routines should check and enforce both input data 
types and content against a positive specification. In regards to IP addresses, 
this should include the authorized manner for the application to represent IP 
addresses and not accept user specified IP addresses and IP address formats 
(such as ranges)
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Attack Pattern ID: 4
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Parent Threat: Injection 
Parent Mitigation: AC, MA
Attack Pattern Name: Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing) (2)
Description
This attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for 
decades. The signal is sent by the attacker to impersonate a supervisor signal. 
This has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line and call. 
While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities 
to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call 
centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be 
operated in countries which have not upgraded telco infrastructure and so are 
vulnerable to Blue boxing.
Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong 
authentication for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different 
than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical 
lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
Solutions and Mitigations
Implementation: Upgrade phone lines. Note this may be prohibitively 
expensive 
Use strong access control such as two factor access control for administrative 
access to the switch
Attack Pattern ID: 5
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Parent Threat: Injection 
Parent Mitigation: AT, PL
Attack Pattern Name: Argument Injection (2)
Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an 
attacker's commands to be directly or indirectly applied as arguments, for 
example as shell commands. This may allow an attacker access to files, 
network resources, media, and in short anything accessible through the shell.
The argument injection attack uses the exposed service or method as a launch 
pad to invoke other programs. If the service does not validate or filter the input 
data then the client program is granted access to execute commands using the 
server's privileges. The OS commands can be appended to standard input for 
shell programs, HTTP Requests, and XML messages. The ability to invoke 
commands is not necessarily sufficient for the attacker to collect the output of 
the attack. This may or may not be an issue depending on the attacker goal.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Do not program input values directly on command shell, instead treat 
user input as guilty until proven innocent. Build a function that takes user input 
and converts it to applications specific types and values, stripping or filtering 
out all unauthorized commands and characters in the process. 
Design: Limit program privileges, so if metacharcters or other methods 
circumvent program input validation routines and shell access is attained then 
it is not running under a privileged account. chroot jails create a sandbox for 
the application to execute in, making it more difficult for an attacker to elevate 
privilege even in the case that a compromise has occurred. 
Implementation: Implement an audit log that is written to a separate host, in the 
event of a compromise the audit log may be able to provide evidence and 
details of the compromise. 
Attack Pattern ID: 6
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: SI, CM
Attack Pattern Name: Blind SQL Injection (2)
Description:
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. 
Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the 
suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL 
Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages.  
Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the attacker 
constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL 
expressions.  The attacker can determine if the syntax and structure of the 
injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not.  
Applied iteratively, the attacker determines how and where the target is 
vulnerable to SQL Injection.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Security by Obscurity is not a solution to preventing SQL Injection. Rather 
than suppress error messages and exceptions, the application must handle them 
gracefully, returning either a custom error page or redirecting the user to a 
default page, without revealing any information about the database or the 
application internals.
Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and 
filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as 
UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered in addition to characters such 
as a single-quote(') or SQL-comments (--) based on the context in which they 
appear.
Attack Pattern ID: 7
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Parent Threat:  Injection
Parent Mitigation: AT, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow in an API Call (2)
Description
This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to 
buffer overflow attacks. An attacker who has access to an API may try to 
embed malicious code in the API function call and exploit a buffer overflow 
vulnerability in the function's implementation. All clients that make use of the 
code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad 
effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software 
process.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.
If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do boundary 
checking.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the 
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds 
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Attack Pattern ID: 8
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: RA, SI, CM, SA, AC
Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities (5)
Description:
This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of shells. An 
attacker can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-line utility to 
escalate privilege to root.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to 
user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover 
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete 
solution.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the 
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds 
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Apply the latest patches to your user exposed services. This may not be a 
complete solution, specially against zero day attack.
Do not unnecessarily expose services.
Attack Pattern ID: 9
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Parent Threat: Injection 
Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables (4)
Description:
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of 
environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an 
environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack 
leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
Solutions and Mitigations
Do not expose environment variable to the user.
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking
You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an environment 
variable vulnerable to buffer overflow
Attack Pattern ID: 10
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: CM, IA
Attack Pattern Name: Cause Web Server Misclassification
Description:
An attack of this type exploits a Web server's decision to take action based on 
filename or file extension. Because different file types are handled by different 
server processes, misclassification may force the Web server to take 
unexpected action, or expected actions in an unexpected sequence. This may 
cause the server to exhaust resources, supply debug or system data to the 
attacker, or bind an attacker to a remote process.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Implementation: Server routines should be determined by content not 
determined by filename or file extension. 
Attack Pattern ID:11 (2)
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigation: IA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/
Multicast Channel (2)
Description:
Attackers aware that more data is being fed into a multicast or public 
information distribution means can 'select' information bound only for another 
client, even if the distribution means itself forces users to authenticate in order 
to connect initally. 
Doing so allows the attacker to gain access to possibly privileged information, 
possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by 
impersonation.
If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output 
mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could 
change its identifier from a less privileged to more so privileged channel or 
command.
Solutions and Mitigations
Associate some ACL (in the form of a token) with an authenticated 
user which they provide middleware. The middleware uses this token as part of 
its channel/message selection for that client, or part of a discerning 
authorization decision for privileged channels/messages. The purpose is to 
architect the system in a way that associates proper authentication/
authorization with each channel/message.
Rearchitect system input/output channels as appropriate to distribute 
self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise protect) channels/messages 
so that only authorized readers can see them.
Attack Pattern ID: 12
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, SM, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Subverting Environment Variable Values (3)
Description
The attacker directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or 
controlling the target software.  The attacker‟s goal is to cause the target 
software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the 
attacker.
Solutions and Mitigations
Protect environment variables against unauthorized read and write access.
Protect the configuration files which contain environment variables against 
illegitimate read and write access.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list.
Apply the least privilege principles.
Attack Pattern ID: 13
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attack
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, IA SA, SI, AU, CA, MA, RA, AT
Attack Pattern Name: Client-side Induction-induced Buffer Overflow (10)
Description
This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client 
software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile 
service. 
Solutions and Mitigations
The client software should not install untrusted code from a non authenticated 
server.
The client software should have the latest patches and should be audited for 
vulnerabilities before being used to communicate with potentially hostile 
servers.
Perform input validation for length of buffer inputs.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete 
solution.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the 
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides 
Attack Pattern ID: 14
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SA, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Command Delimiters (4)
Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an 
attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the 
intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The 
system that uses a filter or a blacklist input validation, as opposed to whitelist 
validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations 
of delimiters) not present in the filter or blacklist. As with other injection 
attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to 
tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL 
queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Perform whitelist validation against a positive specification for 
command length, type, and parameters. 
Design: Limit program privileges, so if commands circumvent program input 
validation or filter routines then commands do not running under a privileged 
account 
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Use type conversions such as JDBC prepared statements. 
Attack Pattern ID: 15
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: AC, AT, AU, CA, CM, IA, MP, PL, PS, SI
Attack Pattern Name Dictionary-based Password Attack (10)
Description
An attacker tries each of the words in a dictionary as passwords to gain access 
to  the system via some user's account.  If the password chosen by the user was 
a word within the dictionary, this attack will be successful (in the absence of 
other mitigations). This is a specific instance of the password brute forcing 
attack pattern.  
Solutions and Mitigations
Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this 
policy. 
Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care must be taken 
to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively enable account lockout 
attacks such as CAPEC-02. 
Attack Pattern ID: 16
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, AU,IA
Attack Pattern Name: Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files (3)
Description
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an attacker 
to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or 
in a possible worst case allows an attacker to upload a file and then execute it. 
Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which 
have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the 
programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces 
and the correct privileges for each interface.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot 
jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker 
gains some limited access to commands. 
Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and vulnerability scanning 
to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to 
executables. 
Attack Pattern ID: 17
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC, IA, MP
Attack Pattern Name Embedding Scripts in Nonscript Elements (5)
Description
This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious scripts are 
embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags 
(<img>), comments in XML documents (< !-CDATA->), etc. These tags may 
not be subject to the same input validation, output validation, and other content 
filtering and checking routines, so this can create an opportunity for an attacker 
to tunnel through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through 
other elements.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting. 
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized 
against an acceptable content specification. 
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser 
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host 
Implementation: Service provider should not use the XMLHttpRequest method 
to create a local proxy for content from other sites, because the client will not 
be able to discern what content comes from which host.
Attack Pattern ID: 18
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: PL, SC, AC, RA, AC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Embedding Scripts within Scripts (6)
Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on 
by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts. The attacker leverages this 
capability to execute scripts to execute his/her own script by embedding it 
within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute. The attacker 
must have the ability to inject script into script that is likely to be executed. If 
this is done, then the attacker can potentially launch a variety of probes and 
attacks against the web server's local environment, in many cases the so-called 
DMZ, back end resources the web server can communicate with, and other 
hosts. 
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting. 
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement 
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other 
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's 
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from. 
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized 
against an acceptable content specification. 
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser 
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host 
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on 
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service 
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on 
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this. 
Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, ensure system 
runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode
Attack Pattern ID 19
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Parent Threat: Probalistic Techniques
Parent Mitigations: AC, IA, PS, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Encryption Brute Forcing(4)
Description
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, 
performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the 
key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
Solutions and Mitigations: 
In theory a brute force attack performing an exhausitve keyspace search will 
always succeed, so the goal is to have computational security. Moore's law 
needs to be taken into account that suggests that computing resources double 
every eighteen months. 
Attack Pattern ID: 20
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication
Parent Mitigations: AC, IA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Exploitation of Session ID‟s and Resource ID‟s and 
other trusted credentials (3)
Description:
Attacks on session IDs and resource IDs take advantage of the fact that some 
software accepts user input without verifying its authenticity.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: utilize strong federated identity such as SAML to encrypt and sign 
identity tokens in transit. 
Implementation: Use industry standards session key generation mechanisms 
that utilize high amount of entropy to generate the session key. Many standard 
web and application servers will perform this task on your behalf. 
Attack Pattern ID: 21
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Exploiting Trust in Client {aka client invisible} (3)
Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in client/server 
communication channel authentication and data integrity.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Ensure that client process and/or message is authenticated so that 
anonymous communications and/or messages are not accepted by the system. 
Attack Pattern ID: 22
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 Parent Threat: Injection 
AC, CA, CM, CP, SI, SC, IR
Attack Pattern Name: File System Function Injection, Content Based (7)
Description
An attack of this type exploits the host's trust in executing remote content 
including binary files. The files are poisoned with a malicious payload 
(targeting the file systems accessible by the target software) by the attacker and 
may be passed through standard channels such as via email, and standard web 
content like PDF and multimedia files. The attacker exploits known 
vulnerabilities or handling routines in the target processes. 
Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege
Validate all input for content including files. Execute programs with 
constrained privileges, so parent process does not open up further 
vulnerabilities. 
Proxy communication to host, so that communications are terminated at the 
proxy, sanitizing the requests before forwarding to server host.
Virus scanning on host
Attack Pattern ID: 23
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: IR, SI, CM
Attack Pattern Name: Filter Failure Through Buffer Overflow (3)
Description
In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized 
transaction.  An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the 
program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) 
and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. lets the user input into the 
system unfiltered).
Solutions and MItigations
Make sure that ANY failure occurring in the filtering or input validation 
routine is properly handled and that offending input is NOT allowed to go 
through. Basically make sure that the vault is closed when failure occurs. 
Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking.
Pre-design through Build: Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as 
StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this 
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.
Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution. 
Design: Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete 
solution.
Attack Pattern ID: 24
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Forced Deadlock (2)
Description
Attackers aware that more data is being fed into a multicast or public 
information distribution means can 'select' information bound only for another 
client, even if the distribution means itself forces users to authenticate in order 
to connect initally. 
Doing so allows the attacker to gain access to possibly privileged information, 
possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by 
impersonation.
If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output 
mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could 
change its identifier from a less privileged to more so privileged channel or 
command.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use known algorithm to avoid deadlock condition (for instance non-blocking 
synchronization algorithms).
For competing actions use well known libraries which implement 
synchronization
Attack Pattern ID: 25
 
 
270 
 
 
Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks
Parent Mitigation: AC,MP,SA,SI,CM
Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging Race Conditions (5)
Description
This attack targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access 
and manipulate the same resource concurrently and the outcome of the 
execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The 
attacker can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the 
resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance a race 
condition can occur while accessing a file, the attacker can trick the system by 
replacing the original file with his version and cause the system to read the 
malicious file.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), 
tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.
Attack Pattern ID: 26
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attack
Parent Mitigation: AC, MP, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links (4)
Description
This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to write to 
sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target file not 
otherwise accessible.
Solutions and Mitigations
1. Use safe libraries when creating temporary files. For instance the standard 
library function mkstemp can be used to safely create temporary files. For shell 
scripts, the system utility mktemp does the same thing.
2.Access to the directories should be restricted as to prevent attackers from 
manipulating the files. Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from 
replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file.
3.Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to files.
4.Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas 
that can be trusted.
Attack Pattern ID: 27
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SA, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Fuzzing (4)
Description
Fuzzing is a software testing method that feeds randomly constructed input to 
the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response to that input 
has occured.  Fuzzing treats the system as a blackbox and is totally free from 
any preconceptions or assumptions about the system.  
Solutions and Mitigations
1. Test to ensure that the software behaves as per specification and that there 
are no unintended side effects. Ensure that no assumptions about the validity of 
data are made.
2. Use fuzz testing during the software QA process to uncover any surprises, 
uncover any assumptions or unexpected behavior.
Attack Pattern ID: 28
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks
Parent Mitigation: AC, AU, CM, MP, RA, SA, SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use 
(TOCTOU) Race Conditions (8)
Description
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) 
for a resource and the time of use of a resource. The typical example is the file 
access. The attacker can leverage a file access race condition by "running the 
race", meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the 
target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. 
During that period of time, the attacker could do something such as replace the 
file and cause an escalation of privilege.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), 
tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.
Attack Pattern ID: 29
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: CM, AC, SA
Attack Pattern Name: Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution (3)
Description
Attackers can sometimes hijack a privileged thread from the underlying system 
through synchronous (calling a privileged function that returns incorrectly) or 
asynchronous (callbacks, signal handlers, and similar) means.
Solutions and Mitigations
1. Application Architects must be careful to design callback, signal, and 
similar asynchronous constructs such that they shed excess privilege prior to 
handing control to user-written (thus untrusted) code.
2. Application Architects must be careful to design privileged code blocks such 
that upon return (successful, failed, or unpredicted) that privilege is shed prior 
to leaving the block/scope.
Attack Pattern ID: 30
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, CA
Attack Pattern Name: Accessing / Intercepting / Modifying HTTP Cookies (3)
Description
This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state 
information and other critical data on client systems.  The first form of this 
attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data 
contained therein. The second form of this attack involves intercepting this 
data as it is transmitted from client to server.  The third form is when the 
cookie‟s content is modified by the attacker before it is sent back to the server. 
Solutions and Mitigations
Use input validation for cookies
Generate and validate MAC for cookies
Use SSL/TLS to protect cookie in transit
Ensure the web server implements all relevant security patches, many 
exploitable buffer overflows are fixed in patches issued for the software.
Attack Pattern ID: 31
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM, AU
Attack Pattern Name: Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query Strings (4)
Description:
A variant of cross-site scripting called "reflected" cross-site scripting, the 
HTTP Query Strings attack consists of passing a malicious script inside an 
otherwise valid HTTP request query string. This is of significant concern for 
sites that rely on dynamic, user-generated content such as bulletin boards, 
news sites, blogs, and web enabled administration GUIs. The malicious script 
may steal session data, browse history, probe files, or otherwise execute 
attacks on the client side. Once the attacker has prepared the malicious HTTP 
query it is sent to a victim user (perhaps by email, IM, or posted on an online 
forum), who clicks on a normal looking link that contains a poison query 
string. This technique can be made more effective through the use of services 
like http://tinyurl.com/, which makes very small URLs that will redirect to 
very large, complex ones. The victim will not know what he is really clicking 
on.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting. 
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement 
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other 
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's 
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from. 
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized 
against an acceptable content specification. 
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including 
remote and user-generated content 
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser 
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host 
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on 
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service 
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies
Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, ensure system 
runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode
Attack Pattern ID: 32
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SA, SI, SC
Attack Pattern Name: HTTP Request Smuggling (3)
Description
HTTP Request Smuggling results from the discrepancies in parsing HTTP 
requests between HTTP entities such as web caching proxies or application 
firewalls. Entities such as web servers, web caching proxies, application 
firewalls or simple proxies often parse HTTP requests in slightly different 
ways. Under specific situations where there are two or more such entities in the 
path of the HTTP request, a specially crafted request is seen by two attacked 
entities as two different sets of requests. This allows certain requests to be 
smuggled through to a second entity without the first one realizing it.
Solutions and Mitigations
HTTP Request Smuggling is usually targeted at web servers. Therefore, in 
such cases, careful analysis of the entities must occur during system design 
prior to deployment. If there are known differences in the way the entities 
parse HTTP requests, the choice of entities needs consideration.
Employing an application firewall can help. However, there are instances of 
the firewalls being susceptible to HTTP Request Smuggling as well.
Attack Pattern ID: 33
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC
Attack Pattern Name: HTTP Response Splitting (2)
Description
This attack uses a maliciously-crafted HTTP request in order to cause a 
vulnerable web server to respond with an HTTP response stream that will be 
interpreted by the client as two separate responses instead of one. This is 
possible when user-controlled input is used unvalidated as part of the response 
headers. The target software, the client, will interpret the injected header as 
being a response to a second request, thereby causing the maliciously-crafted 
contents be displayed and possibly cached.
Solutions and Mitigations
To avoid HTTP Response Splitting, the application must not rely on user-
controllable input to form part of its output response stream. Specifically, 
response splitting occurs due to injection of CR-LF sequences and additional 
headers. All data arriving from the user and being used as part of HTTP 
response headers must be subjected to strict validation that performs simple 
character-based as well as semantic filtering to strip it of malicious character 
sequences and headers.
Attack Pattern ID: 34
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, CA, CP, CM
Attack Pattern Name: Leverage Executable Code in Nonexecutable Files (4)
Description
An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource 
files, when the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or 
configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious 
code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to 
execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are 
increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources 
the possibility of this attack occurring is high.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot 
jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker 
gains some limited access to commands. 
Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and vulnerability scanning 
to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to 
executables. 
Implementation: Implement host integrity monitoring to detect any unwanted 
altering of configuration files. 
Implementation: Ensure that files that are not required to execute, such as 
configuration files, are not over-privileged, i.e. not allowed to execute.
Attack Pattern ID 35
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigation: AC, CA, CM, IA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Using Unpublished Web Service APIs (5)
Description
An attacker searches for and invokes Web Services APIs that the target system 
designers did not intend to be publicly available.  If these APIs fail to 
authenticate requests the attacker may be able to invoke services and/or gain 
privileges they are not authorized for.
Solutions and Mitigations
Authenticating both services and their discovery, and protecting that 
authentication mechanism simply fixes the bulk of this problem. Protecting the 
authentication involves the standard means, including: 1) protecting the 
channel over which authentication occurs, 2) preventing the theft, forgery, or 
prediction of authentication credentials or the resultant tokens, or 3) subversion 
of password reset and the like.
Attack Pattern ID 36
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions (4)
Description
An attacker can resort to stealing data embedded in client distributions or client 
code in order to gain certain information. This information can reveal 
confidential contents, such as account numbers, or can be used as an 
intermediate step in a larger attack (such as by stealing keys/credentials).
Solutions and Mitigations
Never Use Unvalidated Input as Part of a Directive to any Internal Component
Treat the Entire Inherited Process Context as Unvalidated Input
Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
Attack Pattern ID 37
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Parent Threat: Spoofing
Parent Mitigation: AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, RA, SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search 
Paths (8)
Description
This attack loads a malicious resource into a program's standard path used to 
bootstrap and/or provide contextual information for a program like a path 
variable or classpath. J2EE applications and other component based 
applications that are built from mutliple binaries can have very long list of 
dependencies to execute. If one of these libraries and/or references is 
controllable by the attacker then application controls can be circumvented by 
the attacker.
A standard UNIX path looks similar to this
/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
If the attacker modifies the path variable to point to a locale that includes 
malicious resources then the user unwittingly can execute commands on the 
attacker's behalf:
/evildir/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
This is a form of usurping control of the program and the attack can be done on 
the classpath, database resources, or any other resources built from compound 
parts. At runtime detection and blocking of this attack is nearly impossible, 
because the configuration allows execution.
Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege 
Ensure that the program's compound parts, including all system dependencies, 
classpath, path, and so on, are secured to the same or higher level assurance as 
the program
Host integrity monitoring 
Attack Pattern ID: 38
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: AU, IA, SI, CM, SA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens (6) 
Description
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in 
tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If 
client
or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication 
tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even 
opaquely manipulating
that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines 
the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from 
tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
Solutions and Mitigations
One solution to this problem is to protect encrypted data with a CRC of some 
sort. If knowing who last manipulated the data is important, then using a 
cryptographic "message authentication code" (or hMAC) is prescribed. 
However, this guidance is not a panecea. In particular, any value created by 
(and therefore encrypted by) the client, which itself is a "malicous" value, all 
the protective cryptography in the world can't make the value 'correct' again. 
Put simply, if the client has control over the whole process of generating and 
encoding the value--then simply protecting its integrity doesn't help.
Make sure to protect client side authentication tokens for confidentiality 
(encryption) and integrity (signed hash)
Make sure that all session tokens use a good source of randomness
Perform validation on the server side to make sure that client side data tokens 
are consistent with what is expected.  
Attack Pattern ID: 39
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: IA AC
Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices (2)
Description
This attack exploits terminal devices that allow themselves to be written to by 
other users.  The attacker sends command strings to the target terminal device 
hoping that the target user will hit enter and thereby execute the malicious 
command with their privileges. The attacker can send the results (such as 
copying /etc/passwd) to a known directory and collect once the attack has 
succeeded
Solutions and Mitigations
 Design: Ensure that terminals are only writeable by named owner user and/or 
administrator
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Attack Pattern ID: 40
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: AU, IA, SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject 
Malicious Payloads (4)
Description
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email 
headers to inject improper behavior into email programs.
Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In 
addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web 
making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand 
for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like 
browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email 
functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates 
opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email 
header information by default, however the email header contains valuable 
attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the 
email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, 
but can containt scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the 
user's system.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Perform validation on email header data
Implementation: Implement email filtering solutions on mail server or on 
MTA, relay server.
Implementation: Mail servers that perform strict validation may catch these 
attacks, because metacharacters are not allowed in many header variables such 
as dns names  
Attack Pattern ID: 41
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SI, RA, CM, AT
Attack Pattern Name: MIME Conversion (4)
Description
An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a 
buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine.  The MIME 
system is designed to allow various different information formats to be 
interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to 
MIME compatible format and back.
Solutions and Mitigations
Stay up to date with third party vendor patches
Disable the 7 to 8 bit conversion. This can be done by removing the F=9 flag 
from all Mailer specifications in the sendmail.cf file.
Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh) 
Use mail.local
Attack Pattern ID: 42
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI
Attack Pattern Name: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers (1)
Description
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences 
of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic.  This exploit 
relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing 
a “layer” of special characters with each pass.  In this manner, the attacker can 
disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with 
layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent 
processing steps.
Solutions and Mitigations
An iterative approach to input validation may be required to ensure that no 
dangerous characters are present. It may be necessary to implement redundant 
checking across different input validation layers. Ensure that invalid data is 
rejected as soon as possible and do not continue to work with it. 
Make sure to perform input validation on canonicalized data (i.e. data that is 
data in its most standard form). This will help avoid tricky encodings getting 
past the filters. 
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to 
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does 
not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter into the 
system. 
Attack Pattern ID: 43
 
288 
 
 
Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: CA, MA, AC, RA, SC, SI 
Attack Pattern Name: Overflow Binary Resource File (6)
Description
An attack of this type exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the handling 
of binary resources. Binary resources may includes music files like MP3, 
image files like JPEG files, and any other binary file. These attacks may pass 
unnoticed to the client machine through normal usage of files, such as a 
browser loading a seemingly innocent JPEG file. This can allow the attacker 
access to the execution stack and execute arbitrary code in the target process. 
This attack pattern is a variant of standard buffer overflow attacks using an 
unexpected vector (binary files) to wrap its attack and open up a new attack 
vector. The attacker is required to either directly serve the binary content to the 
victim, or place it in a locale like a MP3 sharing application, for the victim to 
download. The attacker then is notified upon the download or otherwise 
locates the vulnerability opened up by the buffer overflow.
Solutions and Mitigations
Perform appropriate bounds checking on all buffers.
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Static code analysis
Implementation: Execute program in less trusted process space environment, 
do not allow lower integrity processes to write to higher integrity processes
Implementation: Keep software patched to ensure that known vulnerabilities 
are not available for attackers to target on host.
Attack Pattern ID: 44
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigations: AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, SI, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links (7)
Description
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer 
overflows. An attacker can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such 
that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software 
processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers 
with insufficient bounds checking.
Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege
Protect files, secure location (of files), encryption
Data sanitization
Abstraction, obfuscation, library checking
Attack Patten ID: 45
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SC,AC,SI,RA
Attack Pattern Name: Overflow Variables and Tags (4)
Description
This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a formatted 
configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The attacker crafts a malicious 
HTML page or configuration file that includes oversized strings, thus causing 
an overflow.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete 
solution.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the 
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds 
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Do not trust input data from user. Validate all user input.
Attack Pattern ID: 46
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: CP, CM, CA, PL, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion (5)
Description
In this attack, the target software is given input that the attacker knows will be 
modified and expanded in size during processing.  This attack relies on the 
target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data may exceed some 
internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.
Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that when parameter expansion happens in the code that the 
assumptions used to determine the resulting size of the parameter are accurate 
and that the new size of the parameter is visible to the whole system
Attack Pattern ID: 47
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigation: SI, CM, SA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a 
URL  (4)
Description
This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources instead 
of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string, but instead 
receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to occur in the 
browser process space with the browser's authority to local files. The attacker 
can send the results of this request to the local files out to a site that they 
control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive authentication data (either 
local or remote), or to gain system profile information to launch further 
attacks.
Solutions and Mitigations
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized 
against an acceptable content specification. 
Implementation: Ensure all configuration files and resource are either removed 
or protected when promoting code into production. 
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting. 
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser 
Attack Pattern ID: 48
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques 
Parent Mitigation: IA, AC, CM, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Password Brute Forcing  (4)
Description
In this attack, the attacker tries every possible value for a password until they 
succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, will always be 
successful because it will essentially go through all possible passwords given 
the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, symbols, 
etc.) and the maximum length of the password.
A system will be particularly vulnerable to this type of an attack if it does not 
have a proper enforcement mechanism in place to ensure that passwords 
selected by users are strong passwords that comply with an adequate password 
policy.
In practice a pure brute force attack on passwords is rarely used, unless the 
password is suspected to be weak.  Other password cracking methods exist that 
are far more effective (e.g. dictionary attacks, rainbow tables, etc.).
Solutions and Mitigations
Implement a password throttling mechanism. This mechanism should take into 
account both the IP address and the log in name of the user. 
Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user created 
passwords comply with it. Alternatively automatically generate strong 
passwords for users. 
Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once in a while a 
new password must be chosen. 
Attack Pattern ID: 49
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: IA, SA
Attack Pattern Name Dictionary-based Password Attack (10)
Description
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover 
their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same 
privileges as the original user.  Generally password recovery schemes tend to 
be weak and insecure.  Most of them use only one security question .  For 
instance, mother's maiden name tends to be a fairly popular 
one.  Unfortunately in many cases this information is not very hard to find, 
especially if the attacker knows the legitimate user.  
These generic security questions are also re-used across many applications, 
thus making them even more insecure.  An attacker could for instance overhear 
a coworker talking to a bank representative at the work place and supplying 
their mother's maiden name for verification purposes.  An attacker can then try 
to log in into one of the victim's accounts, click on "forgot password" and there 
is a good chance that the security question there will be to provide mother's 
maiden name.  
A weak password recovery scheme totally undermines the effectiveness of a 
strong password scheme.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use multiple security questions (e.g. have three and make the user answer two 
of them correctly). Let the user select their own security questions or provide 
them with choices of questions that are not generic. 
E-mail the temporary password to the registered e-mail address of the user 
rather than letting the user reset the password online. 
Ensure that your password recovery functionality is not vulnerable to an 
injection style attack. 
Attack Pattern ID: 50
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigations: AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, SI, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links (7)
Description:
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema 
information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect 
(think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service 
provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata (to effect a 
denial of service), and delete information about service provider interfaces.
WS-Addressing is used to virtualize services, provide return addresses and 
other routing information, however, unless the WS-Addressing headers are 
protected they are vulnerable to rewriting. The attacker that can rewrite WS-
addressing information gains the ability to route service requesters to any 
service providers, and the ability to route service provider response to any 
service. 
Content in a registry is deployed by the service provider. The registry in an 
SOA or Web Services system can be accessed by the service requester via 
UDDI or other protocol. The basic flow for the attacker consists of either 
altering the data at rest in the registry or uploading malicious content by 
spoofing a service provider. The service requester is then redirected to send its 
requests and/or responses to services the attacker controls.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Enforce principle of least privilege 
Harden registry server and file access permissions  
Implement communications to and from the registry using secure protocols 
Attack Pattern ID: 51
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI
Attack Pattern Name: Embedding NULL Bytes (1) 
Description
An attacker embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software.  This 
attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many 
environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop 
processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).
Solutions and Mitigations
Properly handle the NULL characters supplied as part of user input prior to 
doing anything with the data.
Attack Pattern ID: 52
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM
Attack Pattern Name: Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash (3)
Description:
If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may 
not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an attacker to 
embed the NULL midstring while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is 
avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a 
string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of 
NULL in midstring may be used.
Solutions and Mitigations:
Properly handle Null characters. Make sure canonicalization is properly 
applied. Do not pass Null characters to the underlying APIs.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to 
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does 
not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter into the 
system.
Attack Pattern ID: 53
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Probing an Application Through Targeting its Error 
Reporting (2)
Description
An attacker, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized to use 
the application) can probe the application's structure and evaluate its 
robustness by probing its error conditions (not unlike one would during a 'fuzz' 
test, but more purposefully here) in order to support attacks such as blind SQL 
injection, or for the more general task of mapping the application to mount 
another subsequent attack.
Solutions and Mitigations 
Application designers can construct a 'code book' for error messages. When 
using a code book, application error messages aren't generated in string or 
stack trace form, but are cataloged and replaced with a unique (often integer-
based) value 'coding' for the error. Such a technique will require helpdesk and 
hosting personnel to use a 'code book' or similar mapping to decode 
application errors/logs in order to respond to them normally.
Application designers can wrap application functionality (preferably through 
the underlying framework) in an output encoding scheme that obscures or 
cleanses error messages to prevent such attacks. Such a technique is often used 
in conjunction with the above 'code book' suggestion.
Attack Pattern ID: 54
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, IA
Attack Pattern Name: Rainbow Table Password Cracking (3)
Description
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are 
stored.  He then uses a rainbow table of precomputed hash chains to attempt to 
look up the original password.  Once the original password corresponding to 
the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to 
the system.
A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various passwords.  A 
password chain is computed, starting from the original password, P, via a a 
reduce(compression) function R and a hash function H.  A recurrence relation 
exists where Xi+1 =  R(H(Xi)), X0 = P.  Then the hash chain of length n for 
the original password P can be formed:  X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, 
H(Xn).  P and H(Xn) are then stored together in the rainbow table.
Constructing the rainbow tables takes a very long time and is computationally 
expensive.  A separate table needs to be constrcuted for the various hash 
algorithms (e.g. SHA1, MD5, etc.).  However, once a rainbow table is 
computed, it can be very effective in cracking the passwords that have been 
hashed without the use of salt.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use salt when computing password hashes. That is, concatenate the salt 
(random bits) with the original password prior to hashing it.
Attack Pattern ID: 55
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA
Attack Pattern Name: Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' (2)
Description
Attackers can, in some cases, get around logic put in place to 'guard' sensitive 
functionality or data.
The attack may involve gaining access to and calling protected functionality 
(or accessing protected data) directly, may involve subverting some aspect of 
the guard's implementation, or outright removal of the guard, if possible.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly
Use Authorization Mechanisms Correctly
Attack Pattern ID 56
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Parent Threat: Spoofing
SA, SI, AC
Attack Pattern Name: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to 
Register Man in the Middle (3)
Description
This attack utlizes a Rest(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' 
trust in the system resources and environment to place man in the middle once 
SSL is terminated. Rest applications premise is that they leverage existing 
infrastructure to deliver web services functionality.
Solutions and Mitigations
Implementation: Implement message level security such as HMAC in the 
HTTP communication
Design: Utilize defense in depth, do not rely on a single security mechanism 
like SSL
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Attack Pattern ID: 57
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM,  SI
Attack Pattern Name: Restful Privilege Elevation  (3)
Description
Rest uses standard HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permissions methods, but 
these are not necessarily correlated generally with back end programs. Strict 
interpretation of HTTP get methods means that these HTTP Get services 
should not be used to delete information on the server, but there is no access 
control mechanism to back up this logic. This means that unless the services 
are properly ACL'd and the application's service implementation are following 
these guidelines then an HTTP request can easily execute a delete or update on 
the server side.
The attacker identifies a HTTP Get URL such as http://victimsite/updateOrder, 
which calls out to a program to update orders on a database or other resource. 
The URL is not idempotent so the request can be submitted multiple times by 
the attacker, additionally, the attacker may be able to exploit the URL 
published as a Get method that actually performs updates (instead of merely 
retrieving data). This may result in malicious or inadvertant altering of data on 
the server.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege 
Implementation: Ensure that HTTP Get methods only retrieve state and do not 
alter state on the server side 
Implementation: Ensure that HTTP methods have proper ACLs based on what 
the funcitonality they expose
Attack Pattern ID 58
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction (3)
Description
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The 
attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform 
spoofing and session hijacking.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use a strong source of randomness to generate a session ID.
Use adequate length session IDs.
Do not use information available to the user in order to generate session ID 
(e.g., time)…
Encrypt the session ID if you expose it to the user. For instance session ID can 
be stored in a cookie in encrypted format.
Attack Pattern ID: 59
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, PS, SC, IA, SA
Attack Pattern Name: Reusing Session ID‟s (6)
Description
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in 
order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used 
previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. 
Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
Solutions and Mitigations
Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
Protect the communication between the client and server. For instance it is best 
practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the middle attack.
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the session ID will 
be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing session IDs in the URLs. URLs 
can get logged in log files, which are vulnerable to an attacker.
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
Use multifactor authentication.
Attack Pattern ID: 60
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Session Fixation (3)
Description
The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target software 
using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the user successfully 
authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses the (now privileged) 
session identifier in their own transactions
Solutions and Mitigations
Use a strict session management mechanism that only accepts locally 
generated session identifiers of their own choice.
Regenerate and destroy session identifiers when there is a change in the level 
of privilege: 
Use session identifiers that are difficult to guess or brute-force:
Attack Pattern ID: 61
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication
AC, CA, CM, IA, SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding) (6)
Description
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, 
email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on 
the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application.  
If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and 
accepted by the targeted application with the users‟ privilege level.        
        This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in 
user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, 
once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on 
the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated 
using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply 
"riding" the existing session cookie.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use cryptographic tokens to associate a request with a specific action. The 
token can be regenerated at every request so that if a request with an invalid 
token is encountered, it can be reliably discarded. The token is considered 
invalid if it arrived with a request other than the action it was supposed to be 
associated with.
Although less reliable, the use of the optional HTTP Referer header can also be 
used to determine whether an incoming request was actually one that the user 
is authorized for, in the current context.
Additionally, the user can also be prompted to confirm an action every time an 
action concerning potentially sensitive data is invoked. This way, even if the 
attacker manages to get the user to click on a malicious link and request the 
desired action, the user has a chance to recover by denying confirmation. This 
solution is also implicitly tied to using a second factor of authentication before 
performing such actions.
In general, every request must be checked for the appropriate authentication 
token as well as authorization in the current session context.
Attack Pattern ID: 62
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, MP, AC
Attack Pattern Name: Simple Script Injection (5)
Description 
An attacker embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web 
browsers.  The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side 
browser, to execute the script with the users‟ privilege level.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other 
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's 
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized 
against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on 
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service 
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on 
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.
Attack Pattern ID: 63
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM
Attack Pattern Name: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass 
Validation Logic (3)
Description:
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the 
slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple way of 
encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. An URL may 
contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be 
interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character 
followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character 
(%HEX-CODE). 
Solutions and Mitigations
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to 
the software system based on the requirements specifications.
When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using the “GET” 
method to submit data
Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and 
validated as correct data format
Attack Pattern ID: 64
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks
Parent Mitigations: AT, SA, SC, SI, CA, IA, PL
Attack Pattern Name: Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code 
Bound for Authorized Client (7)
Descriptions
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use it, as-is 
or through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information or exploit the 
trust relationship between the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied 
to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to 
communicate with the server.
Solutions and Mitigations
Do not store secrets in client code
All potentially sensitive data, including code, transmitted to the client must be 
encrypted
Attack Pattern ID: 65
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, MP
Attack Pattern Name: SQL Injection (3)
Description
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on 
user input.  An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software 
constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement 
performs actions other than those the application intended.
Solutions and Mitigations
Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and 
filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as 
UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered in addition to characters such 
as a single-quote(') or SQL-comments (--) based on the context in which they 
appear.
Use of parameterized queries or stored procedures - Parameterization causes 
the input to be restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and 
any input outside such domains is considered invalid and the query fails. Note 
that SQL Injection is possible even in the presence of stored procedures if the 
eventual query is constructed dynamically.
Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature 
of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled 
with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing 
information about the database or application.
Attack Pattern ID: 66
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SI, AC
Attack Pattern Name: String Format Overflow in syslog() (2)
Description
This attack targets the format string vulnerabilities in the syslog() function. An 
attacker would typically inject malicious input in the format string parameter 
of the syslog function. This is a common problem, and many public 
vulnerabilities and associated exploits have been posted.
Solutions and Mitigations
The code should be reviewed for misuse of the Syslog function call. Manual or 
automated code review can be used. The reviewer needs to ensure that all 
format string functions are passed a static string which cannot be controlled by 
the user and that the proper number of arguments are always sent to that 
function as well. If at all possible, do not use the %n operator in format strings. 
The following code shows a correct usage of Syslog(): ... syslog(LOG_ERR, 
"%s", cmdBuf); ... The following code shows a vulnerable usage of Syslog(): 
... syslog(LOG_ERR, cmdBuf); // the buffer cmdBuff is taking user supplied 
data. ...
Attack Pattern ID: 67
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
Parent Mitigation: IA  
Attack Pattern Name: Subvert Code-signing Facilities (1)
Description
Because languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and 
to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment, subverting 
this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege. 
Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing 
classifies for this style of attack. This pattern does not include circumstances 
through which a signing key has been stolen.
Solutions and Mitigations
 A given code signing scheme may be fallible due to improper use of 
cryptography
Avoid reliance on flags or environment variables that are user-controllable   
Attack Pattern ID: 68 
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
Parent Mitigation: AC,SI,RA,PS,SC
Attack Pattern Name: Target Programs With Elevated Privileges (5)
Description
This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The attacker 
would try to leverage a bug in the running program and get arbitrary code to 
execute with elevated privileges. For instance an attacker would look for 
programs that write to the system directories or registry keys (such as HKLM, 
which stores a number of critical Windows environment variables).
Solutions and Mitigations
Apply the principle of least privilege.
Validate all untrusted data.
Apply the latest patches.
Scan your services and disable the ones which are not needed and are exposed 
unnecessarily. 
Avoid revealing information about your system (e.g., version of the program) 
to anonymous users. 
Make sure that your program or service fail safely. 
Attack Pattern ID: 69
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: AC,IA
Attack Pattern Name: Try Common (Default) Usernames and Passwords (2)
Description
An attacker may try certain common (default) usernames and passwords to 
gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An attacker may 
try an intelligent brute force using known vendor default credentials as well as 
a dictionary of common usernames and passwords.
Solutions and Mitigations
Delete all default account credentials that may be put in by the product vendor. 
Implement a password throttling mechanism. 
Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user created 
passwords comply with it. 
Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once in a while a 
new password must be chosen. 
Attack Pattern ID: 70
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM
Attack Pattern Name: Using Unicode to Bypass Validation Logic (3)
Description
An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not 
Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying 
mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request.  That may allow the 
attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the 
application to route the request incorrectly.
Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that the system is Unicode aware and can properly process Unicode 
data. Do not make an assumption that data will be in ASCII.
Ensure that filtering or input validation is applied to canonical data
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to 
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does 
not match against white list should not be permitted to enter the system.
Attack Pattern ID: 71
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SA, SI, SC, CA, PL
Attack Pattern Name: URL encoding (8)
Description
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An attacker can take advantage of 
the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. 
An URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in 
order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage 
character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original 
character (%HEX-CODE).  For instance US-ASCII space character would be 
represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-
encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict 
the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests 
it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special 
characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a 
forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL 
can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-
encoding, etc. The attacker could also subvert the meaning of the URL string 
request by encoding the data being sent to the server through a GET request. 
For instance an attacker may subvert the meaning of parameters used in a SQL 
request and sent through the URL string (See Example section).
Solutions and Mitigations
Refer to the RFCS to safely decode URL
Regular expression can be used to match safe URL patterns. May discard valid 
patterns if too restrictive.
Tools available to scan HTTP requests to the server
Security checks should occur after data is decoded and validated for format. 
Bad chars result in validation failure.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list of acceptable input. Test it 
yourself.
Be aware of alternative encoding such as IP encoding
In web-forms, avoid using “Get” and use “Post” when possible
Attack Pattern ID: 72
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, MP, SI
Attack Pattern Name: User-controlled filename (4)
Description
An attack of this type involves an attacker inserting malicious characters (such 
as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by 
the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable 
content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build 
resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. 
In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client 
browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All 
XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these 
vulnerabilities.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use browser technologies that do not allow client side script
Ensure all content delivered to client is sanitized
Validate input for all remote content
Validate output for all remote content
Disable scripts in browser
Scan dynamically generated content
Attack Pattern ID: 73
 
318 
 
 
Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks
Parent Mitigation: CM, CP, IA, MP, SA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating User State (6)
Description
An attacker modifies state information maintained by the target software in 
user-accessible locations.  If successful, the target software will use this tainted 
state information and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within an application. User state 
maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, 
browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a 
shopping cart.
Manipulating user state can be employed by an attacker to elevate privilege, 
conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application 
to derive certain benefits.
Solutions and Mitigations
Do not rely solely on user-controllable locations, such as cookies or URL 
parameters, to maintain user state 
Do not store sensitive information, such as usernames or authentication and 
authorization information, in user-controllable locations. 
At all times sensitive information that is part of the user state must be 
appropriately protected to ensure confidentiality and integrity at each request
Attack Pattern ID: 74
 
 
319 
 
 
Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
AC, CM, CP, CA, SI, AU
Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files (6)
Description
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that influence/control 
the operation of the target software.
Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege
Backup copies of all configuration files
Integrity monitoring for configuration files
Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures.
Load configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a 
separate physical device like a CD
Attack Pattern ID: 75
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Input to File System Calls(4)
Description
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software 
passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps 
modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be 
accessible.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege. 
Design: Ensure all input is validated, and does not contain file system 
commands 
Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot 
jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker 
gains some limited access to commands. 
Design: For interactive user applications, consider if direct file system 
interface is necessary, instead consider having the application proxy 
communication. 
Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and vulnerability scanning 
to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to 
executables. 
Attack Pattern ID: 76
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Threat: CM, SI, SC, AC
Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables (4)
Descriptions
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So 
Forth). An attacker can override environment variables leveraging user-
supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server 
without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the attacker can change 
variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in 
languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow 
the user to override variables.
Solutions and Mitigations
Do not allow override of global variables and do Not Trust Global Variables.
A software system should be reluctant to trust variables that have been 
initialized outside of its trust boundary. Ensure adequate checking is performed 
when relying on input from outside a trust boundary.
Separate the presentation layer and the business logic layer.
Use encapsulation when declaring your variables.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to 
the software system based on the requirements specifications
Attack Pattern ID: 77
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI,  MA, AC, CM, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding (5)
Description
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An attacker 
can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe 
that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, 
the attacker tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which 
leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
Solutions and Mitigations
Verify that the user-supplied data does not use backslash character to escape 
malicious characters.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to 
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does 
not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter into the 
system.
Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding.
Regular expressions can be used to filter out backslash. Make sure you decode 
before filtering and validating the untrusted input data.
In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege when 
determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users to access 
directories/files that they should not access.
Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and 
validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding process, if bad 
character are left after decoding process, treat the data as suspicious, and fail 
the validation process.
Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those 
resources can have alternate names.
Attack Pattern ID: 78
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, AC
Attack Pattern Name: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding (3)
Description
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An attacker would try 
to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes 
characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven 
systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to 
indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For 
murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a 
backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. 
The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to 
understand both forms of the slash. This gives the attacker many opportunities 
to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this 
pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, 
but not the other.
Solutions and Mitigations
Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and 
validated as correct data format. When client input is required from web-based 
forms, avoid using the “GET” method to submit data, as the method causes the 
form data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead, use 
the “POST method whenever possible. There are tools to scan HTTP requests 
to the server for valid URL such as URLScan from Microsoft (http://
www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx) Be aware of the 
threat of alternative method of data encoding and obfuscation technique such 
as IP address endoding. (Do not allow users to access directories/files that they 
should not access.Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines 
all valid input to the application based on the requirements specifications. 
Input that does not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter 
into the system.
Attack Pattern ID: 79
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: SI
Attack Pattern Name: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic (1)
Description
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass 
validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially 
harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective 
at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-
bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character 
encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. 
However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in 
some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to 
use the ``shortest possible'' encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings 
that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly 
subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs 
security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, 
but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters. 
Solutions and Mitigations
The Unicode Consortium recognized multiple representations to be a problem 
and has revised the Unicode Standard to make multiple representations of the 
same code point with UTF-8 illegal. The UTF-8 Corrigendum lists the newly 
restricted UTF-8 range (See references). The exact response required from an 
UTF-8 decoder on invalid input is not uniformly defined by the standards. In 
general, there are several ways a UTF-8 decoder might behave in the event of 
an invalid byte sequence:
Attack Pattern ID: 80
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, AU, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Web Logs Tampering (3)
Discription
Protection services in security are vulnerable so they are backstopped by 
detection in the so-called protect-detect-respond model. A key element in 
detection is log files, to identify a threat impact, for audit purposes, or simply 
responding to a crash. While penetrating a system requires a set of skills, more 
advanced attackers will cover their tracks by manipulating log files to either 
erase entries or input false entries to throw the system administrators off their 
trail. Since most requests to web servers are logged (at least header request 
response data) the attacker literally has the ability to generate log data in every 
request. Of course this is not the same as always being able to delete otherwise 
tamper with log data.
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or 
otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs.
Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, 
reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack 
pattern.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use input validation before writing to web log 
Design: Validate all log data before it is output 
Attack Pattern ID: 81
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion
Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP
Attack Pattern Name: XML Denial of Service (XDoS) (6)
Description:
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that utilizes 
XML data. This is, of course, most distributed systems technology including 
Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most closely associated with web 
services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post 
malicious XML payloads to the service provider designed to exhaust the 
service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. The main weakness in 
XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate 
the XML messages to determine routing, workflow, security considerations, 
and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines that 
XDoS targets. There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive payload and sends 
to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses DOM to parse 
XML. DOM creates in memory representation of XML document, but when 
document is very large (for example, north of 1 Gb) service provider host may 
exhaust memory trying to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous small files that clog 
the system.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate communications 
between service requester and service provider The SPI should be designed to 
throttle up and down and handle a variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage network transports 
to provide availability such as HTTP load balancers
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: XPath Injection (2)
Description
An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of XPath 
expressions to inject the XML database and bypass authentication or glean 
information that he normally would not be able to. XPath Injection enables an 
attacker to talk directly to the XML database, thus bypassing the application 
completely. XPath Injection results form the failure of an application to 
properly sanitize input used as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to 
query an XML database. In order to successfully inject XML and retrieve 
information from a database, an attacker:
Solutions and Mitigations
Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and 
filtered for illegal characters as well as content that can be interpreted in the 
context of an XPath expression. Characters such as a single-quote(') or 
operators such as or (|), and (&) and such should be filtered if the application 
does not expect them in the context in which they appear. If such content 
cannot be filtered, it must at least be properly escaped to avoid them being 
interpreted as part of XPath expressions.
Use of parameterized XPath queries - Parameterization causes the input to be 
restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside 
such domains is considered invalid and the query fails.
Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature 
of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled 
with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing 
information about the database or application.
Attack Pattern ID: 83
 
328 
 
 
Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: SI, SA, AC
Attack Pattern Name: XQuery Injection (3)
Description
This attack utilizes XQuery to probe and attack server systems; in a similar 
manner that SQL Injection allows an attacker to exploit SQL calls to RDBMS, 
XQuery Injection uses improperly validated data that is passed to XQuery 
commands to traverse and execute commands that the XQuery routines have 
access to. XQuery injection can be used to enumerate elements on the victim's 
environment, inject commands to the local host, or execute queries to remote 
files and data sources.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Perform input white list validation on all XML input
Implementation: Run xml parsing and query infrastructure with minimal 
privileges so that an attacker is limited in their ability to probe other system 
resources from xql. 
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Parent Mitigation: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: AC, SC, SI, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Client Network Footprinting (using Ajax/XSS) (4)
Description
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation 
to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it 
does optimize them from an attacker point of view. In many XSS attacks the 
attacker must get a "hole in one" and successfully exploit the vulnerability on 
the victim side the first time, once the client is redirected the attacker has many 
chances to engage in follow on probes, but their is only one first chance. In a 
widely used web application this is not a major problem because 1 in a 1,000 is 
good enough in a widely used application.
A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the environment to 
understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, 
the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are 
typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, 
well known ports, network locations and so on.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser 
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on 
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service 
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on 
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: AC, SC, SI, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Embedding Script (XSS) in HTTP headers (4)
Description
An attack of this type exploits web applications that generate web content, 
such as links in a HTML page, based on unvalidated or improperly validated 
data submitted by other actors.  XSS in HTTP Headers attacks target the HTTP 
headers which are hidden from most users and may not be validated by web 
applications. As with all XSS attacks, there are a number of possible targets:
1. Launch attack on web browser clients and client machine
2. Launch attacks on client machines environment, such as LAN or Intranet
3. Launch attack on web server, including remote web servers
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement 
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other 
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's 
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from. 
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized 
against an acceptable content specification. 
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. 
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser 
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host 
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on 
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service 
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on 
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Forceful Browsing (3)
Description
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website that are 
otherwise unreachable through direct URL entry.
Solutions and Mitigations
Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or resource 
must ensure that the request it is handling has been made in an authorized 
context.
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by not hard-
coding names of application pages or resources. This way, the attacker cannot 
figure out, from the application alone, the resources available from the present 
context.
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM 
Attack Pattern Name: OS Command Injection (3)
Description
An attacker can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate 
privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying 
operating system.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use language APIs rather than relying on passing data to the operating system 
shell or command line. Doing so ensures that the available protection 
mechanisms in the language are intact and applicable.
Filter all incoming data to escape or remove characters or strings that can be 
potentially misinterpreted as operating system or shell commands
All application processes should be run with the minimal privileges required. 
Also, processes must shed privileges as soon as they no longer require them.
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Parent Threat: Spoofing and Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, CA, IA, SC, CM, CP, RA, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Pharming (8)
Description
Pharming attacks occur when victims provide sensitive information to websites 
that do not possess a valid certificate from well-known certificate authorities.
Solutions and Mitigations
All sensitive information must be handled over a secure connection. Known 
vulnerabilities in DNS or router software or in operating systems must be 
patched as soon as a fix has been released and tested.  End users must ensure 
that they provide sensitive information only to websites that they trust, over a 
secure connection with a valid certificate issued by a well-known certificate 
authority.
Attack Pattern ID: 89
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege or Trust
Parent Mitigation: IA, SI, AC, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol (4)
Description
A single sign-on solution for a network uses a fixed preshared key with its 
clients to initiate the signon process in order to avoid eavesdropping on the 
initial exchanges.
Solutions and Mitigations 
The server must initiate the handshake by issuing the challenge. This ensures 
that the client has to respond before the exchange can move any further
The use of HMAC to hash the response from the server can also be used to 
thwart reflection. The server responds by returning its own challenge as well as 
hashing the client's challenge, its own challenge and the preshared secret. 
Requiring the client to respond with the HMAC of the two challenges ensures 
that only the possessor of a valid preshared secret can successfully hash in the 
two values.
Introducing a random nonce with each new connection ensures that the 
attacker can not employ two connections to attack the authentication protocol.
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: SI
Attack Pattern Name: XSS in IMG Tags (1)
Description
Image tags are an often overlooked, but convenient, means for a Cross Site 
Scripting attack. The attacker can inject script contents into an image (IMG) 
tag in order to steal information from a victim's browser and execute malicious 
scripts.
Solutions and Mitigations
In addition to the traditional input fields, all other user controllable inputs, such 
as image tags within messages or the likes, must also be subjected to input 
validation. Such validation should ensure that content that can be potentially 
interpreted as script by the browser is appropriately filtered.All output 
displayed to clients must be properly escaped. Escaping ensures that the 
browser interprets special scripting characters literally and not as script to be 
executed.
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: CA, RA, SC, SI
Attack Pattern Name: Forced Integer Overflow (4)
Description
This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is 
often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The 
attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out 
of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum 
possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, 
therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected 
behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.
Solutions and Mitigations: 
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to 
user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover 
vulnerabilities such as integer overflow.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete 
solution.
Always do bound checking before consuming user input data.
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC, AU, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Log Injection-Tampering-Forging (5)
Description
This attack targets the log files of the target host. The attacker injects, 
manipulates or forges malicious log entries in the log file, allowing him to 
mislead a log audit, cover traces of attack, or perform other malicious actions. 
The target host is not properly controlling log access. As a result tainted data is 
resulting in the log files leading to a failure in accoutability, non-repudiation 
and incident forensics capability.
Solutions and Mitigations
Carefully control access to physical log files.
Do not allow tainted data to be written in the log file without prior input 
validation. Whitelisting may be used to properly validate the data.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to identify log forging vulnerabilities.
Avoid viewing logs with tools that may interpret control characters in the file, 
such as command-line shells.
Attack Pattern ID: 93
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Parent Threat: Spoofing
Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
Attack Pattern Name: Man in the Middle (3)
Description
This type of attack targets the communication between two components 
(typically client and server). The attacker places himself in the communication 
channel between the two components. Whenever one component attempts to 
communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the 
data first goes to the attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, 
and it is then passed on to the other component as if it was never intercepted. 
This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components 
unaware of the potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The 
potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in 
communication or identify between two components.
Solutions and Mitigations
Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both ends of any 
communications channel.
Exchange public keys using a secure channel
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality
Parent Mitigation: SI
Attack Pattern Name: WSDL Scanning (1)
Description:
This attack targets the WSDL interface made available by a web service. The 
attacker may scan the WSDL interface to reveal sensitive information about 
invocation patterns, underlying technology implementations and associated 
vulnerabilities. This type of probing is carried out to perform more serious 
attacks (e.g. parameter tampering, malicious content injection, command 
injection, etc.). WSDL files provide detailed information about the services 
ports and bindings available to consumers. For instance, the attacker can 
submit special characters or malicious content to the Web service and can 
cause a denial of service condition or illegal access to database records. In 
addition, the attacker may try to guess other private methods by using the 
information provided in the WSDL files.
Solutions and Mitigations
It is important to protect WSDL file or provide limited access to it.Review the 
functions exposed by the WSDL interface (specially if you have used a tool to 
generate it). Make sure that none of them is vulnerable to injection.
Ensure the WSDL does not expose functions and APIs that were not intended 
to be exposed.
Pay attention to the function naming convention (within the WSDL interface). 
Easy to guess function name may be an entry point for attack.
Validate the received messages against the WSDL Schema. Incomplete 
solution
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation
CM, SA, SC, SI, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Block Access to Libraries (5)
Description
An application typically makes calls to functions that are a part of libraries 
external to the application.  These libraries may be part of the operating system 
or they may be third party libraries.  It is possible that the application does not 
handle situations properly where access to these libraries has been 
blocked.  Depending on the error handling within the application, blocked 
access to libraries may leave the system in an insecure state that could be 
leveraged by an attacker. 
Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that application handles situations where access to APIs in external 
libraries is not available securely. If the application cannot continue its 
execution safely it should fail in a consistent and secure fashion.
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques
Parent Mitigation: CM, SA, SC, SI, RA
Attack Pattern Name: Cryptanalysis (2)
Description
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms 
and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the 
secret key (instance deduction).  Sometimes the weakness is not in the 
cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes 
cryptanalysis successful.  An attacker may have other goals as well, such as:   
1.  Total Break - Finding the secret key
2.  Gobal Deduction - Finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for 
encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key.
    3.  Information Deduction - Gaining some information about plaintexts or 
ciphertexts that was not previously known
    4.  Distinguishing Algorithm - The attacker has the ability to distinguish the 
output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits
The goal of the attacker performing cryptanalysis will depend on the specific 
needs of the attacker in a given attack context.  In most cases, if cryptanalysis 
is successful at all, an attacker will not be able to go past being able to deduce 
some information about the plaintext (goal 3).  However, that may be sufficient 
for an attacker, depending on the context.
Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that application handles situations where access to APIs in external 
libraries is not available securely. If the application cannot continue its 
execution safely it should fail in a consistent and secure fashion.
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Parent Threat: Spoofing
Parent Mitigation: AT, SA, SI, PL
Attack Pattern Name: Phishing
Description
Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker masquerades as a 
legitimate entity with which the victim might do business in order to prompt 
the user to reveal some confidential information (very frequently 
authentication credentials) that can later be used by an attacker.  Phishing is 
essentially a form of information gathering or "fishing" for information.
Solutions and Mitigations
Do not follow any links that you receive within your e-mails and certainly do 
not input any login credentials on the page that they take you too. Instead, call 
your Bank, Paypal, Ebay, etc., and inquire about the problem. A safe practice 
would also be to type the URL of your bank in the browser directly and only 
then log in. Also, never reply to any e-mails that ask you to provide sensitive 
information of any kind.
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion
Parent Mitigation: IR, SA, SI
Attack Pattern Name: XML Parser Attack (3)
Description
Applications often need to transform data in and out of the XML format by 
using an XML parser.  It may be possible for an attacker to inject data that may 
have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it is being processed.  These 
adverse effects may include the parser crashing, consuming too much of a 
resource, executing too slowly, executing code supplied by an attacker, 
allowing usage of unintenteded system functionality, etc.   An attacker's goal is 
to leverage parser failure to his or her advantage.  In some cases it may be 
possible to jump from the data plane to the control plane via bad data being 
passed to an XML parser [1].
Solutions and Mitigation
Carefully validate and sanitize all user-controllable data prior to passing it to 
the XML parser routine. Ensure that the resultant data is safe to pass to the 
XML parser. 
Perform validation on canonical data. 
Pick a robust implementation of an XML parser. 
Validate XML against a valid schema or DTD prior to parsing
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks
Parent Mitigation: SI,SC
Attack Pattern Name: Overflow Buffers (2) 
Description
Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer 
operations, typically triggered by input injected by an attacker. As a 
consequence, an attacker is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer 
regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of 
execution as per the attacker's choice.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.
If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do boundary 
checking.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the 
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds 
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Utilize static source code analysis tools to identify potential buffer overflow 
weaknesses in the software.
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Parent Threat: Injection
Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, AC
Attack Pattern Name: Server Side Includes (4)
Description
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web 
application that then gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the 
attacker to achieve similar results to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code 
execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the 
SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting 
language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive 
files, such as password files, and execute shell commands.
Solutions and Mitigations
Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf file or local 
.htaccess (Apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories that do not need 
them
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before use in the 
application. This includes omitting, or encoding, certain characters or strings 
that have the potential of being interpreted as part of an SSI directive
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong business reason 
to do so. Every additional component enabled on the web server increases the 
attack surface as well as administrative overhead
Attack Pattern ID: 101
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PMP Summary Table 
 
 
PM PMP 
AC 81.220 
AT 9.19 
AU 14.28 
CA 20.30 
CM 43.130 
CP 8.17 
IA 31.72 
MA 9.13 
PE 2.2 
PL 7.11 
RA 21.42 
SA 20.67 
SC 55.160 
SI 74.235 
 
 
 
